Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
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Could it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). Given some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue (against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations should matter to the law. To solve the puzzle about the role of statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance of epistemology to this practical question.
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The lottery counter-example is arguably due to features of statistical evidence and less-than-full belief that are not usually relevant for the justification of moral beliefs.
“On the other hand, this putative counter-example to the internalization principle is arguably due to features of statistical evidence and less-than-full belief that, we think, are not usually relevant for the justification of moral beliefs”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Littlejohn 2020
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- Two referees for this journal gave extensive comments on previous drafts and I would like to thank both of them for their feedback and advice. I would like to thank Katie Steele for introducing me to the puzzles discussed in this paper and Julien Dutant whose work on knowledge and rational choice was the inspiration for the solution defended here. Discussions with these two along with philosophers on Academia.edu audiences at Birkbeck University, King's College London, University of Leuven, the University of Edinburgh, Maria Alvarez, Bill Brewer, Peter Dennis, Christina Dietz, Branden Fitelson, Ellen Fridland, Dan Greco, John Hawthorne, Chris Kelp, Arnon Keren, Aidan McGlynn, Eliot Michaelson, David Owens, David Papineau, Richard Price, Mona Simion, Martin Smith, Matt Soteriou, Florian Steinberger, Steve Sverdlik, and Tim Williamson have been tremendously helpful. Enoch, David, Fisher, Talia, and Spectre, Levi. 2012. Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity and the Legal Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40: 197-224.
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- Authors
- Littlejohn, C.
- Affiliations
- King's College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Littlejohn, Clayton
- ORCID
- Littlejohn, Clayton
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2017-11-08
- Volume
- 197
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 5253-5286
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2768087180
- Cited by
- 95
- References
- 75
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 7
- FWCI
- 39.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Research Portal (King's College London) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- King’s College London
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal processes and jurisprudence
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Law and Evidence
- Keywords
- statistical evidence, standard of proof, criminal conviction, epistemic value, decision making under risk, expected value, epistemic justification, reliabilism, epistemology of law, truth and knowledge
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