Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces

If that demanding epistemic principle is correct, it is hard to see how our beliefs in any domain can escape skepticism.

“The problem is that it is hard to see how our beliefs in any domain can escape skepticism if this idea is correct”

• cites Kelly 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Korman and Locke 2020 sourceSupported
• cites Pryor 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The lottery counter-example is arguably due to features of statistical evidence and less-than-full belief that are not usually relevant for the justification of moral beliefs.

“On the other hand, this putative counter-example to the internalization principle is arguably due to features of statistical evidence and less-than-full belief that, we think, are not usually relevant for the justification of moral beliefs”

• cites Littlejohn 2020 sourceSupported

Formulations of safety that focus on both ways in which one can fail to be correct have the intuitive result that the subject lacks knowledge in the coin-flip case.

“Formulations of safety that focus on both ways in which one can fail to be correct have the intuitive result that the subject lacks knowledge in that case as well”

If a non-skeptic is granted the existence of moral facts and the truth of some first-order moral beliefs, she can invoke those beliefs to argue that there is a relation between Darwinian factors and moral truths.

“Hence, if a non-skeptic is granted not only the existence of moral facts but also the truth of some of her first-order moral beliefs, then she can invoke those beliefs to argue that there is a relation.”

Darwin, Ruse and Wilson's observations do not amount to full-fledged arguments for moral skepticism, even when combined with the idea that knowledge requires adherence.

“However, although the observations by Darwin, Ruse and Wilson are congenial with our version of the debunking challenge, they do not amount to full-fledged arguments for moral skepticism, even when they are combined with the idea that knowledge requires adherence.”

Debunkers do not seem to have the upper hand in the debate about responding to skeptical challenges by relying on beliefs whose epistemic status is at issue.

“And although things can be said on each side, debunkers do not seem to have the upper hand.”

Whether Darwinian factors and moral truths are unrelated is ultimately a first-order moral question.

“The reason is that whether those factors and the moral truths are unrelated is ultimately a firstorder moral question.”

Given that moral assumption, a non-skeptic can deny that it would be a sheer coincidence if our moral beliefs were to correspond to the facts.

“So, given the moral assumption in question, a non-skeptic can deny that it would be a sheer coincidence if our moral beliefs were to correspond to the facts.”

Our version avoids the over-generalization worries that arise if one insists that third-factor accounts are illegitimately circular.

“Hence, it also avoids the over-generalization 1 3 worries that arise if one insists that third-factor accounts are illegitimately circular.”

By relying on the premise that Darwinian factors are unrelated to truth, debunkers leave room for a powerful response.

“By relying on the premise that the Darwinian factors that have caused our moral beliefs are unrelated to their truth, however, debunkers leave room for a powerful response.”

By denying opponents the right to invoke the truth of their moral beliefs, debunkers risk committing themselves to forms of skepticism that go far beyond morality.

“The reason is that by denying their opponents the right to invoke the truth of their moral beliefs, the debunkers run the risk of committing themselves to forms of skepticism that go far beyond morality.”

The adherence requirement is entailed by recent formulations of the safety requirement.

“The less-discussed adherence requirement has fared better, however, as is shown by the fact that it is entailed by recent formulations of the safety requirement.”

It is hard to vindicate the reliability of our beliefs in any domain without invoking the truth of some of them.

“After all, it is hard to see how one can vindicate the reliability of our beliefs in any domain without invoking the truth of some of them.”

The conclusion of our version of the challenge is that there is no moral knowledge, even granted the truth of some of our moral beliefs.

“The conclusion of our version of the challenge, by contrast, is that there is no moral knowledge (even granted the truth of some of our moral beliefs).”

Our general skills clearly have some impact on our moral beliefs.

“Our general skills clearly have some impact on our moral beliefs-for example, we use our reasoning skills to revise our moral beliefs upon finding that they are inconsistent.”

The survival value associated with our disposition to form moral beliefs is to a great extent independent of which specific contents it ultimately results in.

“As we have stressed, the survival value associated with our disposition to form moral beliefs is to a great extent independent of which specific contents it ultimately results in.”

Disagreements with people who are less well equipped in reasoning skills, lack of bias, access to relevant non-moral evidence, and so on, do little to show that our moral beliefs are not adherent.

“The fact that our moral beliefs are opposed by people who are less well equipped than ourselves in terms of reasoning skills, the lack of bias, access to relevant non-moral evidence, and so on, does little to show that our moral beliefs are not adherent.”

Evolutionary considerations suggest that we lack domain-specific skills which could ensure the adherence of our moral beliefs.

“Evolutionary considerations suggest that we lack domain-specific skills which could ensure the adherence of our moral beliefs.”

Our general skills ensure the adherence of moral beliefs only if those beliefs are not contested by people whose general skills are at least as good as ours.

“The above reasoning shows that our general skills ensure the adherence of moral beliefs only if those beliefs are not contested by people whose general skills are at least as good as ours.”

A third reason for flexibility is the value of the capability of adapting to new social circumstances.

“A third reason has to do with the value of the capability of adapting to new social circumstances.”

Darwinian processes have worked against the emergence of domain-specific moral skills of the type that would provide adherence.

“If our remarks here are on the right track, they suggest that the Darwinian processes have worked against the emergence of domain-specific moral skills of the type that would provide adherence.”

By ruling out third-factor responses as question-begging, debunkers risk committing themselves also to perceptual skepticism.

“By ruling out third-factor responses on the ground that they are question-begging, debunkers accordingly risk committing themselves also to perceptual skepticism.”

The existence of certain types of moral disagreement illustrates that our general skills do not secure the adherence of our moral beliefs.

“However, what the existence of certain types of moral disagreement illustrate is that those skills nevertheless do not secure the adherence of our moral beliefs.”

What Darwinian considerations suggest is that we do not have domain-specific skills of the relevant type.

“What the Darwinian considerations suggest is that we do not have domain-specific skills of the relevant type.”

Our version of the debunking challenge avoids this dilemma because it is out of reach of third-factor responses.

“However, our version of the debunking challenge avoids this dilemma as it is out of reach of third-factor responses.”

In the argument from adherence, the relevance of disagreement is due to the adherence requirement.

“In our argument, the relevance of disagreement is due to the adherence requirement.”

Many incompatible sets of beliefs can play the role responsible for the selection of the disposition to form moral beliefs.

“Many incompatible sets of beliefs can play the role responsible for the selection of the disposition.”

If two people disagree about p even though their epistemic positions in relation to p are equally good, then neither party has an adherent belief about p, no matter whether p is true.

“For plausibly, if two people disagree about p even though their epistemic positions in relation to p are equally good, then neither party has an adherent belief about p, no matter whether p is true.”

Our argument is not vulnerable to third-factor objections.

“The points just made show that our argument is not vulnerable to third-factor objections.”

Whether an argument from moral disagreement is vulnerable to the moral agreement objection depends on why the disagreement is supposed to generate skeptical implications.

“However, whether an argument from moral disagreement is vulnerable to this objection depends on why the disagreement is supposed to generate skeptical implications.”

Having domain-specific moral skills would in many cases not have benefited our ancestors.

“Having such skills would, in many cases, simply not have benefited our ancestors.”

The response to over-generalization is only partial, as it only undermines one possible argument that debunkers are committed to skeptical theses beyond ethics.

“However, they only amount to a partial response to the over-generalization concern, as they only undermine one possible argument to the effect that debunkers are committed to skeptical theses that go beyond ethics.”

Due to relativization to belief-forming methods, worlds where we evolved like hive-bees or termites are irrelevant to whether our actual beliefs constitute knowledge.

“Thus, due to clause (ii) in the safety requirement above, those worlds are irrelevant to whether our actual beliefs constitute knowledge.”

If it can be shown that we have neither domain-specific skills nor general skills that secure the adherence of moral beliefs, it follows that those beliefs violate the adherence requirement and therefore do not constitute knowledge.

“Now, if it can be shown that we have neither domain-specific skills nor general skills that secure the adherence of moral beliefs, it follows (given that the distinction is exhaustive) that those beliefs violate the adherence requirement and therefore do not constitute knowledge.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The distinction between domain-specific and general cognitive skills is exhaustive.

In a peer disagreement, neither party's belief satisfies the adherence requirement.

“Therefore, in a peer disagreement, neither party's belief satisfies the adherence requirement”

Darwinian processes have only partially shaped the contents of our moral beliefs.

“Our argument against the existence of sufficiently robust domain-specific skills in the moral domain focuses on the commonly accepted fact that Darwinian processes have only partially shaped the contents of our moral beliefs.”

• cites Joyce 2016Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The same risk of skepticism extends to most or all other domains of inquiry.

“And the same can be said, it seems, for most or all other domains of inquiry.”

Peer disagreement is a symptom of the more fundamental fact that conflicting beliefs are not adherent.

“Peer disagreement is simply a symptom of the more fundamental fact that the conflicting beliefs are not adherent.”

Another reason why Darwinian processes have promoted flexibility in our moral sensibilities is that the extent to which a set of moral beliefs enhance fitness depends on the circumstances in which the subject lives.

“Another reason why the Darwinian processes have promoted flexibility in our moral sensibilities is that the extent to which a set of moral beliefs enhance fitness depends on the circumstances in which the subject lives”

The dispositions we have inherited define broad, vague limits within which our moral commitments may fall.

“The dispositions we have inherited define certain broad, vague limits within which our moral commitments may fall.”

Within those limits, other factors determine what moral views we more specifically embrace.

“Within the limits, however, other factors determine what moral views we, more specifically, embrace.”

Even if euthanasia is impermissible or polyandry defensible, those truths do not undermine the argument that general cognitive skills fail to ensure the adherence of moral beliefs.

“Similarly, even if it is true that euthanasia is impermissible or that polyandry is defensible, those truths do not undermine our argument for thinking that our general cognitive skills also fail to ensure the adherence of moral beliefs.”

One reason for leeway is that the enhanced fitness of having moral beliefs is to some extent independent of their specific contents.

“One reason for that”

The second possibility-that the adherence of our moral beliefs is ensured by our general cognitive skills-is ruled out by the existence of moral disagreement between persons whose general cognitive skills are equally good.

“Moreover, the second possibility-that the adherence of our moral beliefs is ensured by our general cognitive skills-is ruled out by the existence of moral disagreement between persons whose general cognitive skills are equally good.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Our moral beliefs are very often contested by people whose general cognitive skills are at least as good as ours.

Such skills would prevent the leeway and flexibility in our moral beliefs which are important preconditions for the survival value of having them.

“The reason is that such skills would prevent the leeway and flexibility in our moral beliefs which are important preconditions for the survival value of having them.”

There is no need for an advocate of the argument from adherence to counter third-factor responses with principles that invite global skepticism.

“Hence, there is no need for an advocate of the argument from adherence to counter third factor-responses with principles that invite global skepticism.”

A case can be made that moral beliefs and epistemic beliefs differ with respect to adherence due to possible differences in their evolutionary backgrounds.

“But, while this issue requires more attention than we can give it here, we think a case can be made for thinking that moral beliefs and epistemic beliefs differ with respect to their adherence due to possible differences in their evolutionary backgrounds.”

The complaint that third-factor responses beg the question relies on the demanding epistemic principle that we may rely on beliefs in an area only if we can explain their reliability without assuming the truth of some of them.

“The problem with this complaint is that it seems to rely on a very demanding epistemic principle, namely the idea that we are permitted to rely on our beliefs in an area only if we can explain their reliability without assuming the truth of some of them.”

There are cases in which the adherence of the subject's belief that p is ensured by factors that have nothing to do with her epistemic position in relation to p.

“The reason is that there are cases in which the adherence of the subject's belief that p is ensured by factors that have nothing to do with her epistemic position in relation to p.”

The combination of evolutionary debunking and argument from moral disagreement presents a challenge more formidable than when they are considered separately.

“The combination of those strategies presents, we think, a challenge that is more formidable than when they are considered separately.”

Acceptance of moral rules in a community might enhance fitness by disposing its members not to free-ride or harm their offspring.

“The acceptance of moral rules in a community might enhance fitness by disposing its members not to free-ride or harm their offspring.”

If an area includes claims used as premises in the skeptical argument, there are worries about self-defeat.

“Of course, if the area in question includes claims that are used as premises in the skeptical argument, then there are worries about selfdefeat”

• cites Cuneo 2007 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Kyriacou 2016 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

An account of the reliability of perceptual beliefs based on how our sense organs work and have evolved begs the question against perceptual skeptics in the same way third-factor accounts beg the question against moral skeptics.

“However, that account begs the question against perceptual skeptics in exactly the same way as that in which third-factor accounts begs the question against moral skeptics.”

If we have skills enabling adherent belief that pain is bad, it is unclear why those capacities do not enable adherent beliefs about many other moral issues with widespread disagreement.

“If we have skills that enable us to adherently believe that pain is bad, it is unclear why those capacities do not enable us to have adherent beliefs about the many other moral issues about which there is instead widespread disagreement.”

In the argument from adherence, the evolutionary perspective is not so easily replaced.

“In the argument from adherence, by contrast, the evolutionary perspective is not so easily replaced.”

There is no automatic way to extend the argument from adherence so that it entails skepticism about other domains.

“There is therefore no automatic way to extend the argument from adherence so that it entails skepticism about those domains as well.”

Not only moral anti-realists and skeptics but also non-skeptical moral realists have often taken the challenges posed by moral disagreement very seriously.

“It is worth noting that not only moral anti-realists and skeptics but also non-skeptical moral realists have often taken the challenges posed by moral disagreement very seriously”

• cites Smith 1994Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Parfit 2011 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Explanations of moral agreement appealing to cognitive skills are less plausible than the alternative offered by the evolutionary perspective.

“And the problem is that such explanations are less plausible than the alternative one which is offered by the evolutionary perspective our argument invokes.”

There are situations where features not part of the subject's epistemic position, such as wishful thinking, ensure no nearby worlds in which she has a different belief.

“As we noted in Sect.4, there are situations in which features that are not a part of the subject's epistemic position, such as wishful thinking, ensure that there are no nearby worlds in which she has a different belief.”

To turn the defensive use of Harman's claim into an offensive argument for lack of moral knowledge or justified moral beliefs, the skeptic needs further problematic assumptions, such as that other types of justification do not count.

“But to turn that defensive argument into a more offensive one (for the conclusion that we lack moral knowledge or justified moral beliefs), the skeptic needs to make further problematic assumptions, such as that other types of justification somehow do not count.”

Our argument fares better relative to the objection from moral agreement.

“This is why our argument fares better also relative to the objection from moral agreement.”

A skeptic relying on Harman's claim risks committing to ideas that generalize too broadly by leading to skepticism in other areas dealing with causally inert facts, such as logic or mathematics.

“And then she once again risks committing herself to ideas that generalize too broadly by leading to skepticism also in other areas that deal with facts that seem to be causally inert, such as logic or mathematics.”

The cognitive-skills explanation of moral agreement leaves it mysterious why disagreement is widespread about other moral questions.

“By contrast, the explanation of moral agreement which appeals to our cognitive skills leaves it mysterious why disagreement is so widespread about other moral questions.”

The adherence requirement accommodates the idea that neither party to a peer disagreement has knowledge even if each party has the same beliefs in all nearby worlds.

“Thus, the adherence requirement accommodates the idea that neither party to a peer disagreement has knowledge even if each party has the same beliefs in all nearby worlds.”

The argument from adherence allows us to argue more offensively for the view that there is no moral knowledge, via the idea that the evolutionary perspective suggests moral beliefs violate the adherence requirement.

“That allows us to argue more offensively for the view that there is no moral knowledge, via the idea that the evolutionary perspective suggests that moral beliefs violate the adherence requirement.”

If the rules we would have accepted had we evolved like hive-bees or termites differ too radically from current moral rules, it might be that we would not even count as having moral beliefs in such circumstances.

“Thus, if the rules we would have accepted if we had evolved like hive-bees or termites differ too radically from the moral rules we currently accept, it might be that we would not even count as having moral beliefs in such circumstances.”

The existence of moral agreement spells trouble for the argument from adherence only if we have reason to think the agreement obtains because our cognitive skills ensured it.

“This means that the existence of moral agreement spells trouble for the argument from adherence only if we have reason to think that the agreement obtains because our cognitive skills have ensured that it does.”

When that holds, there is no nearby world in which the subject has the belief of the peer with whom she disagrees.

“When that holds, there will also be no nearby world in which the subject has the belief of the peer with whom she disagrees.”

Appealing to a principle like internalization is a promising way to argue from skepticism about moral knowledge to skepticism about moral justification.

“We only wish to note that appealing to a principle along the lines just indicated is a promising way to argue from skepticism about moral knowledge to skepticism about moral justification.”

It is consistent with internalism to hold that when a subject learns her belief violates the adherence requirement, that information undermines its justification.

“For instance, it is consistent with internalism to hold that when a subject learns that her belief violates the adherence requirement, then that information undermines its justification.”

The internalization principle faces potential problems.

“That said, the internalization principle also faces potential problems.”

What the evolutionary perspective says about moral beliefs differs from what it says about the origins of beliefs in other domains.

“Moreover, what the evolutionary perspective says about moral beliefs differs from what it says about the origins of beliefs in other domains.”

The evolutionary account is more plausible because it explains both disagreement about certain moral issues and consensus about others.

“What makes the evolutionary account more plausible is that it helps to explain both why there is disagreement about certain moral issues and why there is a tendency towards consensus about others.”

Combining the debunking strategy with the argument from disagreement, as the argument from adherence does, avoids some of the most influential objections to both strategies.

“Last but not least, when the debunking strategy is combined with the argument from disagreement, in the way that the argument from adherence does, we are able to avoid some of the most influential objections to both those strategies.”

Whether we have cognitive skills that secure the adherence of our mathematical beliefs is left open by the argument, even granted that best explanations of those beliefs do not imply their truth.

“For example, whether we have cognitive skills that secure the adherence of our mathematical beliefs is a question our argument leaves open, even granted that the best explanations of those beliefs do not imply their truth.”