CoChat

Decolonizing AI Ethics: Relational Autonomy as a Means to Counter AI Harms

Open access
Mhlambi, Sábëlo, Tiribelli, Simona · 2023 · Topoi
Cited by 82

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Many popular artificial intelligence (AI) ethics frameworks center the principle of autonomy as necessary in order to mitigate the harms that might result from the use of AI within society. These harms often disproportionately affect the most marginalized within society. In this paper, we argue that the principle of autonomy, as currently formalized in AI ethics, is itself flawed, as it expresses only a mainstream mainly liberal notion of autonomy as rational self-determination, derived from Western traditional philosophy. In particular, we claim that the adherence to such principle, as currently formalized, does not only fail to address many ways in which people’s autonomy can be violated, but also to grasp a broader range of AI-empowered harms profoundly tied to the legacy of colonization, and which particularly affect the already marginalized and most vulnerable on a global scale. To counter such a phenomenon, we advocate for the need of a relational turn in AI ethics, starting from a relational rethinking of the AI ethics principle of autonomy that we propose by drawing on theories on relational autonomy developed both in moral philosophy and Ubuntu ethics.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11245-022-09874-2

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 27 references

Research works printed but not linked: 81

  1. Anderson J, Honneth A (2005) Autonomy, vulnerability, recognition, and justice. In: Christman J, Anderson A (eds) Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: new essays. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 127–149 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Asante ML, Abarry AS (1996) African intellectual heritage: a book of sources. Temple University Press, Philadelphia
  3. Bell D (1993) Communitarianism and its critics. Clarendon, Oxford
  4. Benjamin R (2019) Race after technology: abolitionist tools for the new Jim code. Polity, Cambridge
  5. Benson P (1990) Feminist second thoughts about free agency. Hypatia 5(3):47–64 · DOI
  6. Benson P (2005) Feminist intuitions and the normative substance of autonomy. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 124–142 · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614194.006
  7. Browne S (2015) Dark matters: on the surveillance of blackness. Duke University Press, Durham · DOI · Paper page
  8. Calvo RA, Peters D, Vold K, Ryan RM (2020) Supporting human autonomy in ai systems: a framework for ethical enquiry. In: Burr C, Floridi L (eds) Ethics of digital well-being: philosophical studies series. Springer, Cham, p 140
  9. Christman J, Anderson J (2005) Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: new essays. Cambridge University Press, New York · DOI · Paper page
  10. Daniels N (1974) On liberty and inequality in Rawls. Soc Theory Pract 3(2):149–159 · doi:10.5840/soctheorpract1974322
  11. Dignum V (2022) Relational artificial intelligence. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2202.07446 · DOI
  12. Dworkin G (1988) The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York · DOI · Paper page
  13. Dworkin R (2000) Sovereign virtue: the theory and practice of equality. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
  14. Ekstrom L (1993) A coherence theory of autonomy. Philos Phenomenol Res 53:599–616. https://doi.org/10.2307/2108082 · DOI · Paper page
  15. Eze EC (1997) The color of reason: the idea of “Race” in Kant’s anthropology. In: Eze EC (ed) Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical reader. Blackwell Publishers, Hoboken
  16. Floridi L (2011) The informational nature of personal identity. Minds Machines 21:549–566. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-011-9259-6 · DOI · Paper page
  17. Frankfurt H (1989) Freedom of the will and the concept of the person. In: Christman J (ed) The inner citadel: essays on individual autonomy. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 63–76
  18. Giovanola B, Sala R (2021) The reasons of the unreasonable: is political liberalism still an option? Philos Soc Crit. https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537211040568 · DOI
  19. Giovanola B, Tiribelli S (2022a) Weapons of Moral construction? On the value of fairness in algorithmic decision-making. Ethics Inform Technol. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-022-09622-5 · DOI
  20. Grovier T (1993) Self-trust, autonomy and self-esteem. Hypatia 8(1):99–119. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1993.tb00630.x · DOI · Paper page
  21. Gutman A (1985) Communitarian critics of liberalism. Philos Public Aff 14(3):308–322
  22. Helberger, N (2016) Profiling and targeting consumers in the internet of things—a new challenge for consumer law. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2728717 · DOI
  23. IEEE (2017) The IEEE global initiative on ethics of autonomous and intelligent systems. IEEE Standards Association. https://standards.ieee.org/industry-connections/ec/autonomous-systems.html
  24. IEEE (2019) Global initiative on ethics of autonomous and intelligent systems. Ethically aligned design: a vision for prioritizing human well-being with autonomous and intelligent systems, 1st ed. (EAD1e). https://standards.ieee.org/wp-content/uploads/import/documents/other/ead1e.pdf
  25. Jaggar A (1983) Feminist politics and human nature. Rowman and Allanheld, New Jersey
  26. Jaworska A (2009) Caring, minimal autonomy, and the limits of liberalism. In: Lindemann H, Verkerk M, Walker M (eds) Naturalized bioethics: toward responsible knowing and practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
  27. Jonjepier F, Klenk M (2022) The philosophy of online manipulation. Routledge, London · DOI
  28. Kahneman D (2011) Thinking fast and slow. Straus & Giroux, New York
  29. Killmister S (2017) Taking the measure of autonomy: a four-dimensional theory of self-governance. Routledge, New York · DOI
  30. Korsgaard CM (1996) The sources of normativity. Cambridge University Press, New York · DOI · Paper page
  31. Korsgaard CM (2014) The normative constitution of agency. In: Vargas M, Yaffe G (eds) Rational and social agency: the philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 190–214 · DOI
  32. Kunene M (1981) Anthem of the decades: a Zulu epic. Heinemann, London
  33. Kunene M (1982) The ancestors & the sacred mountain: poems. Heinemann, London
  34. Kymlicka W (1989) Liberalism, community and culture. Clarendon, Oxford
  35. Lee JS, Hord FL (2016) I am because we are: readings in Africana philosophy. University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst
  36. MacIntyre (1988) Whose justice? Which rationality? University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
  37. Mackenzie C (2014) Three dimensions of autonomy: a relational analysis. In: Veltman A, Piper M (eds) Autonomy, oppression, and gender. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 15–41 · DOI · Paper page
  38. Mackenzie C (2015) Responding to the agency dilemma: autonomy, adaptive preferences, and internalized oppression. In: Oshana M (ed) Personal autonomy and social oppression. Routledge, New York, pp 48–67
  39. Mackenzie C, Stoljar N (2000a) Relational autonomy: feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self. Oxford University Press, New York · DOI · Paper page
  40. Mackenzie C, Stoljar N (2000b) Introduction: autonomy refigured. In: MacKenzie C, Stoljar N (eds) Relational autonomy: feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 3–31 · DOI · Paper page
  41. Mandela N (1994) Long walk to freedom: the autobiography of Nelson Mandela, 1st edn. Times Warner book, London
  42. Mbembe A (2019) Necropolis. Duke University Press, Durham · DOI · Paper page
  43. Mcdowell C, Chinchilla MY (2016) Partnering with communities and institutions. In: Gordon E, Mihailidis M (eds) Civic media: technology, design, practice. MIT Press, pp 461–480 · DOI
  44. McLeod C, Sherwin S (2000) Relational autonomy, self-trust, and health care for patients who are oppressed. In: MacKenzie C, Stoljar N (eds) Relational autonomy: feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self. Oxford University Press, pp 259–279 · DOI · Paper page
  45. Menkiti IA (1984) Person and community in African traditional thought. In: Wright R (ed) African philosophy: an introduction. University Press of America, Lanham, pp 171–182
  46. Michael B (2005) Planning agency, autonomous agency. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York
  47. Mignolo WD, Escobar A (2010) Globalization and the decolonial option. Routledge, London
  48. Molema L (1917) The Bantu past and present, an ethnographical & historical study of the native races of South Africa (2012[1917]). Forgotten Books, London
  49. Ndlovu-Gatsheni SJ (2019) Provisional notes on decolonizing research methodology and undoing its dirty history. J Dev Soc 35(4):481–492. https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X19880417 · DOI
  50. Ngubane J (1979) Conflict of minds. Books in Focus, New York
  51. Nkrumah (1966) Neo-colonialism: the last stage of imperialism. International Publishers, New York
  52. Noble, (2018) Algorithms of oppression: how search engines reinforce racism. New York University Press, New York · DOI · Paper page
  53. Nyathi (2001) Traditional ceremonies of Amandebele. Mambo Press, Gweru
  54. O’Neil C (2016) Weapons of math destruction: how big data increases inequality and threatens democracy. Crown, New York
  55. Oshana M (1998) Personal autonomy and society. J Soc Philos 29(1):81–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00098 · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00098
  56. Oshana M (2006) Personal autonomy in society. Ashgate, Hampshire
  57. Pariser E (2011) The filter bubble. Penguin, London
  58. Pittman RC (1960) Equality versus liberty: the eternal conflict. Am Bar Assoc J 46(8):873–880
  59. Prunkl C (2022) Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence. Nat Mach Intell 4:99–101. https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9 · DOI
  60. Ramose BM (1999) African philosophy through Ubuntu. Mond Books Harare, Zimbabwe
  61. Raz J (1986) The morality of freedom. Clarendon Press, Oxford
  62. Rettovà A (2016) African philosophy as a radical critique. J Afr Cult Stud 28(2):127–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/13696815.2016.1159123 · doi:10.1080/13696815.2016.1159123
  63. Ricaurte P (2019) Data epistemologies, the coloniality of power, and resistance. Television New Media 20(4):350–365. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476419831640 · DOI · Paper page
  64. Roessler B (2021) Autonomy: an essay on the life well-lived. John Wiley, New Jersey
  65. Samkange S, Tommie M (1980) Hunhuism or ubuntuism: a Zimbabwe indigenous political philosophy. Graham Pub, Salisbury
  66. Sandel M (1982) Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
  67. Smith EHJ (2019) A history of the dark side of reason. Princeton University Press, Princeton
  68. Sunstein C (2008) Democracy and the internet. In: van den Hoven J, Weckert J (eds) Information technology and moral philosophy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 93–110 · DOI
  69. Susser D, Roessler B, Nissenbaum H (2019). Technology, autonomy, and manipulation. Internet Policy Review, 8 (2). https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1410 · DOI · Paper page
  70. Taylor C (1979) Hegel and the modern society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge · DOI · Paper page
  71. Taylor JS (2009) Practical autonomy and bioethics. Routledge, London
  72. Tene O, Polonetsky J (2013) Big data for all: privacy and user control in the age of analytics. Nw. J. Tech. Intell. Prop 11:239
  73. Thaler R, Sunstein C (2009) Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. Penguin, London
  74. Thomas P (2017) Self-determination: the ethics of action. Oxford University Press, Oxford
  75. Tiribelli S (2020) Predeterminazione algoritmica e libertà di scelta. In: Alici L, Miano F (eds) Etica nel Futuro. Orthotes, Napoli, pp 431–441
  76. Tiribelli S (2023) Moral freedom in the age of artificial intelligence. Mimesis International, Milan, London
  77. Tutu D (1999) No future without forgiveness. Doubleday, New York · DOI · Paper page
  78. Veltman A, Piper M (2014) Autonomy, oppression, and gender. Oxford University Press, Oxford · DOI
  79. Wachter S (2020) Affinity profiling and discrimination by association in online behavioural advertising. Berkeley Technol Law J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3388639 · DOI · Paper page
  80. Westlund A (2009) Rethinking relational autonomy. Hypatia 24:26–49. https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phu025 · DOI
  81. Zuboff S (2019) The age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future and the new frontier of power. Public Affairs, New York

Cited by

See all 82

Metadata

Authors
Mhlambi, S., & Tiribelli, S.
Venue
Topoi
Published
2023-02-08
Volume
42
Issue
3
Pages
867-880
ISSN
  • 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8749
OpenAlex
W4319601691
Cited by
82
References
27
FWCI
19.78
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid
Licence

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Decolonizing AI Ethics: Relational Autonomy as a Means to Counter AI Harms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11245-022-09874-2
The paper
Mhlambi, S., & Tiribelli, S. (2023). Decolonizing AI Ethics: Relational Autonomy as a Means to Counter AI Harms. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09874-2

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.