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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet; 21 of the 64 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure

Open access
Mollema, Warmhold Jan Thomas·2025·AI and Ethics

Verified 2026-10-12 · 1 reference not checked yet

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper proposes a general taxonomy of epistemic injustice and extends it to AI, adding algorithmic variants such as generative hermeneutical ignorance, access, manipulative and amplified testimonial injustice. It then argues for a novel, speculative subclass—generative hermeneutical erasure—where LLMs’ Western “view from nowhere” erodes non-Western epistemic particulars, especially through epistemic colonization.

Key findings

  • The paper provides a general taxonomy of epistemic injustice with “eleven initial elements,” starting from Fricker’s testimonial and hermeneutical injustice and integrating participatory injustice, contributory injustice, epistemic labor invalidation, epistemic domination, epistemic exploitation, zetetic injustice, testimonial spurning, and hermeneutical death.
  • It extends the taxonomy to AI and covers four forms of epistemic injustice arising in interaction with generative AI: generative hermeneutical ignorance, generative hermeneutical access, generative manipulative testimonial injustice, and generative amplified testimonial injustice.
  • It proposes generative hermeneutical erasure as an extreme subclass of generative hermeneutical ignorance, reversing the schema of epistemic silence: instead of gaining a concept, one moves from having an epistemic particular to its absence through conceptual disruption imposed by LLMs.
  • It cites evidence that ImageNet is 60% Western source images (US: 45%) and only 2.2% from China and India, and that GPT “inherits a WEIRD psychology” and most resembles a cluster including the USA, Canada, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Great Britain, Australia, Andorra, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical taxonomy construction, relying on scholars from philosophy of technology, political philosophy, and social epistemology, including Fricker, Báez-Vizcaíno, Pohlhaus, Medina, Miragoli, and Kay et al.
  • The taxonomy follows three rules: adequate description, hierarchical tree-introduction, and mono-inheritance; it is then extended to the AI domain and used to formulate generative hermeneutical erasure via Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and decolonial approaches.
  • No empirical data collection or sample is reported; the analysis is literature-based conceptual synthesis, with an illustrative mapping to the MIT AI Risk Repository.

Limitations

  • The paper states the taxonomy is not complete, is “minimally viable,” open-ended, and based only on readily available conceptual resources; generative hermeneutical erasure is described as speculative with contours “yet to be further elucidated.”
  • The paper states that the mono-inheritance rule rules out overlaps and hybrid cases, though it cannot rule out that a phenomenon in the AI domain may deserve “manifold labeling.”
  • Evident from the text: the proposed taxonomy and generative hermeneutical erasure are not empirically validated or tested through case studies; support comes from secondary literature and illustrative examples.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s43681-025-00801-w

Cites

67 of 69 references verified1 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

19 Valid · 6 Not valid · 35 Not checked · 74 Own results and interpretations

37 more claims · 3 with their cited sources checked

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 75
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 30
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

4 of 4

Citations

Cites

Show all 54 references

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. de Sousa Santos, B.: Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. Routledge (2014). https://unescochair-cbrsr.org/pdf/resource/Epistemologies_of_the_South.pdf
  2. Mbembe, A.: The earthly community: reflections on the last utopia. Trans. Corcoran, S. V2_ Lab for the Unstable Media (2022)
  3. Mills, C.: The Racial Contract. Cornell University Press (1997)
  4. Pasquinelli, M.: Three thousand years of algorithmic rituals: the emergence of AI from the computation of space. E-Flux J. 101 (n.d.). https://www.e-flux.com/journal/101/273221/three-thousand-years-of-algorithmic-rituals-the-emergence-of-ai-from-the-computation-of-space/
  5. Wittgenstein, L.: On Certainty (Anscombe, G. E. M. & von Wright, G. H. (eds.). Trans. Paul, D.). Blackwell. (1975)
  6. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations (Trans. Anscombe, G. E. M., Hacker, P. M. S. & Schulte, J.). Wiley-Blackwell. (2009)
  7. Mollema, W.J.T.: Social AI and the equation of wittgenstein’s Language user with calvino’s literature machine. Int. Rev. Literary Stud. 6(1), 39–55 (2024c). https://irlsjournal.com/index.php/Irls/article/view/54

Metadata

Authors
Mollema, W. J. T.
Corresponding author
Mollema, Warmhold Jan Thomas
Venue
AI and Ethics
Published
2025-07-30
Volume
5
Issue
5
Pages
5535-5555
ISSN
  • 2730-5953 (ISSN-L)
  • 2730-5961
OpenAlex
W4412750889
Cited by
24
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 5
FWCI
24.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • AI and Ethics (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
epistemic injustice, generative AI, machine learning, epistemic opacity, algorithmic discrimination, global AI governance, conversational AI agents, epistemicide, non-Western epistemologies, collective sensemaking

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s43681-025-00801-w
The paper
Mollema, W. J. T. (2025). A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure. AI and Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-025-00801-w

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.