The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deciphering malware’s use of TLS (without decryption)
Open accessAbstract
The use of TLS by malware poses new challenges to network threat detection because traditional pattern-matching techniques can no longer be applied to its messages. However, TLS also introduces a complex set of observable data features that allow many inferences to be made about both the client and the server. We show that these features can be used to detect and understand malware communication, while at the same time preserving the privacy of the benign uses of encryption. These data features also allow for accurate malware family attribution of network communication, even when restricted to a single, encrypted flow. To demonstrate this, we performed a detailed study of how TLS is used by malware and enterprise applications. We provide a general analysis on millions of TLS encrypted flows, and a targeted study on 18 malware families composed of thousands of unique malware samples and tens-of-thousands of malicious TLS flows. Importantly, we identify and accommodate for the bias introduced by the use of a malware sandbox. We show that the performance of a malware classifier is correlated with a malware family’s use of TLS, i.e., malware families that actively evolve their use of cryptography are more difficult to classify. We conclude that malware’s usage of TLS is distinct in an enterprise setting, and that these differences can be effectively used in rules and machine learning classifiers.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Ensemble methods in machine learning
Dietterich, T. G. (2000) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45014-9_1 · Cited by 8,408
A survey of techniques for internet traffic classification using machine learning
Nguyen, T. T. T., & Armitage, G. (2008) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2008.080406 · Cited by 1,664 · cited 1×
“: The sequence of packet lengths and packet inter-arrival times (SPLT) has been well studied [25], [39].”
BackgroundWebsite Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Panchenko, A., Lanze, F., Zinnen, A., Henze, M., Pennekamp, J., Wehrle, K., & Engel, T. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23477 · Cited by 645 · cited 1×
“In [27], the authors derive features based on the packet sizes to perform website fingerprinting attacks against encrypted traffic.”
BackgroundAutomated traffic classification and application identification using machine learning
Zander, S., Nguyen, T., & Armitage, G. (2005) · The IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks 30th Anniversary (LCN'05)l · doi:10.1109/lcn.2005.35 · Cited by 517
Cited by
FS-Net: A Flow Sequence Network For Encrypted Traffic Classification
Liu, C., He, L., Xiong, G., Cao, Z., & Li, Z. (2019) · IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications · doi:10.1109/infocom.2019.8737507 · Cited by 630
FlowPrint: Semi-Supervised Mobile-App Fingerprinting on Encrypted Network Traffic
van Ede, T., Bortolameotti, R., Continella, A., Ren, J., Dubois, D. J., Lindorfer, M., Choffnes, D., van Steen, M., & Peter, A. (2020) · Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2020.24412 · Cited by 339
Anderson, B., & McGrew, D. (2017) · Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining · doi:10.1145/3097983.3098163 · Cited by 295
Self-citationIdentifying Encrypted Malware Traffic with Contextual Flow Data
Anderson, B., & McGrew, D. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security · doi:10.1145/2996758.2996768 · Cited by 261
Self-citationLin, K., Xu, X., & Gao, H. (2021) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2021.107974 · Cited by 226
Metadata
- Authors
- Anderson, B., Paul, S., & McGrew, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques
- Published
- 2017-08-31
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 195-211
- ISSN
- 1772-9890 (ISSN-L)
- 2263-8733
- OpenAlex
- W2470356888
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 15.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Deciphering malware’s use of TLS (without decryption). https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11416-017-0306-6
- The paper
- Anderson, B., Paul, S., & McGrew, D. (2018). Deciphering malware’s use of TLS (without decryption). Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-017-0306-6
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.