Luck and Agent-Causation: A Response to Franklin
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Contrastive reasoning forms the basis of abductive inference.
“In addition, contrastive reasoning forms the basis of abductive inference [19], i.e., the process of inferring certain facts that render some observation plausible [20].”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [19]
Cites
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874 · see citing works
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Clarke, R. (2003) · doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 · Cited by 477 · see citing works
Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will
Ciocchi, D. M., & Evangelical Philosophical Society (2001) · Philosophia Christi · doi:10.5840/pc20013121 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
Levy, N. L. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.001.0001 · Cited by 345 · see citing works
Self-citationHard luck: how luck undermines free will and moral responsibility
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.50-1391 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
O'Connor, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019515374x.001.0001 · Cited by 130 · see citing works
Coffman, E. J. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9046-8 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Tognazzini, N. A. (2012) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.714390 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
AGENT CAUSATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LUCK
Clarke, R. (2005) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00234.x · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Introduction to the Special Edition
Kyriakakis, J. (2010) · Criminal Law and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11572-010-9099-0 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck
Franklin, C. E. (2015) · Criminal Law and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11572-013-9274-1 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
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Stepin, I., Alonso, J. M., Catala, A., & Pereira-Farina, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3051315 · Cited by 376 · see citing works
“Thus, contrastive explanation is applied to agent’s decision-making (i.e., why the agent makes a choice refraining from an alternative choice) [82], [101].”
BackgroundLibertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection
Moore, D. (2021) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00370-2 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
- Authors
- Levy, N.
- Affiliations
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Levy, Neil
- ORCID
- Levy, Neil
- Venue
- Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Published
- 2014-03-26
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 779-784
- ISSN
- 1871-9791 (ISSN-L)
- 1871-9805
- OpenAlex
- W2044956790
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 11
- Citations by year
- 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Criminal Law and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- agent causation, libertarian free will, moral responsibility, contrastive explanations, free will
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