Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. I specifically conceptualise how such artifacts (a) scaffold and extend moral reasoning and decision-making processes, (b) have a certain moral status which is contingent on their cognitive status, and (c) whether responsibility can be attributed to distributed systems. This paper is primarily written for those interested in the intersection of cognitive and moral theory as it relates to artifacts, but also for those independently interested in philosophical debates in extended and distributed cognition and ethics of (cognitive) technology.
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“Moreover, even supporters of EXT admit that it is not easy to define the tipping point from a highly embedded cognitive system to an extended one (Farina & Lavazza, 2022, pp. 7-8;Heersmink, 2017, p. 434).”
From ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact (2024) · cites this paper as Heersmink, 2017
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Cites
Hutchins, E. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1881.001.0001 · Cited by 10,801 · cited 4×
“Anthropologist Ed Hutchins (1995), philosopher Andy Clark (1997, 2008), and various others (Rowlands 1999; Kirsh 2006; Sutton 2006, 2010; Menary 2007; Wheeler 2010) developed a view on human cognition, arguing that cognitive states and processes are, in some cases, distributed across humans and…”
BackgroundInfluentialClark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 1×
“The paradigm examples in the extended and distributed cognition literature concern cognitive processes such as navigating (Hutchins 1995), mental imagery (Clark and Chalmers 1998), remembering (Rowlands 1999; Michaelian and Sutton 2013), and calculating (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
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Hollan, J., Hutchins, E., & Kirsh, D. (2000) · ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction · doi:10.1145/353485.353487 · Cited by 2,300 · cited 1×
“On this view, ‘‘a cognitive process is delimited by the functional relationships among the elements that participate in it, rather than by the spatial colocation of the elements’’ (Hollan et al. 2000, p. 176).”
BackgroundSupersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension
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Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Clark, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 · Cited by 2,201
On the Morality of Artificial Agents
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1023/b:mind.0000035461.63578.9d · Cited by 1,218 · cited 2×
“Floridi (2013; Floridi and Sanders 2004) uses the phrase ‘‘distributed morality’’ to refer ‘‘only to cases of moral actions that are the result of otherwise morally-neutral or morally-negligible interactions among agents constituting a multiagent system, which might be human, artificial, or…”
BackgroundMoralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things
Verbeek, P.-P. (2011) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226852904.001.0001 · Cited by 923
The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition
Wilson, R. A., & Clark, A. (2008) · Cited by 759
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Talking to Bots: Symbiotic Agency and the Case of Tay
Neff, G. (2016) · International journal of communication · Cited by 557
Recommendations for Responsible Development and Application of Neurotechnologies
Goering, S., Klein, E., Specker Sullivan, L., Wexler, A., Agüera y Arcas, B., Bi, G., Carmena, J. M., Fins, J. J., Friesen, P., Gallant, J., et al. (2021) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-021-09468-6 · Cited by 228
A Virtue Epistemology of the Internet: Search Engines, Intellectual Virtues and Education
Heersmink, R. (2018) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2017.1383530 · Cited by 122
Self-citationIs Having Your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault? The Ethics of Extended Cognition
CARTER, J. A., & PALERMOS, S. O. (2016) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2016.28 · Cited by 89
Pensar la (teoría de la) educación, desde la tecnología de nuestro tiempo
del Dujo, Á. G., Vlieghe, J., Muñoz-Rodríguez, J. M., & Lucas, J. M. (2021) · Teoría de la Educación Revista Interuniversitaria · doi:10.14201/teri.25432 · Cited by 63
Metadata
- Authors
- Heersmink, R.
- Affiliations
- Macquarie University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Heersmink, Richard
- ORCID
- Heersmink, Richard
- Venue
- Science and Engineering Ethics
- Published
- 2016-07-05
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 431-448
- ISSN
- 1353-3452 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-5546
- OpenAlex
- W2471430239
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 58
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 2.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science and Engineering Ethics (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- distributed cognition, cognitive artifacts, moral agency, moral responsibility, extended cognition, moral reasoning, ethics of technology
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Decision Making, Humans, Morals, Ethical Theory
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.