The DOI matches its Crossref record; 113 of the 113 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 73 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact
Open accessAbstract
According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of extended cognition (EXT) (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). He argues that EXT enables us to consider tools as constitutive parts of the students’ cognitive system, thus preserving their cognitive character from technologically induced cognitive diminishment. The first aim of this paper is to show that this solution is not sufficient to solve the TET. Second, I aim to offer a complementary and more encompassing framework of tool-use to address the TET. Then, I apply it to the educational uses of ChatGPT as the most notable example of LLM, although my arguments can be extended to other generative AI systems. To do so, in Sect. 1.1, I present Pritchard’s framework of cognitive character and virtue epistemology applied in education, to which I am committed in this treatment. In Sects. 2 and 3, I respectively illustrate Pritchard’s (2014) solution to the TET, and I highlight the general limitations of his proposal. Thus, in Sect. 4.1 I characterize ChatGPT as a computational cognitive artifact using Fasoli’s (Fasoli, 2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. In Sect. 4.2, I introduce my proposal, which combines Pritchard’s account of virtue epistemology with Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts to address the TET. Finally, in Sect. 5.1, I present some epistemically virtuous uses of ChatGPT in educational contexts. To conclude, I argue in favor of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing educational activities involving AI technologies such as ChatGPT.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that Pritchard's proposed solution to the "technology-education tension" (TET)—combining virtue epistemology with the theory of extended cognition (EXT)—is only partial, and proposes instead a "contextual virtue epistemology" that combines Pritchard's virtue framework with Fasoli's taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. It applies this framework to ChatGPT, characterized as an intrinsically multifunctional computational cognitive artifact that can substitute, complement, or constitute students' cognitive processes.
Key findings
- Pritchard's EXT-based solution to the TET is affected by at least four problems: (1) the conditions for EXT are unclear; (2) even if clarified, they may not be recognizable in practice; (3) they may not apply to every form of tool-use or every TET case; and (4) tool-uses may have different effects on different components of the cognitive character, so "EXT does not per se solve the TET." A fifth problem (affective, motivational, existential effects) is noted in a footnote.
- The proposed framework distinguishes three relationships between cognitive artifacts and cognitive processes—constitutive, complementary, and substitutive—defined via the "degree of cognitive agency" the agent exerts, and extends these to extended systems (Constitutive-EXT, Complementary-EXT, Substitutive-EXT).
- The paper introduces "cognitive trade-offs": the equilibria and dynamics of enhancement and diminishment of different components of the cognitive character, considering both biological and technological resources in embedded and extended systems (e.g., extending ability X at the cost of diminishing ability Y or virtue Z).
- ChatGPT is characterized as a cognitive artifact whose major threat is substituting human cognitive abilities across many tasks; the paper sketches epistemically virtuous educational uses (e.g., comparing/ranking ChatGPT outputs, the "zero trust framework," process-oriented writing assessment) drawing on Arango-Muñoz's criteria of coherence, consensus, intelligibility, and relevance.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis: the paper is a theoretical treatment, not an empirical study. It commits to Pritchard's (2013, 2014, 2016) account of cognitive character and virtue responsibilism, then critiques Pritchard's EXT-based solution and develops an alternative.
- The proposed framework combines Pritchard's virtue epistemology with Fasoli's (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts, applied to ChatGPT (implementing GPT-3.5) as the most notable LLM example, with arguments stated to generalize to other generative AI systems.
- Illustrative examples are drawn from the existing literature (e.g., Mollick & Mollick 2022; Dan et al. 2023; Heersmink & Knight 2018) rather than from new data; the paper calls for empirical analyses to test whether such exercises develop capacities contributing to human flourishing.
Limitations
- Stated: the framework presented "is limited to representational cognitive artifacts," leaving out non-representational artifacts (Malafouris 2013); the author cannot offer a comprehensive normative evaluation of the different components of the cognitive character, since it is context-dependent and must be addressed in a multidisciplinary way; the analysis of distributed cognition and socially distributed epistemology in education is said to go beyond the scope of the work; and further research is needed on educational group dynamics involving AI tools.
- Evident from the text: there is no empirical data or sample—the educational applications are proposals and illustrations, and the author explicitly notes that "we need empirical analyses" to show such exercises are useful; the paper also leaves open for EXT theorists the question of whether substitutive extended cognitive systems are genuine instances of EXT.
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Claims the paper makes
6 Valid · 2 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 41 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In addition, there is no shared agreement in defining a necessary and or sufficient mark of what cognition is (Facchin, 2023;Varga, 2017), thus making it difficult to establish whether an external component may respect such a mark (Adams and Aizawa 2008).”
§ ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact > 3 The limitations of Pritchard's solution
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Facchin, 2023 source
The Abstract (p. 1) defines a mark of the cognitive as individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and argues that such a mark cannot be provided at present. It also describes tensions in the literature and fragmentation across cognitive-science research traditions, supporting the paraphrase that there is no shared agreement on such a mark. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Not matchedcites Varga, 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Adams and Aizawa 2008
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Despite there being no universally shared definition of 'cognitive task' (Fasoli, 2017), and despite ChatGPT not being a cognitive system per se, it can still be considered a cognitive artifact since its function is to contribute to the solving of human cognitive tasks (Norman, 1991;Heersmink, 2013;Casati 2017;Fasoli, 2018).”
§ ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact > 4.1 ChatGPT as a Cognitive artifact
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Norman, 1991
- Supportedcites Heersmink, 2013 source
Section 3.1 defines a cognitive artifact by its function of helping users perform a cognitive task. That is the criterion the citing sentence applies to ChatGPT. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Fasoli, 2018 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“First, it has been convincingly argued that the theories of extended (EXT) and embedded (EMB) cognition are explanatorily, empirically, and predictively indistinguishable since they both posit extracranial mechanisms, even though EMB does not attribute a cognitive status to the external components (Barker, 2010;Sprevak, 2010).”
§ ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact > 3 The limitations of Pritchard's solution
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Barker, 2010 source
Barker argues in the Introduction (p. 3) that TEX and TEM cannot be distinguished empirically or by theoretical virtues. In §4 (pp. 20–21), he says competing explanations score equally on testable predictions and that the same predictions and discoveries are available to both. Section 2 (p. 6) explains that both posit processes with extrabrain parts but disagree about whether those parts are cognitive. (LLM, conf=0.93)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Sprevak, 2010 source
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
In the paper
“To conclude, either among supporters of EXT, there is no shared agreement on defining the conditions for cognitive extension (Colombo et al., 2019).”
§ ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact > 3 The limitations of Pritchard's solution
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Colombo et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The extension of cognitive ability X may undermine the development of intellectual virtue A.”
§ ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact > 3 The limitations of Pritchard's solution
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037//0003-066x.55.1.68 · Cited by 54,599 · cited 2×
“…it might be useful to combine the insights offered by different theoretical frameworks, coming from 16 The framework I presented here is limited to representational cognitive artifacts. the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of cognitive sciences (Fasoli, 2016, 2017), pedagogy,…”
Hutchins, E. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1881.001.0001 · Cited by 10,801 · cited 2×
“…research is needed to analyze educational group dynamics in which AI tools and LLMs contribute to knowledge and metaknowl-edge-forming processes by combining the frameworks of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995; Palermos, 2016; Theiner et al., 2010) and social epistemology (Palermos, 2022a, b).”
Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought
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ChatGPT for Good? On Opportunities and Challenges of Large Language Models for Education
Kasneci, E., Seßler, K., Küchemann, S., Bannert, M., Dementieva, D., Fischer, F., Gasser, U., Groh, G., Günnemann, S., Hüllermeier, E., et al. (2023) · doi:10.35542/osf.io/5er8f · Cited by 7,552
ChatGPT for good? On opportunities and challenges of large language models for education
Kasneci, E., Sessler, K., Küchemann, S., Bannert, M., Dementieva, D., Fischer, F., Gasser, U., Groh, G., Günnemann, S., Hüllermeier, E., et al. (2023) · Learning and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2023.102274 · Cited by 7,326 · cited 4×
“…those who are simply scared of introducing ChatGPT in educational contexts due to fears that the students may excessively rely on it in a passive way, thus leading to their deskilling or preventing the development of relevant cognitive abilities (Kasneci et al., 2023; Mhlanga, 2023; Shiri, 2023).”
BackgroundInfluentialBarsalou, L. W. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002149 · Cited by 6,887
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 1×
“…of extended cognition (EXT), according to which a tool that is highly integrated and functionally contributes to the cognitive processes of one agent, under specific coupling conditions, can be considered as a constitutive component of an extended cognitive process (Clark and Chalmers, 1998).”
BackgroundBarsalou, L. W. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 · Cited by 5,936 · cited 1×
“They argued so by considering experimental evidence on embodied cognition, which is concerned with the interaction of brain, body, and world, revealing the sensory motor grounding of knowledge (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; 2016; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).”
BackgroundHuman Cognitive Abilities: A Survey of Factor-Analytic Studies
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- Fasoli, M. (2016). Neuroethics of cognitive artifacts. In A. Lavazza (Ed.), Frontiers in neuroethics: Conceptual and empirical advancements (pp. 63–75). Cambridge scholars publishing.
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Cited by
A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness
Heersmink, R., de Rooij, B., Clavel Vázquez, M. J., & Colombo, M. (2024) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-024-09777-3 · Cited by 91
“In this section, we’ll conceptualise LLMs as multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts (Cassinadri, 2024).”
de Fine Licht, K. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00799-9 · Cited by 40
“When they do argue for a position, it is often about implementation under reasonable resource constraints (Cassinadri, 2024).”
Should I Use ChatGPT to Write My Papers?
Aylsworth, T., & Castro, C. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00809-w · Cited by 42
“Cassinadri (2024) explores this issue of extended cognition as it relates specifically to the use of ChatGPT in education.”
Generative Artificial Intelligence and Extended Cognition in Science Learning Contexts
Novoa, Á. R., & Arias, D. A. D. (2025) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-025-00660-1 · Cited by 50
“Accordingly, we could use a constitutive cognitive artifact without extending our cognition in that tool (Cassinadri, 2024, p. 13).”
Expropriated Minds: On Some Practical Problems of Generative AI, Beyond Our Cognitive Illusions
Paglieri, F. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00743-x · Cited by 27
“With respect to generative AI, how it will be used in educational settings will have a significant impact on the shape of future societies (for discussion, see Cassinadri, 2024).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Cassinadri, G.
- Affiliations
- Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Cassinadri, Guido
- ORCID
- Cassinadri, Guido
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2024-01-27
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W4391278536
- Semantic Scholar
- fd2421b0775fb643b91d4b7a7130a5802d496f61
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 108
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 8
- FWCI
- 21.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Digital Education and Society
- Social Sciences › Education › Artificial Intelligence in Education
- Social Sciences › Communication › Digital Media and Philosophy
- Keywords
- ChatGPT, virtue epistemology, extended cognition, cognitive artifacts, large language models, generative AI in education, intellectual virtues, Pritchard
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