Attributing Agency to Automated Systems: Reflections on Human–Robot Collaborations and Responsibility-Loci
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Many ethicists writing about automated systems (e.g. self-driving cars and autonomous weapons systems) attribute agency to these systems. Not only that; they seemingly attribute an autonomous or independent form of agency to these machines. This leads some ethicists to worry about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps in cases where automated systems harm or kill human beings. In this paper, I consider what sorts of agency it makes sense to attribute to most current forms of automated systems, in particular automated cars and military robots. I argue that whereas it indeed makes sense to attribute different forms of fairly sophisticated agency to these machines, we ought not to regard them as acting on their own, independently of any human beings. Rather, the right way to understand the agency exercised by these machines is in terms of human-robot collaborations, where the humans involved initiate, supervise, and manage the agency of their robotic collaborators. This means, I argue, that there is much less room for justified worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps than many ethicists think.
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Current AI will possess supervised agency.
“This paper concedes that current AI will possess supervised agency”
From Instrumental Robots. (2020) · cites this paper as Nyholm 2018a
In “Automated Cars Versus Small Children, and Individual Versus Collaborative Agency” (page not provided), Nyholm says automated cars can exercise supervised and deferential agency in the limited domain of driving. The Conclusion likewise discusses particular robots, including automated cars and weapons systems. The paper does not establish that current AI generally will possess supervised agency. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAt best, the agency of a chatbot can be understood like a child: it acts somewhat autonomously by providing information to customers, but is ultimately in a supervised endeavour with its parent, Air Canada, who ought to initiate, supervise, and manage its work, and Air Canada remains the responsible party.
“At best, we could therefore understand the agency of a chatbot like a child, where it acts somewhat autonomously by providing information to customers, but is ultimately in a supervised endeavour with its parent, Air Canada, who ought to initiate, supervise, and manage its work. Air Canada, like any parent, remains the responsible party.”
From Air Canada’s chatbot illustrates persistent agency and responsibility gap problems for AI (2025) · cites this paper as Nyholm 2018
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAs Sven Nyholm reminds us, we hold parents and guardians accountable for children's actions under a form of supervised agency, and it is only when children gain the necessary rational capacity that moral agency and responsibility is wholly transferred to them.
“As Sven Nyholm reminds us, this is why we hold parents and guardians accountable for their actions under a form of supervised agency (Nyholm 2018). It is only when children gain the necessary rational capacity that moral agency and responsibility is wholly transferred to them and we no longer hold their parents accountable for their actions.”
From Air Canada’s chatbot illustrates persistent agency and responsibility gap problems for AI (2025) · cites this paper as Nyholm 2018
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredMinimal agency comes in different kinds and degrees, not merely in the difference between minimal and moral agency.
“he correctly points out that there is not just the difference between minimal and moral agency, but that also minimal agency comes in different kinds and degrees.”
From Instrumental Robots. (2020) · cites this paper as Nyholm 2018a
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References 40 · Cited by 242
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Anscombe E Intention 1957 Oxford Basil Blackwell
- Korsgaard C Self-constitution 2010 Oxford Oxford University Press
- Ravid O Don’t sue me, i was just lawfully texting and drunk when my autonomous car crashed into you Southwest Law Review 2014 44 1 175 207
- Williams B Moral luck 1982 Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Authors
- Nyholm, S.
- Affiliations
- Eindhoven University of Technology (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Nyholm, Sven
- ORCID
- Nyholm, Sven
- Venue
- Science and Engineering Ethics
- Published
- 2017-07-18
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1201-1219
- ISSN
- 1353-3452 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-5546
- PMC
- PMC6097047
- OpenAlex
- W2738218048
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 35 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 23.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Science and Engineering Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- TU/e Research Portal (submittedVersion)
- Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- TU/e Research Portal (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- agency attribution, automated systems, human-robot collaboration, responsibility gap, autonomous weapons, autonomous vehicles, military robots, moral responsibility
- MeSH terms
- Artificial Intelligence, Attitude, Automation, Automobiles, Humans, Robotics, Social Behavior, Social Responsibility, Comprehension, Weapons
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