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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 21 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Instrumental Robots.

Open access
Köhler, Sebastian · 2020 · Science and engineering ethics

Abstract

Advances in artificial intelligence research allow us to build fairly sophisticated agents: robots and computer programs capable of acting and deciding on their own (in some sense). These systems raise questions about who is responsible when something goes wrong-when such systems harm or kill humans. In a recent paper, Sven Nyholm has suggested that, because current AI will likely possess what we might call "supervised agency", the theory of responsibility for individual agency is the wrong place to look for an answer to the question of responsibility. Instead, or so argues Nyholm, because supervised agency is a form of collaborative agency-of acting together-the right place to look is the theory of collaborative responsibility-responsibility in cases of acting together. This paper concedes that current AI will possess supervised agency, but argues that it is nevertheless wrong to think of the relevant human-AI interactions as a form of collaborative agency and, hence, that responsibility in cases of collaborative agency is not the right place to look for the responsibility-grounding relation in human-AI interactions. It also suggests that the right place to look for this responsibility-grounding relation in human-AI interactions is the use of certain sorts of agents as instruments.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper argues that even if current AI has “supervised agency,” human–AI interactions are not best understood as collaborative agency. Instead, responsibility in cases like autonomous cars or weapons should be grounded in the familiar relation of using the AI as an instrument.

## Key findings

  • The paper concedes Nyholm’s premise that current AI plausibly has supervised agency, but rejects his conclusion that this makes human–AI interaction a case of collaborative agency.
  • It argues that many standard accounts of joint/shared agency already rule out current AI as collaborators; for example, on Gilbert’s account, shared intention requires normative commitments, and on Searle’s account it requires “we-intentions,” both of which current AI cannot have.
  • Using Bratman’s framework, the paper says supervised agency is still not enough for genuine “doing something together,” because cases like Driver and Company do not require the human and AI to share an intention to drive together.
  • It proposes an alternative: responsibility should be explained by the relation of using minimal agents as instruments, with analogies to dogs, horses, and other non-human animals used instrumentally.

## Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical argument, centered on evaluating Nyholm’s account of responsibility in human–AI interactions.
  • Uses comparative case analysis, especially Driver, Company, and Adult/Child, plus examples of autonomous vehicles, autonomous weapons, AlphaGoZero, and animal instruments.
  • Main analysis is normative and theoretical: it tests whether supervised agency satisfies conditions for shared/joint agency, then contrasts that with responsibility norms for instrument use.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that it does not offer “a fully fleshed out account” of the relevant norms governing responsibility for AI used as instruments, and says these require further interdisciplinary research.
  • It explicitly takes no stance on what capacities are required for moral agency and assumes, rather than argues, that current AI are not moral agents.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is largely philosophical and illustrative, so it does not provide empirical evidence about real-world AI systems or responsibility practices.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11948-020-00259-5

Cites

57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

3 Valid · 1 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 32 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 57 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Burri, S. (2017). What’s the moral problem with killer robots? In R. Jenkins, M. Robillard, & B. J. Strawser (Eds.), Who should die?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  2. Calo, R. (2015). Robots and the lessons of cyberlaw. California Law Review, 103, 513–563.
  3. Calo, R. (2016). Robots in American Law (February 24, 2016). University of Washington School of Law Research Paper No. 2016-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2737598.
  4. Darwall, S. (2006). The second person standpoint. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  5. Levin, J. (2013). Functionalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2018 ed.). Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Köhler, S.
Affiliations
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management (DE)
Corresponding author
Köhler, Sebastian
Venue
Science and engineering ethics
Published
2020-08-19
Volume
26
Issue
6
Pages
3121-3141
ISSN
  • 1353-3452 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-5546
OpenAlex
W4237346123
Cited by
18
References
57
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 6 · 2020: 1
FWCI
3.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Science and Engineering Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gGmbH
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
artificial intelligence, robot agency, collaborative agency, individual agency, responsibility for harm, human-AI interaction, moral responsibility
MeSH terms
Artificial Intelligence, Humans, Robotics, Social Behavior, Software

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Instrumental Robots. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11948-020-00259-5
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Köhler, S. (2020). Instrumental Robots. Science and engineering ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-020-00259-5

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.