Cited by 21Misinformation and Its ImpactsHate Speech and Cyberbullying DetectionSentiment Analysis and Opinion Mining

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Automated Multilingual Detection of Pro-Kremlin Propaganda in Newspapers and Telegram Posts

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Abstract

The full-scale conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine generated an unprecedented amount of news articles and social media data reflecting opposing ideologies and narratives. These polarized campaigns have led to mutual accusations of misinformation and fake news, shaping an atmosphere of confusion and mistrust for readers worldwide. This study analyses how the media affected and mirrored public opinion during the first month of the war using news articles and Telegram news channels in Ukrainian, Russian, Romanian, French and English. We propose and compare two methods of multilingual automated pro-Kremlin propaganda identification, based on Transformers and linguistic features. We analyse the advantages and disadvantages of both methods, their adaptability to new genres and languages, and ethical considerations of their usage for content moderation. With this work, we aim to lay the foundation for further development of moderation tools tailored to the current conflict.

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  • The extraction script from [25] includes various morphological, syntactical, shallow semantic, and punctuation-based features.

    “This model includes various morphological features such as the number of different parts of speech and their types (e.g. verbs, modal and passive forms, proper, common, discourse markers, negations, comparatives, and superlatives), as well as syntactical features such as the frequency of different subordinate clauses (e.g. temporal, concession, clauses of reason, purpose, etc).”

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Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Carroll J (2017) Image and imitation the visual rhetoric of pro-russian propaganda. Ideol Polit J 8:36–79
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  7. OED Online (2022) Propaganda vol 11. Oxford University Press, Oxford
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Metadata

Authors
Solopova, V., Popescu, O.-I., Benzmüller, C., & Landgraf, T.
Affiliations
  • Freie Universität Berlin (DE)
  • Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e. V. (DLR) (DE)
Corresponding author
Solopova, Veronika
Venue
Datenbank-Spektrum
Published
2023-03
Volume
23
Issue
1
Pages
5-14
ISSN
  • 1610-1995 (ISSN-L)
  • 1618-2162
OpenAlex
W4323043532
Cited by
21
References
28
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 5
FWCI
9.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Datenbank-Spektrum (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Freie Universität Berlin
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Sentiment Analysis and Opinion Mining
Keywords
Russian invasion of Ukraine, misinformation detection, multilingual text classification, news articles, transformer models, linguistic features, content moderation, propaganda detection, public opinion

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