The Limits of Deterrence Theory in Cyberspace
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Abstract
In this article, I analyse deterrence theory and argue that its applicability to cyberspace is limited and that these limits are not trivial. They are the consequence of fundamental differences between deterrence theory and the nature of cyber conflicts and cyberspace. The goals of this analysis are to identify the limits of deterrence theory in cyberspace, clear the ground of inadequate approaches to cyber deterrence, and define the conceptual space for a domain-specific theory of cyber deterrence, still to be developed.
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“Everything from email scams to full-scale cyber-warfare may be accelerated or intensified by the malicious use of AI technologies (Taddeo 2018).”
From AI4People—An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations (2018) · cites this paper as Taddeo 2018
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Cited by
Items 101–107 of 107
Richard, M. J. (2026) · Al-Biruni Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences · doi:10.64440/biruni/bir016
“…assumption that the parties involved operate within a specific context of interests and military options and seek to adopt immediately implementable strategies to avoid nuclear conflict, thus making deterrence itself a practical policy for risk management and not merely a theoretical concept [35].”
Sour, L. (2026) · Przegląd Nauk o Obronności · doi:10.37055/pno/216939
“(Nye, 2017; Taddeo, 2018) The resulting configuration is a form of entangled deterrence, where local actors depend on foreign technologies and global actors depend on local access.”
Prokopovych-Tkachenko, D. (2026) · Національні інтереси України. · doi:10.52058/3041-1793-2026-1(18)-1561-1576
‘Simülasyon Teorisi’ ve ‘Geçiş Nesnesi’ Bağlamında Dijital Dünyada Gerçeklik Algısı
Odabaş, Y. (2026) · Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi · doi:10.17120/omuifd.1761817
Bridging education and economy resilience: advancing education on Asean
Risna, M., & Purnamasari, S. A. (2025) · doi:10.66793/intraders3bookchapter
Gondokusumo, M. T., Supriyadi, A. A., Hilmansyah, C., & Widjayanto, J. (2026) · Jurnal Relevansi Ekonomi Manajemen dan Bisnis · doi:10.61401/relevansi.v10i4.629
“Taddeo (2017) shows that classical deterrence theory struggles with cyberspace because it cannot accommodate attribution ambiguity, inter-actor dynamics, and uncontrolled escalation, while Lilli (2021) argues that effective cyber deterrence must enlist the private sector proactively.”
24714 The Role of Dual-use Technology, Services and Expertise in Small State Cyber Deterrence
Keinonen, M., & Halunen, K. (2026) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783111613031-017
Metadata
- Authors
- Taddeo, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Taddeo, Mariarosaria
- ORCID
- Taddeo, Mariarosaria
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2017-10-16
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 339-355
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W2766424535
- Cited by
- 98
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 6
- FWCI
- 29.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Fell Fund, University of Oxford (151/063)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- deterrence theory, cyber deterrence, cyberspace, cyber conflict, conceptual analysis, cyber warfare
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