A Virtue-Based Framework to Support Putting AI Ethics into Practice
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many ethics initiatives have stipulated sets of principles and standards for good technology development in the AI sector. However, several AI ethics researchers have pointed out a lack of practical realization of these principles. Following that, AI ethics underwent a practical turn, but without deviating from the principled approach. This paper proposes a complementary to the principled approach that is based on virtue ethics. It defines four “basic AI virtues”, namely justice, honesty, responsibility and care, all of which represent specific motivational settings that constitute the very precondition for ethical decision making in the AI field. Moreover, it defines two “second-order AI virtues”, prudence and fortitude, that bolster achieving the basic virtues by helping with overcoming bounded ethicality or hidden psychological forces that can impair ethical decision making and that are hitherto disregarded in AI ethics. Lastly, the paper describes measures for successfully cultivating the mentioned virtues in organizations dealing with AI research and development.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810 · cited 1×
“…dual-process theory, Fortitude helps to overcome these difficulties Situational forces, peer influences, authorities, etc their reaction follows system 1 thinking (Kahneman, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), meaning an intuitive, implicit, effortless, automatic mode of mental information processing.”
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
The global landscape of AI ethics guidelines
Jobin, A., Ienca, M., & Vayena, E. (2019) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0088-2 · Cited by 6,220 · cited 4×
“AI ethics, in order to be truly successful, should not only repeat bullet points from the numerous ethics codes (Jobin et al., 2019).”
BackgroundInfluentialBehavioral Study of obedience.
Milgram, S. (1963) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0040525 · Cited by 4,918 · cited 1×
“A similar problem occurs with authorities (Milgram, 1963).”
Floridi, L., Cowls, J., Beltrametti, M., Chatila, R., Chazerand, P., Dignum, V., Luetge, C., Madelin, R., Pagallo, U., Rossi, F., et al. (2018) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-018-9482-5 · Cited by 4,774 · cited 2×
“…(integrating ethical decision routines in AI systems (Hagendorff, 2021c)), ethics in design (finding development methods that support the evaluation of ethical implications of AI systems (Floridi et al., 2018)) and ethics for design (ensuring integrity on the side of developers (Johnson, 2017)).”
BackgroundStudies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority
Asch, S. E. (1956) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093718 · Cited by 4,267
Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities
Bandura, A. (1999) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0303_3 · Cited by 4,228 · cited 1×
“The concept of moral disengagement is another important factor in bounded ethical decision making (Bandura, 1999).”
BackgroundAnalysis and Synthesis of Research on Responsible Environmental Behavior: A Meta-Analysis
Hines, J. M., Hungerford, H. R., & Tomera, A. N. (1987) · The Journal of Environmental Education · doi:10.1080/00958964.1987.9943482 · Cited by 3,390 · cited 1×
“Here, again, insights from moral psychology as well as behavioral ethics research can be used (Hines et al., 1987; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Treviño et al., 2006, 2014) to catalogue measures that bolster ethical decision making as well as virtue acquisition (see Tables 3 and 4).”
BackgroundAnscombe, G. E. M. (1958) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819100037943 · Cited by 2,686
The Ethics of AI Ethics -- An Evaluation of Guidelines
Hagendorff, T. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1903.03425 · Cited by 1,907 · cited 6×
“As said before, the four basic AI virtues cover all common principles of AI ethics as described in prior discourses (Fjeld et al., 2020; Floridi et al., 2018; Hagendorff, 2020; Jobin et al., 2019; Morley et al., 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
Mapping the ethics of generative AI: a comprehensive scoping review
Hagendorff, T. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09694-w · Cited by 141
“…2019; Morley et al., 2019); it diversified into alternatives for the principle-based approach, for instance by building AI-specific virtue ethics (Hagendorff, 2022a; Neubert & Montañez, 2020); it received criticism for being inefficient, useless, or whitewashing (Hagen-dorff, 2022b, 2023a; Munn,…”
Self-citationOrtega-Bolaños, R., Bernal-Salcedo, J., Germán Ortiz, M., Galeano Sarmiento, J., Ruz, G. A., & Tabares-Soto, R. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence Review · doi:10.1007/s10462-024-10740-3 · Cited by 76
“It is essential to avoid technical or methodological solutionism, the mis-taken belief that complex socio-technical and political problems can be solved or avoided entirely by applying new techniques (Hagendorff 2022a; Santoni de Sio and Mecacci 2021).”
InfluentialThree lines of defense against risks from AI
Schuett, J. (2025) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-023-01811-0 · Cited by 41
Döring, N. (2023) · Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung · doi:10.1055/a-2142-9527 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Hagendorff, T.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2022-06-21
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W4283204686
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 24.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Virtue-Based Framework to Support Putting AI Ethics into Practice. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13347-022-00553-z
- The paper
- Hagendorff, T. (2022). A Virtue-Based Framework to Support Putting AI Ethics into Practice. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-022-00553-z
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.