Cited by 4,228Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics in Business and EducationSocial and Intergroup Psychology

Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities

Bandura, Albert·1999·Personality and Social Psychology Review

Abstract

Moral agency is manifested in both the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely and the proactive power to behave humanely. Moral agency is embedded in a broader sociocognitive self theory encompassing self-organizing, proactive, self-reflective, and self-regulatory mechanisms rooted in personal standards linked to self-sanctions. The self-regulatory mechanisms governing moral conduct do not come into play unless they are activated, and there are many psychosocial maneuvers by which moral self-sanctions are selectively disengaged from inhumane conduct. The moral disengagement may center on the cognitive restructuring of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one by moral justification, sanitizing language, and advantageous comparison; disavowal of a sense of personal agency by diffusion or displacement of responsibility; disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects of one 's actions; and attribution of blame to, and dehumanization of those who are victimized. Many inhumanities operate through a supportive network of legitimate enterprises run by otherwise considerate people who contribute to destructive activities by disconnected subdivision of functions and diffusion of responsibility. Given the many mechanisms for disengaging moral control, civilized life requires, in addition to humane personal standards, safeguards built into social systems that uphold compassionate behavior and renounce cruelty.

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Crossref · 10.1207/s15327957pspr0303_3

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Authors
Bandura, A.
Affiliations
Stanford University (US)
Corresponding author
Bandura, Albert
Venue
Personality and Social Psychology Review
Published
1999-08
Volume
3
Issue
3
Pages
193-209
ISSN
  • 1088-8683 (ISSN-L)
  • 1532-7957
OpenAlex
W2105717202
Cited by
4,228
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 534 · 2025: 386 · 2024: 234 · 2023: 225 · 2022: 247 · 2021: 234 · 2020: 318 · 2019: 300 · 2018: 227 · 2017: 176 · 2016: 176 · 2015: 182 · 2014: 156 · 2013: 158 · 2012: 198
FWCI
4.78
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Personality and Social Psychology Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
moral disengagement, moral agency, inhumanity, self-regulation, moral justification, diffusion of responsibility, displacement of responsibility, dehumanization, blame attribution

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