The DOI matches its Crossref record; 79 of the 79 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 10 of the 69 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency
Open accessAbstract
We examine the question of material agency as raised in material engagement theory (MET). Insofar as MET tends to highlight the causal roles played by extra-bodily material flows in human practices, the term “material agency” does not sufficiently distinguish cases in which these flows are part of an agentive engagement from cases in which they are not. We propose an operational criterion to effect such a distinction. We claim this criterion is organizational, i.e., systemic, and not causal. In the enactive account, agency requires three organizational conditions: self-individuation, interactional asymmetry, and normativity. These conditions can have organic, sensorimotor, and sociomaterial realizations. The dance of human productive practices is indeed spread between brains, bodies, and the world, as MET claims, but it is distributed in an organized manner that involves constraints and norms at various scales. We put forward a relational and non-anthropocentric perspective toward an enactive approach to productive practices. We discuss some aspects of agentive ensembles rendered more intelligible by our proposal, including incorporation, soft assembly and non-decomposability, and the grounding of teleology normative processes at multiple scales. In this manner, we seek to continue the dialog between MET and enactive theory, beginning with the view that a situated system must realize certain minimal organizational conditions to be called an agent.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that material engagement theory’s notion of “material agency” needs an operational, organizational criterion to distinguish agentive material engagements from merely active material processes. It proposes an enactive account of minimal agency—self-individuation, interactional asymmetry, and normativity—as compatible with MET and sketches implications for productive practices.
Key findings
- MET’s material agency thesis usefully decenters agency but does not sufficiently distinguish cases in which extra-bodily material flows are part of an agentive engagement from cases in which they are not; the authors propose an operational criterion that is organizational/systemic, not causal.
- Enactive minimal agency requires three organizational conditions: self-individuation, interactional asymmetry, and normativity; these can have organic, sensorimotor, and sociomaterial realizations.
- The account is presented as compatible with MET’s three core theses—extended mind, enactive signification, and material agency—and aims to clarify incorporation, soft assembly, non-decomposability, scale, historicity, and teleology in productive practices.
- The authors use two contrasting examples: living root bridges among the Khasi people in Meghalaya as a case of non-human agency fulfilling organizational criteria, and traditional lime mortar production as active material processes that are not agents themselves.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis; no empirical sample or data are reported. The paper synthesizes material engagement theory and enactive theory, drawing on prior enactive work and illustrative cases.
- Main analysis defines agency operationally through system-theoretic/organizational conditions, contrasts this with hylomorphic/intentionalist accounts, and extends it from minimal agency to sensorimotor agency and productive practices.
- Two illustrative examples—living root bridges and lime mortar production—are used to show how the proposed criterion distinguishes agentive ensembles from non-agentive material processes.
Limitations
- Stated: fully articulating a MET-compatible enactive conception of productive practices is beyond the paper’s scope; the definition “may be revised and improved”; and historical and situated explanations for the creativity and stability of production traditions are owed.
- Evident: the paper reports no empirical testing or data, and its examples are illustrative rather than systematic; it states that the enactive notion of agency should be applied and its usefulness tested in the empirical field of productive practices.
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Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 10 Not valid · 46 Not checked · 130 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“In the enactive account, agency requires three organizational conditions: self-individuation, interactional asymmetry, and normativity.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Barandiaran et al., 2009 source
Section 2.4 identifies individuality, interactional asymmetry, and normativity as the three requirements for agency. The passage labeled “YES” explicitly says all three are necessary and none is sufficient alone; section 4 connects them to the system’s organization. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Not matchedcites Di Paolo, 2005, 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Varela, 1997 source
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“There is rather the possibility of a mental realm emerging from productive practices”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Sohn-Rethel, 1978 source
- Partly supportedcites Stewart, 2014 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Abstract Thought and the Exchange Abstraction” (page unavailable), Stewart says social forms can provide the ground for conceptual forms, which supports a possible connection between social practices and thought. But he explicitly says the relationship is not one-way: social and thought forms arise together, and cognitive capacities also enable social forms. The claim’s suggestion that a mental realm emerges from productive practices alone omits that qualification. (LLM, conf=0.82)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Studies on soft assembly in embodied cognitive tasks show that incorporations are not a given but vary with experience (e.g., Dotov et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2012; Baber et al. 2019).”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Baber et al. 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites Dotov et al., 2010 source
The Discussion section (“Noise at the Body-Tool Boundary”; page unavailable) describes the mouse as functionally integrated with the participant during skilled task performance, then less integrated when its behavior is perturbed. This supports the claim that incorporation in a softly assembled body-tool system is contingent on the interaction rather than a given. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Partly supportedcites Anderson et al., 2012 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports the 'not a given' half: Section 2 (Abstract and 'Breaking down boundaries between the animal and environment') describes task-specific synergies as temporary, softly assembled coalitions of neural, bodily and environmental components with no predetermined roles, and the 'Kelso' conclusion repeats that object identification can be accomplished by coalitions spanning brain, body, tools and other agents. On incorporation it reports only Cardinali et al. (2008) — a reaching tool became incorporated into the body schema after a single brief bout of use — so it shows incorporation can arise from tool use, but nowhere states that incorporations vary as a function of experience (no comparison across experience levels, skill or duration). The variability-with-experience claim is therefore attributed to this review without being made in it, and the incorporation evidence itself is someone else's study that the paper merely cites. (LLM, conf=0.72)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Following enactive work, we propose that all forms of agency are characterized by requirements of self-individuation , interactional asymmetry , and normativity .”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Barandiaran et al., 2009 source
Section 2.4 (p. 6) states that individuality, interactional asymmetry, and normativity are all necessary conditions for agency. Section 2 (p. 2) introduces the same three requirements as the basis for a general definition of agency. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Not matchedcites Di Paolo, 2005, 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Varela, 1997 source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“These studies show that the dynamic signature of skill development, for instance, of a phenomenological transition from readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand in tool use, is marked by scale-free correlations across multiple timescales .”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Dotov et al., 2010 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion (‘Noise at the Body-Tool Boundary’; page unavailable) reports power-law scaling during skilled tool use and a significant decrease in long-range correlations when the tool was perturbed. But the study examines disrupted performance, not skill development, and describes the transition as ready-to-hand to unready-to-hand; it places unready-to-hand between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand rather than demonstrating a transition to presence-at-hand. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Partly supportedcites Anderson et al., 2012 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports the core dynamical point: the Abstract defines 1/f scaling as temporal long-range dependencies in which 'higher frequency, lower amplitude fluctuations are nested within lower frequency, higher amplitude fluctuations as one moves from finer to courser grains of analysis' (i.e. scale-free correlations across multiple timescales), and Section 2 ('Breaking down boundaries between the animal and environment') reports that Dotov, Nie & Chemero (2010, in press) 'found 1/f scaling at the hand-mouse interface while the mouse was operating normally, but not during the disruption' — the readiness-to-hand/unreadiness-to-hand tool-use transition. What the source does not support is the framing as 'skill development': in this paper the tool-use evidence concerns moment-to-moment incorporation and disruption of an extended cognitive system within a 1-minute trial, not the acquisition of skill over time, and the only learning-related 1/f result it gives (Stephen, Dixon & Isenhower 2009; Stephen & Dixon 2009) is about insight/strategy learning measured in eye movements, not tool use. The terminology also differs — our copy names the transition 'readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand' rather than 'presence-at-hand'. As a review reporting others' studies, the attribution of the finding itself is acceptable, but the skill-development generalization goes beyond this source. (LLM, conf=0.75)
- Not matchedcites Baber et al. 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 7 Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices · p. 17
“(Lave & Wegner 1991; Lave, 2011)”
§ References · p. 21
“- Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation . Cambridge University Press.”
Citations
Cites
Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation
Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815355 · Cited by 35,324
(1984) · Cited by 21,166
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013) · doi:10.4324/9780203720714 · Cited by 4,869
The principles of psychology, Vol I.
James, W. (1890) · doi:10.1037/10538-000 · Cited by 4,514 · cited 2×
“A self-sustaining network of equilibrating relations among sensorimotor schemes (a “bundle of habits” to use William James’, 1890 term) can fulfill the three requirements for agency: it can become a self-individuated autonomous system, regularly inducing asymmetric regulations of the coupling with…”
BackgroundDavidson, D. (1963) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023177 · Cited by 2,938 · cited 1×
“It is a noncircular definition in which agency is not defined as, say, the capacity “to act,” or in traditional terms of intentionality (e.g., Davidson, 1963).”
BackgroundMind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696 · cited 1×
“The enactive approach is a non-reductionist naturalism that regards the properties of living and cognitive systems as part of a continuum (conceptually as well as ontologically; e.g., Thompson, 2007), without erasing qualitative differences.”
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Clark, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 · Cited by 2,201 · cited 1×
“Much of the thrust behind MET derives from advances in embodied cognitive sciences, notably not only the enactive language expressed in the last quote but also the extended functionalism of Andy Clark (2008), Michael Wheeler (2010), and others (e.g., Rowlands, 2009; Rupert, 2009).”
BackgroundPrinciples of Biological Autonomy
Varela, F. J. (2025) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14875.001.0001 · Cited by 1,885 · cited 2×
“A broad constraint on these conditions is epistemic: A definition of agency should be operational, that is, based on what can be explained about a concrete instance without appealing to historical or contextual knowledge beyond the concrete current situation (Di Paolo, 2009; Varela, 1979).”
BackgroundParticipatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640 · cited 1×
“Mutual incorporation may also take place fleetingly as a result of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009).”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Balksten, K. (2007). Traditional lime mortar and plaster. Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden.
- Di Paolo, E. (2003). Organismically-inspired robotics: Homeostatic adaptation and teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop, in K. Murase & T. Asakura (eds.), Dynamical systems approach to embodiment and sociality. Adelaide, Australia: Advanced Knowledge International. pp 19 – 42.
- Malafouris, L. (2016). On human becoming and incompleteness: A material engagement approach to the study of embodiment in evolution and culture. In G. Etzelmüller & C. Tewes (Eds.), Embodiment in evolution and culture (pp. 289–306). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Simondon, G. (2020). Individuation in light of notions of form and information. University of Minnesota Press.
Cited by
Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things
Barandiaran, X. E., & Pérez-Verdugo, M. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-04961-4 · Cited by 19
“This does indeed underline the strong relation between agency, productive practices [see also Di Paolo et al., 2023] and technical interventions, and the enactive idea of coupling stresses the co-constitutive and constraining role of the environment in cognitive processes.”
Evald Ilyenkov and the enactive approach
Paolo, E. A. D., & Potapov, K. (2024) · Studies in East European Thought · doi:10.1007/s11212-024-09645-2 · Cited by 16
“Further work is needed to address the specific kinds of practices emphasised by Ilyenkov, particularly labour and the mediation of material/cultural artefacts, though some enactive work has begun to look into these issues too (Di Paolo et al. 2023; Gallagher 2021).”
Self-citationGambarotto, A., & van Es, T. (2025) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1007/s11299-025-00323-2 · Cited by 9
“While the enactive approach has increasingly acknowledged the social and material dimensions of cognition (e.g., Di Paolo et al. 2018, 2023), insights from the Marxist tradition remain underexplored in this context.”
Rethinking student agency through ‘material agency’ in the context of learning in nature
Nelson, E., & Cowie, B. (2024) · Environmental Education Research · doi:10.1080/13504622.2024.2383749 · Cited by 7
“He proposes, much like Di Paolo, Lawler, and Vaccari (2023) and Malafouris (2016), that ‘material entities have agency only if two conditions are met: an ontological condition (agency is an asymmetrical and relational category) and an epistemo-logical condition (material entities mediate and…”
AI and the Relationship Between Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Patiency
Formosa, P., Hipólito, I., & Montefiore, T. (2026) · Integrated science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-14537-6_3 · Cited by 17
“An enactive perspective highlights this gap further by strengthening the role of the body by seeing agents as embodied within a reciprocal engagement with an environmental niche (Gonçalves et al., 2024; Di Paolo et al., 2023).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Di Paolo, E. A., Lawler, D., & Vaccari, A. P.
- Affiliations
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (AR)
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2023-04-26
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 2
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W4367050718
- Cited by
- 17
- References
- 76
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 1
- FWCI
- 2.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-sa
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Greater South Information System
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Posthumanist Ethics and Activism
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Keywords
- enactive theory, material agency, material engagement theory, productive practices, interactional asymmetry, normativity, distributed agency, non-anthropocentrism, teleology, incorporation, sociomateriality
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