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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 83 of the 83 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 46 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts

Open access
Schmidt, Eva, Putora, Paul Martin, Fijten, Rianne · 2025 · Philosophy & Technology

Abstract

Abstract Artificial intelligent (AI) systems used in medicine are often very reliable and accurate, but at the price of their being increasingly opaque. This raises the question whether a system’s opacity undermines the ability of medical doctors to acquire knowledge on the basis of its outputs. We investigate this question by focusing on a case in which a patient’s risk of recurring breast cancer is predicted by an opaque AI system. We argue that, given the system’s opacity, as well as the possibility of malfunctioning AI systems, practitioners’ inability to check the correctness of their outputs, and the high stakes of such cases, the knowledge of medical practitioners is indeed undermined. They are lucky to form true beliefs based on the AI systems’ outputs, and knowledge is incompatible with luck. We supplement this claim with a specific version of the safety condition on knowledge, Safety*. We argue that, relative to the perspective of the medical doctor in our example case, his relevant beliefs could easily be false, and this despite his evidence that the AI system functions reliably. Assuming that Safety* is necessary for knowledge, the practitioner therefore doesn’t know. We address three objections to our proposal before turning to practical suggestions for improving the epistemic situation of medical doctors.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that medical doctors who rely on opaque AI outputs in high-stakes contexts may form true beliefs but still lack knowledge because their beliefs fail a perspective-relative safety condition, Safety*. Using a hypothetical breast-cancer recurrence case, it claims opacity, correctness-blindness, potential malfunction, and high stakes make the doctor’s true belief lucky and therefore not knowledge.

Key findings

  • In the “Cancer Risk” case, an opaque AI system predicts that patient P is not at risk—below a threshold of 0.05—and MD forms a true belief on that basis. The authors argue MD does not know because, relative to his perspective, the belief could easily be false if the system were malfunctioning; it is therefore not Safe*.
  • Four features undermine MD’s knowledge: the system’s opacity, MD’s inability to check correctness directly, the real possibility of AI flaws/malfunctions/biases, and the high stakes for P and MD. MD’s evidence that the system works reliably does not remove the doubt that defeats knowledge.
  • The paper blocks three objections: overgeneralization to perceptual expertise, expert testimony, CT scanners, and RCTs; undergeneralization from the breast-cancer case; and the claim that knowledge is practically irrelevant. It argues knowledge matters for moral/legal responsibility and informed consent.
  • Practical remedies suggested are independent sources and “broken-leg” override, explainable AI or expert understanding of the system, and reliable validation/certification structures.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis, not an empirical study. The paper uses a hypothetical medical case, “Cancer Risk,” plus the “Broken Clock” epistemological analogy.
  • It develops and applies Safety*: “If S were to believe that p, then relative to her perspective, it could not easily be false that p,” drawing on Whiting.
  • It addresses three objections and then proposes practical measures; the paper states there are no data, materials, or code to be made available.

Limitations

  • The paper states no formal limitations section; its Data Availability statement says there are no data, materials, or code to be made available.
  • Evident from the text: the argument rests on a hypothetical case and philosophical intuitions rather than empirical measurement, and its conclusion depends on accepting Safety* as necessary for knowledge and on pragmatic encroachment about high stakes.
  • Evident from the text: the scope is limited to high-stakes, correctness-blind medical contexts; the authors acknowledge that complete understanding of AI inner workings remains improbable and that generalization depends on shared structural features.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s13347-024-00834-9

Cites

83 of 83 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

7 Valid · 5 Not valid · 19 Not checked · 58 Own results and interpretations

37 more claims

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 34
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 19

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Citations

Cites

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Schmidt, E., Putora, P. M., & Fijten, R.
Affiliations
  • TU Dortmund University (DE)
  • University of Bern (CH)
  • Maastricht University Medical Centre (NL)
Corresponding author
Schmidt, Eva
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2025-01-13
Volume
38
Issue
1
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W4406334317
Cited by
14
References
77
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 3
FWCI
111.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Research Publications (Maastricht University) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Technische Universität Dortmund
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Health Informatics › Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Knowledge Management and Technology
Keywords
artificial intelligence in healthcare, algorithmic opacity, epistemic luck, breast cancer recurrence prediction, high-stakes decision making, trust in AI outputs, epistemic justification

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13347-024-00834-9
The paper
Schmidt, E., Putora, P. M., & Fijten, R. (2025). The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00834-9

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.