Cited by 26Ethics and Social Impacts of AIPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryLiterary and Philosophical Studies

Second-Person Authenticity and the Mediating Role of AI: A Moral Challenge for Human-to-Human Relationships?

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Battisti, Davide·2025·Philosophy & Technology

Abstract

The development of AI tools, such as large language models and speech emotion and facial expression recognition systems, has raised new ethical concerns about AI’s impact on human relationships. While much of the debate has focused on human-AI relationships, less attention has been devoted to another class of ethical issues, which arise when AI mediates human-to-human relationships. This paper opens the debate on these issues by analyzing the case of romantic relationships, particularly those in which one partner uses AI tools, such as ChatGPT, to resolve a conflict and apologize. After reviewing some possible, non-exhaustive, explanations for the moral wrongness of using AI tools in such cases, I introduce the notion of second-person authenticity: a form of authenticity that is assessed by the other person in the relationship (e.g., a partner). I then argue that at least some actions within romantic relationships should respect a standard of authentic conduct since the value of such actions depends on who actually performs them and not only on the quality of the outcome produced. Therefore, using AI tools in such circumstances may prevent agents from meeting this standard. I conclude by suggesting that the proposed theoretical framework could also apply to other human-to-human relationships, such as the doctor-patient relationship, when these are mediated by AI; I offer some preliminary reflections on such applications.

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  • AI agents are intentionally designed to simulate love, loyalty, and desire.

    “AI agents are not emotionally capable, yet they are intentionally designed to simulate love, loyalty, and desire (Battisti 2025).”

    From Toward an Ethic of Synthetic Relationality: Identity, Intimacy, and Risk in AI-Mediated Roleplay Environments (2025) · cites this paper as Battisti 2025

    The Introduction describes commercial AI applications that create virtual personas for conversation and role-playing, and notes that some users perceive their relationships with AI as romantic. It does not say that AI agents are intentionally designed to simulate love, loyalty, and desire, or establish that they lack emotional capacity. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • AI agents are not emotionally capable.

    “AI agents are not emotionally capable, yet they are intentionally designed to simulate love, loyalty, and desire (Battisti 2025).”

    From Toward an Ethic of Synthetic Relationality: Identity, Intimacy, and Risk in AI-Mediated Roleplay Environments (2025) · cites this paper as Battisti 2025

    The Introduction (section 1; page unavailable) describes commercialized AI applications with virtual personas that engage in romantic role-playing, which partly supports the sentence’s point about simulated relationships. It does not say that AI agents lack emotional capacity or that they are designed to simulate love, loyalty, and desire specifically. Searches for emotional capacity and those terms found no confirming passage. (LLM, conf=0.77)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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1 of the 48 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Munn, N., & Weijers, D. M. (2023). Can we be friends with AI? What risks would arise from the proliferation of such friendships? International Conference on Computer Ethics, 1(1). Retrieved from https://soremo.library.iit.edu/index.php/CEPE2023/article/view/254. Accessed 13 Feb 2025.
  2. Sartre, J. P., & Richmond. (2022). Being and nothingness. Routledge.
  3. Zhou, Y., & Fischer, M. H. (Eds.). (2020). AI love you (2019th ed.). Springer Nature.

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Authors
Battisti, D.
Affiliations
University of Bergamo (IT)
Corresponding author
Battisti, Davide
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2025-02-25
Volume
38
Issue
1
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W4407932534
Cited by
25
References
48
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 8
FWCI
25.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Aisberg (University of Bergamo) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Literary and Philosophical Studies
Keywords
romantic relationships, ChatGPT, conflict resolution, apology, authenticity, physician-patient relationship, large language models, speech emotion recognition, facial expression recognition, human-AI relationship

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