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Purging the Judiciary After a Transition: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Open access
Šipulová, Katarína, Kosař, David · 2025 · Hague Journal on the Rule of Law

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 49 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

Judges play a key role in the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, less attention has been paid so far to the question of how to address their collaboration with non-democratic regimes. In theory, judges can be subjected to virtually all transitional justice mechanisms ranging from criminal prosecution and lustration to truth-seeking, or even amnesties. However, we show in a case study of Czechia that these mechanisms are not well equipped to address the complicity of judges in past crimes for three reasons: (1) judges usually play different roles in past crimes from political elites, (2) the principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence preclude the easy replacement of judges, and (3) pragmatic exigencies, such as the shortage of lawyers who are not tainted by cooperation with the previous regime, further complicate the renewal of the bench. Nevertheless, we argue that the lack of recognition of the role judges have played in non-democratic regimes is dangerous, as it may negatively affect public confidence in the judiciary and taint its legitimacy. Examples from Hungary, Poland and Romania, moreover, show that populist leaders are tempted to abuse the transitional justice rhetoric use the failure to deal with the past of judges as a justification for their court-curbing practices. Post-transition purges are therefore stuck between a rock (interfering in judicial independence and practical exigencies) and a hard place (mental dependence of the judiciary on the previous regime, low public trust in courts). When the democratic opposition defeats the populist leader, such as in Poland in 2023, it unfortunately faces the same dilemma. Thus, the Czech way of dealing with the past within the judiciary in transition from communism to democracy (transition 1.0) provides important insights also for today's undoing of populist judicial reforms and transition from authoritarian populism to democracy (transition 2.0).

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper argues that Czech post-1989 judicial purges were extensive on paper but only partly effective in practice: of five mechanisms, only the dismissal of communist-era court presidents was fully successful. It uses Czechia’s experience to show that transitional justice tools fit judges poorly because of judicial independence, non-retroactivity, and shortages of non-tainted legal talent.

## Key findings

  • Czechia adopted five mechanisms for judicial turnover after 1989: lustration, removal of communist-era court presidents, retention elections, disciplinary proceedings, and criminal prosecution.
  • The paper concludes that only one mechanism was fully successful: removal of communist-era court presidents; the other four yielded limited results.
  • Lustration reached its peak effect too late: by November 1991, when the Large Lustration Law took effect, most “compromised judges” had already left, and overall only about one third of communist-era judges left between January 1990 and December 1992 (484 of 1460).
  • Public confidence in the judiciary was low: a 1990 poll showed only 28% of citizens trusted Czech courts, and by 2019 13.5% of all active judges had joined the Communist Party before 1989.

## Methods

  • Historical qualitative case study of Czechia’s post-1989 judicial turnover, framed as a transitional justice analysis.
  • The paper examines five judicial-purge mechanisms and traces their design, stated aims, and outcomes across the post-communist period, drawing on legal provisions, parliamentary debates, court decisions, and archival/public information discussed in the text.
  • Main analysis is comparative and interpretive: it assesses whether each mechanism achieved core or derived transitional-justice goals and why outcomes were limited.

## Limitations

  • The paper does not report a formal sampling strategy, dataset, or statistical model; the evidence base appears to be historical and legal rather than systematically quantified.
  • The text itself notes uncertainty and fragility in the underlying archives: secret-service files were incomplete, some names were wrongly listed, and the “reliability of the information stored in these archives” was questioned.
  • Evident from the text: the conclusions are largely case-specific to Czechia, so direct generalization to other countries is limited, even though the paper draws lessons for other CEE and post-backsliding contexts.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s40803-024-00201-y

Cites

76 of 76 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 76 references

Research works printed but not linked: 18

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  2. Ash TG (1993) The magic lantern: the revolution of ’89 witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague, Reprint edition. Vintage, New York
  3. Bröstl A (2003) At the crossroads on the way to an independent Slovak Judiciary. In J. Přibáň, P. Roberts and J. Young (eds.) Systems of Justice in Transition: Central European Experience since 1989. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot
  4. Czarnota A, Krygier M, Sadurski W (eds) (2005) Rethinking the rule of law after communism, 1st edn. Central European University Press
  5. Dyzenhaus D (2003b) Judicial independence, transitional justice and the rule of law. Otago Law Rev 10:345–370
  6. Elster J (2003) Emotions and transitional justice. Sound Interdiscip J 86:17–40
  7. Huntington SP (1993) The third wave: democratization in the Late 20th Century, unknown. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla
  8. Kosař D, Šipulová K (2020) How to fight court-packing. Constit Stud 6:1
  9. Mochizuki (2017) Roles and functions of transitional justice mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region in the development of international law. Chin (Taiwan) Yearbook Int Law Aff 35:70–98
  10. Motejl O (2009) Soudnictví a jeho správa. In Bobek M, Molek P and Šimíček V (eds.) Komunistické právo v Československu: Kapitoly z dějin bezpráví. Masarykova univerzita Mezinárodní politologický ústav, Brno
  11. Offe C (1997) Varieties of transition: the East European and East German Experience, MIT Press, Ed. The MIT Press, Cambridge
  12. Oko O (2005) Seeking justice in transitional societies: an analysis of the problems and failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria. Brooklyn J Int Law 31:1
  13. Orbman J (1991) Laying the ghosts of the past. Report Eastern Europe 24:4–11
  14. Popova M, Beers DJ (2020) No revolution of dignity for Ukraine’s Judges: Judicial Reform after the Euromaidan. Demokratizatsiya J Post Sov Democr 28:113–142
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  16. Teitel RG (2002) Transitional justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford
  17. Vyshinsky A (1948) The law of the soviet state. Macmillan
  18. Wagnerová E (2003) Position of Czech Judges in the Czech Republic. In Přibáň J, Roberts P and Young J (eds.), Systems of Justice in Transition: Central European Experience since 1989. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Šipulová, K., & Kosař, D.
Affiliations
Masaryk University (CZ)
Corresponding author
Šipulová, Katarína
Venue
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law
Published
2024-03-04
Volume
17
Issue
1
Pages
61-93
ISSN
  • 1876-4045 (ISSN-L)
  • 1876-4053
OpenAlex
W4392377880
Cited by
6
References
70
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1
FWCI
9.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Veřejné služby Informačního systému (Masarykiana Brunensis Universitas) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council (101002660)
  • Masaryk University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › War, Law, and Justice
  • Social Sciences › Law › Judicial and Constitutional Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Eastern European Communism and Reforms
Keywords
transitional justice, judicial independence, separation of powers, lustration, post-communist transition, public trust in courts, authoritarian populism, Poland, Hungary, Romania

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Purging the Judiciary After a Transition: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s40803-024-00201-y
The paper
Šipulová, K., & Kosař, D. (2025). Purging the Judiciary After a Transition: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00201-y

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