Cited by 35Network Security and Intrusion DetectionAnomaly Detection Techniques and ApplicationsSmart Grid Security and Resilience

Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Security: Unsupervised Learning Approaches for Anomaly Detection

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Pinto, Andrea, Herrera, Luis-Carlos, Donoso, Yezid, Gutierrez, Jairo A.·2024·International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems

Abstract

Traditional security detection methods face challenges in identifying zero-day attacks in critical infrastructures (CIs) integrated with the industrial internet of things (IIoT). These attacks exploit unknown vulnerabilities and are difficult to detect due to their connection to physical systems. The integration of legacy ICS networks with modern computing and networking technologies has significantly expanded the attack surface, making these systems more susceptible to cyber-attacks. Despite existing security measures, attackers continually find ways to breach these operating networks. Anomaly detection systems are critical in protecting these CIs from current cyber threats. This study investigates the effectiveness of unsupervised anomaly detection models in detecting operational anomalies that could lead to cyber-attacks, thereby disrupting and negatively impacting quality of life. We preprocess the data with a focus on cybersecurity and chose the SWAT dataset because it accurately represents the types of attack vectors that critical infrastructures commonly encounter. We evaluated the performance of isolation forest (IF), local outlier factor (LOF), one-class SVM (OCSVM), and Autoencoder algorithms—trained exclusively on normal data—in enhancing cybersecurity within IIoT environments. Our comprehensive analysis includes an assessment of each model’s detection capabilities. The findings highlight the VAE-LSTM model’s potential to identify cyber-attacks within seconds in a high-frequency dataset, suggesting near real-time detection capability. The final model combines the reconstruction ability of the variational autoencoder (VAE) with regularization using the Kullback–Leibler divergence, reflecting the non-Gaussian nature of industrial system data. Our model successfully detected 23 out of 26 attack scenarios in the SWAT dataset, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving the security of IIoT-based CIs.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s44196-024-00644-z

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  • Their results empirically validated the effectiveness of reconstruction-error-based techniques.

    “Their results empirically validated the effectiveness of reconstruction-error-based techniques.”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [82]

    Section 5.5.1 reports that the VAE-LSTM produced low reconstruction errors for normal data and higher errors for anomalies; the study identified 23 of 26 attack scenarios. But Section 5.4 reports that a vanilla autoencoder’s reconstruction error stayed low for both normal and abnormal data, limiting its detection. The results support the effectiveness of the VAE-LSTM approach, not reconstruction-error-based techniques generally. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Reconstruction-error-based methods are particularly effective for detecting sensor/actuator faults, false data injection, command manipulation, and generic injection-type attacks that cause local or global distortions in multivariate process trajectories.

    “First, these methods are particularly effective for detecting sensor/actuator faults, false data injection, command manipulation, and generic injection-type attacks that cause local or global distortions in multivariate process trajectories [77,79,81-83,86,87].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [82]

    Section 5.5.1 (page unavailable) reports that the VAE-LSTM detected 23 of 26 evaluated attack scenarios and that deviations from learned sensor patterns are difficult to reconstruct. Section 4.1 (page unavailable) identifies sensors and actuators as attack surfaces. The paper does not establish particular effectiveness for sensor/actuator faults, false data injection, command manipulation, and generic injection attacks as distinct categories; its evaluation concerns cyberattacks with physical effects in the SWAT water-treatment dataset. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Autoencoder-like models (AE, VAE, OC-NN) and PCA-based approaches can flag process states that lie outside the learned normal manifold, including zero-day attack scenarios that were not explicitly seen during training.

    “By learning a compact representation of normal operating conditions and monitoring reconstruction error or boundary-based anomaly scores, autoencoder-like models (AE, VAE, OC-NN) and PCA-based approaches can flag process states that lie outside the learned normal manifold, including zero-day attack scenarios that were not explicitly seen during training [77,79,81-83,86,87].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [82]

    Section 4.3 (page unavailable) explains how autoencoders trained on normal data can flag deviations through reconstruction error, and the Conclusions report detecting attacks with models trained only on normal data. The paper discusses OC-NN only as a prior study, does not establish the claim for PCA-based approaches, and reports that its vanilla autoencoder missed many attacks. Thus it supports the general mechanism and zero-day rationale, but not the full list of methods as stated. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The dataset distribution for reconstruction-error-based anomaly detection studies shows a strong reliance on a limited set of public process benchmarks (SWaT, HAI, BATADAL, and TE) supplemented by a small number of custom-built CAN fieldbus and wind-turbine SCADA datasets.

    “Finally, the dataset distribution again reveals a strong reliance on a limited set of public process benchmarks-SWaT, HAI, BATADAL, and TE-supplemented by a small number of custom-built CAN fieldbus and wind-turbine SCADA datasets [77,79,81-83,85-87].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [82]

    Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Comparative studies on SWaT and TE data further confirm that reconstruction-error-based detectors often outperform classical statistical methods in capturing complex nonlinear relationships among process variables.

    “Comparative studies on SWaT and TE data further confirm that reconstruction-error-based detectors often outperform classical statistical methods in capturing complex nonlinear relationships among process variables [82,86].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [82]

    Section 5.5.1 compares models on SWAT and identifies VAE-LSTM as the best-performing evaluated model, supporting the SWAT portion of the claim. The paper does not report a comparison on TE data or establish that reconstruction-error detectors outperform classical statistical methods specifically because they capture nonlinear relationships among process variables (section 5.5.1; page not available). (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. UK's National Cyber Security Centre: NCSC Annual Review 2023, London (2023).

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Authors
Pinto, A., Herrera, L.-C., Donoso, Y., & Gutierrez, J. A.
Affiliations
Universidad de Los Andes (CO)
Corresponding author
Pinto, Andrea
Venue
International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems
Published
2024-09-10
Volume
17
Issue
1
ISSN
1875-6883 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4402408429
Cited by
35
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 18
FWCI
5.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Tuwhera (Auckland University of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Universidad de los Andes
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Anomaly Detection Techniques and Applications
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Keywords
critical infrastructure security, Industrial Internet of Things, anomaly detection, unsupervised learning, zero-day attacks, industrial control systems, SWaT dataset, variational autoencoder, LSTM, Isolation Forest, local outlier factor, one-class support vector machine, Kullback-Leibler divergence, real-time attack detection, cyberattack detection

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