Dual processes in reasoning?
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Dual-process theory suggests humans rely more often on rapid, cognitively biased (System 1) thinking than on System 2 deliberate cognition.
“Dual-process theory suggests humans rely more often on rapid, cognitively biased (System 1) thinking than on System 2 deliberate cognition (Wason and Evans 1974).”
From Human-Clinical AI Agent Collaboration (2025) · cites this paper as Wason and Evans 1974
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Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137 · see citing works
Self-citationDual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271 · see citing works
Self-citationWood, W., & Rünger, D. (2016) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033417 · Cited by 1,445 · see citing works
The cognitive functions of language
Carruthers, P. (2002) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000122 · Cited by 728 · see citing works
An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning
Osman, M. (2004) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196730 · Cited by 444 · see citing works
Kool, W., & Botvinick, M. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0401-9 · Cited by 288 · see citing works
Buçinca, Z., Malaya, M. B., & Gajos, K. Z. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2102.09692 · Cited by 1,124 · see citing works
“According to the dual-process theory, humans mostly operate on System 1 thinking, which employs heuristics and shortcuts when making decisions [32, 63].”
Explainability pitfalls: beyond dark patterns in explainable AI
Ehsan, U., & Riedl, M. O. (2024) · Patterns · doi:10.1016/j.patter.2024.100971 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
The influence of prior belief on scientific thinking
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.011 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Self-citationExplainability Pitfalls: Beyond Dark Patterns in Explainable AI
Ehsan, U., & Riedl, M. O. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2109.12480 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
Raees, M., Khan, V.-J., Lykourentzou, I., & Papangelis, K. (2026) · Proceedings of the 2026 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3791467 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Human-Clinical AI Agent Collaboration
Kadem, M., & Al-Khazraji, B. (2025) · Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series · doi:10.1609/aaaiss.v6i1.36060
Tao, Y., Meyer, J., & Kizilcec, R. F. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2609.23936
- Authors
- Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. S. B. T.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1974-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 141-154
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2086282622
- Cited by
- 575
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 62 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 62 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 2.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- dual-process theory, deductive reasoning, negation, rationalization, conscious thought
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