The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
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Citations
Cites
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance.
Mann, H. M., & Scherer, F. M. (1971) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325977 · Cited by 6,267
(2015) · Adversarial Risk Analysis · doi:10.1201/b18653-3 · Cited by 3,632
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Contributions to the theory of games.
(1960) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/0016-0032(60)90366-5 · Cited by 1,824
Selten, R. (1988) · Theory and Decision Library C · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_2 · Cited by 917
11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
Kuhn, H. W. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-012 · Cited by 913
Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
Myerson, R. B. (1978) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753236 · Cited by 737
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
Thompson, A. A., Scherer, F. M., & Shepherd, W. G. (1971) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056840 · Cited by 682
Cited by
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,846
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics
Smith, V. L. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322156954 · Cited by 960
Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, R. W.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1981-08
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 92-100
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1994752643
- Cited by
- 755
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 2.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1
- The paper
- Rosenthal, R. W. (1981). Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.