Cited by 1,756Game Theory and Voting SystemsAuction Theory and ApplicationsMulti-Agent Systems and Negotiation

Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations

Yoav Shoham, Kevin Leyton‐Brown·2009·Choice Reviews Online

Abstract

Groves mechanisms 288 10.4.2The VCG mechanism 292 10.4.3 VCG and individual rationality 295 10.4.4 VCG and weak budget balance 296 10.4.5 Drawbacks of VCG 297 10.4.6 Budget balance and efficiency 301 10.4.7 The AGV mechanism 302 10.5 Beyond efficiency 303 10.5.1 What else can be implemented in dominant strategies?303 10.5.2 Tractable Groves mechanisms 305 10.6 Computational applications of mechanism design 307 10.6.1 Task scheduling 307 10.6.2Bandwidth allocation in computer networks 309 10.6.3Multicast cost sharing 312 10.

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Crossref · 10.5860/choice.46-5662

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3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Mechanism designers have developed incentive-compatible systems that can lead to cooperation between self-interested agents, but these systems often assume a top-down process that coordinates the process.

    “Although mechanism designers have developed incentive-compatible systems that can lead to cooperation between self-interested agents, these systems often assume a top-down process that coordinates the process [65, 75].”

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Authors
Shoham, Y., & Leyton‐Brown, K.
Affiliations
  • Stanford University (US)
  • University of British Columbia (CA)
Venue
Choice Reviews Online
Published
2009-06-01
Volume
46
Issue
10
Pages
46-5662-46-5662
ISSN
  • 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
  • 1523-8253
OpenAlex
W1528676759
Cited by
1,756
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 52 · 2022: 68 · 2021: 127 · 2020: 110 · 2019: 132 · 2018: 142 · 2017: 113 · 2016: 147 · 2015: 131 · 2014: 143 · 2013: 134 · 2012: 118
Type
book review
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Choice Reviews Online (publishedVersion)
  • CERN Document Server (European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
Keywords
multi-agent systems, mechanism design, Groves mechanism, VCG mechanism, individual rationality, budget balance, dominant strategy implementation, task scheduling, bandwidth allocation

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