The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On limiting the market for status signals
Open accessAbstract
In many societies, individuals care how others view them. In their efforts to impress, such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type. This leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a Pareto- improving tax policy. The impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered.
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Cites
An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma
Moffitt, R. (1983) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,094
The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods
Frank, R. H. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 800
Are Workers Paid their Marginal Products
Frank, R. H. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 401
Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers
Blackorby, C., & Donaldson, D. J. (1988) · American Economic Review · Cited by 322
Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
Mailath, G. J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913560 · Cited by 260
Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination
Besley, T. J., & Coate, S. (1992) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(92)90025-b · Cited by 256
Means Testing versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programmes
Besley, T. (1990) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554085 · Cited by 139
A simple model for merit good arguments
Besley, T. J. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90038-2 · Cited by 103
Cited by
Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles
Clark, A. E., Frijters, P., & Shields, M. A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.1.95 · Cited by 3,159
Satisfaction and comparison income
Clark, A. E., & Oswald, A. J. (1996) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)01564-7 · Cited by 2,948
Is the desire for status a fundamental human motive? A review of the empirical literature.
Anderson, C., Hildreth, J. A. D., & Howland, L. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0038781 · Cited by 1,133
Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
A Signaling Explanation for Charity
Glazer, A., & Konrad, K. A. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_43 · Cited by 688
Metadata
- Authors
- Ireland, N. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1994-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 91-110
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2075699506
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 11.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.