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Cited by 123

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Managerial discretion, organizational structure, and corporate performance

Denis, David J., Denis, Diane K.·1993·Journal of Accounting and Economics
DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(93)90011-4
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Crossref · 10.1016/0165-4101(93)90011-4

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  • Academic and anecdotal evidence suggest that bankers and buyout specialists took the cash flow forecasts very seriously.

    “Finally, academic and anecdotal evidence suggest that bankers and buyout specialists took the cash flow forecasts vely seriously.”

    From The Valuation of Cash Flow Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis (1995) · cites this paper as Denis and Denis (1993)

Citations

Cites

No references could be resolved yet.

Research works printed but not linked: 29

  1. Baker, 1989, Organizational changes and value creation in leveraged buyouts: The case of O.M. Scott & Sons Company, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 163, 10.1016/0304-405X(89)90080-9 · DOI
  2. Dann, 1988, Corporate financial policy and corporate control: A study of defensive adjustments in asset and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 87, 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90041-4 · DOI
  3. Denis, 1990, Defensive changes in corporate payout policy: Share repurchases and special dividends, Journal of Finance, 45, 1433, 10.2307/2328744 · DOI
  4. Denis, 1992, Corporate investment decisions and corporate control: Evidence from going private transactions, Financial Management, 10.2307/3666021 · DOI
  5. Gupta, 1991, Ownership structure, leverage, and firm value: The case of leveraged recapitalizations, Financial Management, 20, 69, 10.2307/3665752 · DOI
  6. Jarrell, 1989, The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers: Evidence from three decades, Financial Management, 18, 12, 10.2307/3665645 · DOI
  7. Jensen, 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, American Economic Review, 76, 323
  8. Jensen, 1989, Active investors, LBOs, and the privatization of bankruptcy, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2, 35, 10.1111/j.1745-6622.1989.tb00551.x · DOI
  9. Jensen, 1990, Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225, 10.1086/261677 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Kaplan, 1989, Management buyouts: Evidence of taxes as a source of value, Journal of Finance, 44, 611, 10.2307/2328773 · DOI
  11. Kaplan, 1989, The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value, Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 217, 10.1016/0304-405X(89)90047-0 · DOI
  12. Kaplan, 1990, How risky is the debt in highly leveraged transactions? Evidence from public recapitalizations, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 215, 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90027-W · DOI
  13. Lang, 1991, A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The case of bidder returns, Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 315, 10.1016/0304-405X(91)90005-5 · DOI
  14. Lehn, 1989, Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private transactions, Journal of Finance, 44, 771, 10.2307/2328782 · DOI
  15. Loderer, 1990, Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: The experience of a comprehensive sample, Financial Management, 19, 17, 10.2307/3665607 · DOI
  16. Lowenstein, 1985, Management buyouts, Columbia Law Review, 85, 730, 10.2307/1122333 · DOI
  17. McConnell, 1985, Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm, Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 399, 10.1016/0304-405X(85)90006-6 · DOI
  18. McConnell, 1985, Corporate combinations and common stock returns: The case of joint ventures, Journal of Finance, 40, 519, 10.2307/2327898 · DOI
  19. Mikkelson, 1989, Manager's voting rights and corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 263, 10.1016/0304-405X(89)90084-6 · DOI
  20. Mitchell, 1990, Do bad bidders become good targets?, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 372, 10.1086/261682 · DOI
  21. Morck, 1990, Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?, Journal of Finance, 45, 31, 10.2307/2328808 · DOI
  22. Murphy, 1985, Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 11, 10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6 · DOI
  23. Muscarella, 1990, Efficiency and organizational structure: A study of reverse LBOs, Journal of Finance, 45, 1389, 10.2307/2328742 · DOI
  24. Shleifer, 1989, Managerial entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 123, 10.1016/0304-405X(89)90099-8 · DOI
  25. Smith, 1990, Corporate ownership structure and performance: The case of management buyouts, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 143, 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90024-T · DOI
  26. Stulz, 1988, Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25, 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90039-6 · DOI · Paper page
  27. Stulz, 1990, Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies, Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 3, 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90011-N · DOI
  28. Travlos, 1987, Corporate takeover bids, method of payment, and bidding firm's stock returns, Journal of Finance, 42, 943, 10.2307/2328300 · DOI
  29. Waite, 1991, The eclipse of growth capital, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 4, 77, 10.1111/j.1745-6622.1991.tb00574.x · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Denis, D. J., & Denis, D. K.
Venue
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1993-01
Volume
16
Issue
1-3
Pages
209-236
ISSN
0165-4101
DOI
10.1016/0165-4101(93)90011-4
Cited by
123
References
0
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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