Managerial control of voting rights
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Large owners have greater incentives to acquire information and monitor managers than small shareholders.
“Large owners have greater incentives to acquire information and monitor managers than small shareholders”
From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as Stulz, 1988
Entrenchment can also produce beneficial effects by reducing the extent to which the threat of a takeover distorts investments in long-term projects or by enabling managers to extract higher acquisition premia in negotiated transactions.
“To be sure, entrenchment can also produce beneficial effects by reducing the extent to which the threat of a takeover distorts investments in long-term projects [Stein (1988) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993)] or by enabling managers to extract higher acquisition premia in negotiated transactions [Stulz (1988)].”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Stulz (1988)
Cited by
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Finance, Growth, and Inequality
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- Authors
- Stulz, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1988-01
- Volume
- 20
- Pages
- 25-54
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1494703832
- Cited by
- 2,429
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 72 · 2020: 59 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 65 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 89 · 2015: 87 · 2014: 89 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 95.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Private Equity and Venture Capital
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
- Keywords
- firm value, financing decisions, tender offers, takeover premiums, shareholder value, capital structure, corporate control
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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