Cited by 2,429Corporate Finance and GovernancePrivate Equity and Venture CapitalFinancial Reporting and Valuation Research

Managerial control of voting rights

Stulz, RenéM.·1988·Journal of Financial Economics

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

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Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Large owners have greater incentives to acquire information and monitor managers than small shareholders.

    “Large owners have greater incentives to acquire information and monitor managers than small shareholders”

    From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as Stulz, 1988

  • Entrenchment can also produce beneficial effects by reducing the extent to which the threat of a takeover distorts investments in long-term projects or by enabling managers to extract higher acquisition premia in negotiated transactions.

    “To be sure, entrenchment can also produce beneficial effects by reducing the extent to which the threat of a takeover distorts investments in long-term projects [Stein (1988) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993)] or by enabling managers to extract higher acquisition premia in negotiated transactions [Stulz (1988)].”

    From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Stulz (1988)

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Stulz, R.
Venue
Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1988-01
Volume
20
Pages
25-54
ISSN
0304-405X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1494703832
Cited by
2,429
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 72 · 2020: 59 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 65 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 89 · 2015: 87 · 2014: 89 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 132
FWCI
95.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Private Equity and Venture Capital
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
Keywords
firm value, financing decisions, tender offers, takeover premiums, shareholder value, capital structure, corporate control

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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