The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Network externalities, complementarities, and invitations to enter
Open accessAbstract
We discuss the incentive of an exclusive holder of a technology to share it with competitors in a market with network externalities. We assume that high expected sales increase the willingness to pay for the good. This is named the "network effect". At a stable fulfilled expectations equilibrium, where the actual sales are equal to the expected ones, it is shown that, if the network effect is sufficiently strong, a quantity leader has an incentive to invite entry and license his technology without charge. If the quantity leader has the opportunity to use lump sum license fees, he will invite a larger number of competitors. If no lump sum fees are allowed, the leader will charge a decreasing fee in the intensity of the network externality and will invite entry. In markets with very strong network externalities, the leader pays a subsidy to the invited followers. We also show that the results hold under uncertainty, and when the post-entry competition is Cournot.
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Cites
Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods
Salop, S. C. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003323 · Cited by 2,975
Systems Competition and Network Effects
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1994) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.2.93 · Cited by 2,646
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555589 · Cited by 2,597
A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service
Rohlfs, J. (1974) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003090 · Cited by 1,001
Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information
Gallini, N. T., & Wright, B. D. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555500 · Cited by 487
Competition and Integration Among Complements, and Network Market Structure
Economides, N., & Salop, S. C. (1992) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2950629 · Cited by 411
Self-citationWilson, R. (1993) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195068856.001.0001 · Cited by 400
Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition
Farrell, J., & Gallini, N. T. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886069 · Cited by 312
Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities
Economides, N. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 273
Self-citationNetwork effects without network externalities
Chou, C.-F., & Shy, O. (1990) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(90)90019-w · Cited by 249
Cited by
Economides, N. (1996) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(96)01015-6 · Cited by 1,583
Self-citationChapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03031-7 · Cited by 1,061
Open Platform Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control
Boudreau, K. (2010) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1215 · Cited by 978
Boudreau, K. J. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0678 · Cited by 676
Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature
Rietveld, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2021) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206320969791 · Cited by 504
Metadata
- Authors
- Economides, N.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-09
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 211-233
- ISSN
- 0176-2680 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2570665819
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 27.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.