The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information
Abstract
Licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions, including the form and size of the payment to the inventor (fixed fee versus some output-based royalty), the degree of exclusivity, and the division of rents. In this article, we show that the form of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange: the superiority of a licensor's precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and the fact that sharing this information with the licensee may facilitate imitation. We show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output-based payment (or royalty) and may leave some of the rents with the licensee. Conditions under which exclusive license contracts (linear and nonlinear) and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified.
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Cites
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Dugger, W. M. (1987) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1987.11504638 · Cited by 14,786
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Teece, D. (1993) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/0048-7333(93)90063-n · Cited by 7,242
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261408 · Cited by 2,271
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure
Bhattacharya, S., & Ritter, J. R. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297419 · Cited by 721
Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent
Kamien, M. I., & Tauman, Y. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885693 · Cited by 632
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&DPreprint
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 508
How to License Intangible Property
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885697 · Cited by 506
Cited by
Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions
Jensen, R., & Thursby, M. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.1.240 · Cited by 1,159
Harhoff, D., Henkel, J., & von Hippel, E. (2003) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(03)00061-1 · Cited by 772
Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome
Williams, H. L. (2013) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/669706 · Cited by 506
Licensing the market for technology
Arora, A., & Fosfuri, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00002-7 · Cited by 443
How do foreign patent rights affect U.S. exports, affiliate sales, and licenses?
Smith, P. J. (2001) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00086-1 · Cited by 371
Metadata
- Authors
- Gallini, N. T., & Wright, B. D.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1990
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 147
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982763318
- Cited by
- 487
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 10.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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