Organizational forms and investment decisions

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491

CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*

Sharpe, W. F. (1964) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02865.x · Cited by 19,441

Separation of Ownership and Control

Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058

The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets

Lintner, J. (1965) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1924119 · Cited by 6,877

THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]

Lintner, J. (1975) · Stochastic Optimization Models in Finance · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-780850-5.50018-6 · Cited by 6,743

Agency Problems and Residual Claims

Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827

On financial contracting

Smith, C. W., & Warner, J. B. (1979) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(79)90011-4 · Cited by 2,894

Theory of Value

Baudier, E., & Debreu, G. (1959) · Cited by 2,545

The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing

Arrow, K. J. (1973) · Readings in Welfare Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15492-0_19 · Cited by 1,179

The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing

Arrow, K. J. (1964) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296188 · Cited by 1,172

The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations

Sahlman, W. A. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90065-8 · Cited by 2,609

Corporate finance and corporate governance

WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04592.x · Cited by 2,266

Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic management research

Bascle, G. (2008) · Strategic Organization · doi:10.1177/1476127008094339 · Cited by 1,133

The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea

Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., & Yoo, S. S. (2007) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000003458 · Cited by 486

Investment in Relationship-Specific Assets: Does Finance Matter?

Strieborny, M., & Kukenova, M. (2016) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfv049 · Cited by 26