The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 102 of the 111 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Large shareholders, however, create a different agency problem: Conflicts arise between the controlling shareholder and other shareholders”
From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as Jensen and Meckling, 1976
In the citing paper
“Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) posited that agency cost occurred from separation of ownership control and manager interests that result in conflicts.”
From Capital Structure and Financial Performance: Panel Evidence from Quoted Manufacturing Firms in Nigeria (2011–2020) (2023) · cites this paper as Jensen and Meckling (1976)
In the citing paper
“In both the contractual framework of Jensen and Meckling, and the residual control rights framework of Grossman, Hart and Moore, the rights of the investors are protected, and sometimes even specified, by the legal system.”
From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as Jensen and Meckling (1976)
Citations
Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*
Sharpe, W. F. (1964) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02865.x · Cited by 19,441
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Simon, H. A. (1955) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884852 · Cited by 15,877
EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK*
Malkiel, B. G., & Fama, E. F. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00518.x · Cited by 15,699
A Behavioral Theory of the FirmPreprint
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 15,384
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
Miller, M. H. (1958) · American Economic Review · Cited by 14,574
The theory of the growth of the firm
Penrose, E. (1996) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/s0024-6301(96)90295-2 · Cited by 13,770
Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work
Fama, E. F. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325486 · Cited by 13,635
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Coase, 1964, Discussion, American Economic Review, LIV, 194
- Manne, 1972, The social responsibility of regulated utilities, Wisconsin Law Review, V, 995
- Ross, 1973, The economic theory of agency: The principals problems, American Economic Review, LXII, 134
- Simon, 1959, Theories of decision making in economics and behavioral science, American Economic Review, 253
Cited by
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Self-citationCorporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm
Grant, R. M. (1996) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250171110 · Cited by 16,157
Metadata
- Authors
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H.
- Affiliations
- University of Rochester (US)
- ORCID
- Jensen, Michael C.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1976-10
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 305-360
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2752617332
- Cited by
- 71,491
- References
- 111
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3604 · 2025: 3966 · 2024: 3845 · 2023: 4284 · 2022: 3843 · 2021: 3870 · 2020: 3665 · 2019: 3275 · 2018: 3203 · 2017: 2874 · 2016: 2727 · 2015: 3042 · 2014: 3081 · 2013: 2998 · 2012: 2758
- FWCI
- 260.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Law › Corporate Insolvency and Governance
- Keywords
- theory of the firm, agency costs, ownership structure, managerial behavior, separation of ownership and control, debt, Pareto optimality, property rights, joint-stock companies, corporate governance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
- The paper
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.