Compositionality: A connectionist variation on a classical theme

Abstract

Connectionism has been attacked on the grounds that it does not employ compositionally structured representations (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This article develops the response that Connectionist models can, and in fact sometimes do, employ compositionally structured representations without, thereby, simply implementing a Classical “Language of Thought.” Focusing on the mode of combination employed in constructing representations, it distinguishes concatenative compositionality, essential to the Classical approach, from a merely functional counterpart increasingly common in Connectionist research. On the basis of this distinction it is possible to demonstrate that Connectionist representations can be compositional without being Classical, and further, that Fodor and Pylyshyn's supposedly conclusive arguments in favor of the Classical approach do not in fact support that approach over the Connectionist alternative (as opposed to an “ossociotionist” straw man).