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Compensating corporate venture managers
Open accessAbstract
This article reports the results of a questionnaire survey addressed to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies concerning incentive practices for venture managers. Data was also collected for venture performance history in these companies. Highlights of the results are: Most companies are not providing different incentives for venture managers than for other managers. Companies that do and companies that do not provide special incentives seem to agree on the types of incentives which would promote improved venture performance, which include milestone bonuses, equity, and/or options in the new venture, variable bonuses based on venture ROI. The primary obstacle to installing such incentives is reported by firms without special incentives in place to be concern about internal equity. Firms with special incentives already in place have less concern with this problem. A moderate problem to such firms is difficulty in defining venture objectives. There is no evidence, from this study, that special incentives for venture managers affected the outcome in venture performance, when such performance was measured by the percentage of “successes” and “failures.” About 50% success rate was reported by each group. The article deals with these questions: Are performance incentives essential? Certainly not, from the data in this sample, but this was a “head count” of successes and failures—a study of overall economic performance might yield a different result. One expensive failure can wipe out the gains from many small successes. Are the incentives reported effective? Obviously not enough to show a difference between those who use them and those who don't. Analysis of the incentive elements used and the earnings limits imposed suggest that the special incentives are not particularly special, nor very much of an incentive. Further, the most common incentive reported, based on venture ROI, fails to consider the time period usually required to achieve a positive ROI, and the many changes of management which occur during that period. What criteria should be used for designing an incentive program for venture managers? Recognition of the probability of management change, incentives which promote early identification of need for change of direction or to abort, focus on event completion milestones rather than the calendar, the relationship of reward potential to risk potential including job security and actual financial risk by the venture manager, achievability, and simplicity are factors to be considered. What kind of financial incentives might be included in incentive design? Depending on the life cycle stage of the venture, fixed and variable bonuses, options for equity or shadow equity in the venture itself, actual equity in the new venture, and to a lesser extent, salary increases and equity or equity options in the parent are suggested. How can the obstacles to installation of performance incentives for venture managers be reduced? To reduce perception of internal inequity, relating potential risk to potential reward and extending performance incentives to other managers is suggested. The problem of defining venture objectives as an obstacle is instantly solved as an incentive issue by making ownership possibility a reality for venture management, especially with financial investment required by venture management.
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Citations
Cited by
Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and Entrepreneurial Failure
McGrath, R. G. (1999) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259034 · Cited by 1,476
Hornsby, J. S., Kuratko, D. F., & Zahra, S. A. (2002) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/s0883-9026(00)00059-8 · Cited by 1,156
Why do some societies invent more than others?
Shane, S. A. (1992) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/0883-9026(92)90033-n · Cited by 683
A Model of Middle–Level Managers’ Entrepreneurial Behavior
Kuratko, D. F., Ireland, R. D., Covin, J. G., & Hornsby, J. S. (2005) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2005.00104.x · Cited by 621
When does corporate venture capital investment create firm value?
Dushnitsky, G., & Lenox, M. J. (2006) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2005.04.012 · Cited by 550
Metadata
- Authors
- Block, Z., & Ornati, O. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Venturing
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1987
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 41-51
- ISSN
- 0883-9026 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2054639334
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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