Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
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In Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990), when the pie shrunk at the same rate for both individuals, the rejection rate was only 12 percent in the first round, but when the pie shrunk at different rates for each subject, the rejection rate was 57 percent in the first round.
“In one investigation of this game, Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990) found that when the pie shrunk at the same rate for both individuals, the rejection rate was only 12 percent in the first round, but when the pie shrunk at different rates for each subject, the rejection rate was 57 percent in the first round.”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990)
The Weg et al. (1990) result is consistent with the self-serving bias: subjects whose pies shrank relatively slowly viewed this as justification for requesting a large fraction of the pie, while subjects whose pies shrunk quickly rejected the rate of pie-shrinkage as a criterion for allocating the pie.
“Again, consistent with the self-serving bias, perhaps subjects whose pies shrank relatively slowly viewed this as justification for requesting a large fraction of the pie, but subjects whose pies shrunk quickly rejected the rate of pie-shrinkage as a criterion for allocating the pie.”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990)
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Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.11.1.109 · Cited by 1,071 · see citing works
- Authors
- Weg, E., Rapoport, A., & Felsenthal, D. S.
- Affiliations
- University of Haifa (IL)
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1990-03
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 76-95
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069681584
- Cited by
- 65
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 2 · 2015: 1 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 14.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- two-person bargaining, alternating offers, infinite horizon games, discount factor, subgame perfect equilibrium, fairness norms, equity norms, surplus distribution, counteroffers
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