CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,080Conflict Management and NegotiationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases

Open access
Babcock, Linda, Loewenstein, George·1997·Journal of Economic Perspectives
DOI 10.1257/jep.11.1.109
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

The authors review studies conducted by themselves and coauthors that document a 'self-serving' bias in judgments of fairness and demonstrate that the bias is an important cause of impasse in negotiations. They discuss experimental evidence showing that (1) the bias causes impasse; (2) it is possible to reduce impasses by debiasing bargainers; and (3) the bias results from selective evaluation of information. The authors also review results from a field study of negotiations between teachers' unions and school boards in Pennsylvania that both document the fairness bias in a naturalistic setting and demonstrates its impact on strikes.

Verified 2026-10-23 · 1 reference not checked yet

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that a self-serving bias — the tendency to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself — is a major cause of bargaining impasse, operating even when disputants have identical information and no incentive to be strategic. Evidence from a controlled tort-case experiment, a field study of Pennsylvania teacher negotiations, and reinterpretations of prior bargaining experiments links biased assessments of fairness to higher rates of impasse and strike activity.

Key findings

  • In the Texas tort experiment (80 University of Chicago undergraduates and 80 University of Texas law students), plaintiffs' predictions of the judge's award averaged $14,527 higher than defendants', and plaintiffs' fair-settlement values averaged $17,709 higher, both statistically different from zero (p < .0001).
  • Impasse tracked the size of the discrepancy: in one experiment only 4% of negotiations with below-median discrepancy ended in impasse versus 28% above the median; in the role-timing manipulation, 6% of negotiations were resolved by the judge when subjects learned their role after reading the case versus 28% when they knew their role initially.
  • A debiasing intervention (informing subjects of the bias and asking them to list weaknesses in their own case) reduced the discrepancy in expectations from $21,783 to $4,674 (p < .05) and cut the impasse rate from 35% to 4% (p < .01). Merely informing subjects of the bias had no effect on their own predictions, though it made them more realistic about the other party's predictions.
  • In the Pennsylvania teacher field study, union-listed comparable districts averaged $27,633 in salary versus $26,922 for board-listed districts (mean difference $711, about 2.4% of average teacher salary); a district where the union's list averaged $1,000 more than the board's was approximately 49% more likely to strike. Since 1971, roughly 8% of teacher contract negotiations ended in strikes, averaging 16.4 days.

Methods

  • Controlled laboratory bargaining: a tort case based on a real Texas trial (motorcyclist suing for $100,000), with plaintiff and defendant subjects given identical 27 pages of case materials, asked to predict the judge's award and a fair settlement, then allowed 30 minutes to negotiate with accumulating court costs; a manipulation varied whether subjects learned their role before or after reading the case.
  • Field study: surveys of union and school board presidents in all Pennsylvania school districts on which districts they viewed as comparable for salary negotiations, linked to district-level data on strikes, salaries, and demographics; regression of strike incidence on the difference in average salaries of the two parties' lists, controlling for district wealth and local labor market conditions. Response rates were 57% for union presidents and 35% for school board presidents.
  • Reinterpretation of prior experimental results (Roth and Murnighan's lottery-chip game, shrinking-pie and ultimatum games, Thompson and Loewenstein's labor-management study, Babcock and Olson's Wisconsin arbitration study) as manifestations of the self-serving bias.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the first tort experiment does not necessarily demonstrate that the self-serving bias causes impasse, since a third factor such as aggressiveness could drive both misestimation and unwillingness to settle; the role-timing manipulation was introduced to address this.
  • The authors state an unresolved issue: whether it benefits a party to be less biased, holding the other party's beliefs constant, since reduced bias may lower impasse but also make a party less persuasive in negotiation.
  • The paper notes (in a footnote) selectivity concerns in the field survey response rates; evident from the text, the debiasing interventions that worked (learning one's role late, listing weaknesses in one's own case) have limited practical applicability, and the essay-style perspective-taking intervention moved the discrepancy in the opposite direction to the intended one.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/jep.11.1.109

Cites

60 of 149 references verified0 citation errors · 88 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

4 of 54 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Premisecitation

    In a survey of 205 experienced bankruptcy lawyers and 150 judges involved in bankruptcy cases, comparisons of judges' and lawyers' responses revealed a self-serving bias in virtually every question.

    “Comparisons of judges' and lawyers' responses revealed a self-serving bias in virtually every question in the survey.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eisenberg (1994)

      Section I, “The Data,” reports 205 lawyer responses and 150 judge responses. Section II and the discussion of Tables 1–3 describe substantial self-serving, or egocentric, differences between judges’ and lawyers’ responses. The paper establishes this pattern for the questions it analyzes, not for virtually every question in the survey. (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Findingown data

    In the first Texas tort experiment, nonsettlement was strongly related to the discrepancy between plaintiffs' and defendants' predictions of what the judge would award.

    “The first row of the table shows that in this experiment, nonsetdement was strongly related to the discrepancy between the plaintiffs' and defendants' predictions of what the judge would award.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    In the debiasing intervention, the discrepancy in parties' expectations about the judge averaged $21,783 in the control condition but only $4,674 when subjects received the debiasing procedure (p < .05).

    “The effect of this intervention was to diminish the discrepancy in the parties' expectations about the judge (see the second section of Table 2): the discrepancy averaged $21,783 in the control condition, in which neither party received this intervention, but only $4,674 when the subjects received the debiasing procedure (p < .05).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1996

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Findingown data

    In the Pennsylvania teacher negotiations field study, a district where the average salary of the union's list is $1000 greater than the board's list will be approximately 49 percent more likely to strike than a district where the average salaries of the union's and board's lists are the same.

    “The point estimate suggests that a district where the average salary of the union's list is $1000 greater than the board's list will be approximately 49 percent more likely to strike than a district where the average salaries of the union's and board's lists are the same.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    In the Pennsylvania teacher negotiations field study, the average salary in districts listed by the union was $27,633, while the average salary in districts listed by the board was $26,922.

    “The average salary in districts listed by the union was $27,633, while the average salary in districts listed by the board was $26,922.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 37
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 16

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    37 percent of judges reported that they most frequently allow reimbursement at the value of the services, while only 15 percent of lawyers reported that judges reimburse at such rates.

    “Thirty-seven percent of judges reported that they most frequently allow reimbursement at the”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eisenberg (1994)

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    60 percent of lawyers reported that they always comply with fee guidelines, but judges reported that only 18 percent of attorneys always comply.

    “Sixty percent of lawyers report that they always comply with fee guidelines, but judges reported that only 18 percent of attorneys always comply.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eisenberg (1994)

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    78 percent of judges reported that they rule on interim fee applications at the fee hearing, but only 46 percent of lawyers reported that judges rule so quickly.

    “For example, 78 percent of judges reported that they rule on interim fee applications at the fee hearing, but only 46 percent of lawyers report that the judges rule so quickly.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eisenberg (1994)

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the Texas tort experiment, plaintiffs tended to weight arguments favoring the plaintiff as much more compelling than those favoring the defendant, and vice versa.

    “Consistent with the psychology research, plaintiffs tended to weight arguments favoring the plaintiff as much more compelling than those favoring the defendant, and vice versa.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer, 1995

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Informing subjects of the bias made them more realistic about the predictions of the other party, but did not cause them to modify their own predictions of the judge.

    “Our results indicate that informing subjects of the bias made them more realistic about the predictions of the other party.However, it did not cause them to modify their own predictions of the judge.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the new Texas tort study, only 4 percent of negotiations in which the discrepancy was below the median ended in impasse, while 28 percent of pairs above the median discrepancy failed to settle.

    “As in the previous experiment, the discrepancy in the parties' assessments of the judge's decision was related to settlement; only 4 percent of the negotiations in which the discrepancy was below the median ended in impasse while 28 percent of pairs above the median discrepancy failed to settle (see the second row of Table 1).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In the first Texas tort experiment, negotiators formed self-serving assessments of the judge's award and the discrepancy between plaintiffs' and defendants' assessments was correlated with the parties' ability to reach voluntary settlements.

    “Our first experiment with this framework found strong evidence that the negotiators formed self-serving assessments of the judge's award and that the discrepancy between the plaintiffs' and defendants' assessments was correlated with the parties' ability to reach voluntary settlements (Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer Table 1 Probability of Impasse by Discrepancy Between Plaintiffs' and Defendant”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer and Babcock, 1993 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Instructing subjects to write an essay arguing the opponent's case changed the discrepancy in expectations in a marginally statistically significant way opposite to the intended direction, and had no significant impact on the settlement rate.

    “This did change the discrepancy in expectations, and in a way that was marginally statistically significant, but opposite to the intended direction.Again, there was no significant impact on the settlement rate.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the new Texas tort study, when subjects did not learn their roles until after they read the case and made their assessments, only 6 percent of negotiations were resolved by the judge; when subjects knew their roles initially, 28 percent of negotiations had to be resolved by the judge, a statistically significant difference.

    “Consistent with a causal relationship running from the self-serving bias to impasse, when the subjects did not learn their roles until after they read the case and made their assessments of the judge and fairness, only 6 percent of the negotiations were resolved by the judge; however, when the subjects knew their roles initially, 28 percent of negotiations had to be resolved by the judge (this”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer, 1995

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Informing subjects of the self-serving bias had no effect on the discrepancy in the parties' expectations, nor on the likelihood of settlement.

    “However, being informed of the bias had no effect on the discrepancy in the parties' expectations, nor on the likelihood of settlement.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the first Texas tort experiment, plaintiffs' predictions of the judge averaged $14,527 higher than defendants', and plaintiffs' fair settlement values averaged $17,709 higher than defendants', with both differences statistically different from zero (p < .0001).

    “The self-serving bias was clear in that plaintiffs' predictions of the judge averaged $14,527 higher than defendants', and plaintiffs' fair settlement values averaged $17,709 higher than defendants', with both differences statistically different from zero (p < .0001).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the Pennsylvania teacher negotiations field study, the mean difference of $711 is statistically and economically significant; it is equivalent to about 2.4 percent of average teacher salary at a time when salary increases averaged less than 5 percent per year.

    “The mean difference of $711 is statistically and economically significant; it is equivalent to about 2.4 percent of average teacher salary at a time when salary increases averaged less than 5 percent per year.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    All experimental subjects, especially the law and business school students, had numerous experiences with bargaining prior to participating in the experiment, but this experience did not seem to alert them even to the existence of the self-serving bias, let alone give them the capacity to counteract it.

    “Undoubtedly, all of our experimental subjects, especially the law and business school students, had numerous experiences with bargaining prior to participating in our experiment, but this experience did not seem to alert them even to the existence of the self-serving bias, let alone actually give them the capacity to counteract it.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    In the Texas tort experiment, both parties were given the same case information and neither had private information about the judge, so differences in estimates between defendant and plaintiff cannot be attributed to differences in information.

    “Since both parties are given the same case information and neither party has private information about the judge, differences in estimates between defendant and plaintiff cannot be attributed to differences in information.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Messick and Sentis (1979), seven-hour subjects thought the 10-hour subject should be paid $30.29 on average, while 10-hour subjects thought they should be paid $35.24; the $4.95 difference was cited as evidence of a self-serving bias in perceptions of fairness.

    “Seven-hour subjects, on average, thought the 10-hour subject should be paid $30.29.However, the 10-hour subjects thought they should be paid $35.24.The difference between $30.29 and $35.24-$4.95-wascited as evidence of a selfserving bias in perceptions of fairness.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Messick and Sentis (1979) source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The first Texas tort study does not necessarily demonstrate that the self-serving bias causes impasse; a third factor such as aggressiveness could cause certain subjects to misestimate the judge and be unwilling to settle.

    “One limitation of this study is that it does not necessarily demonstrate that the self-serving bias causes impasse.It is possible, for example, that there is a third factor, perhaps some element of personality such as aggressiveness, that causes certain subjects to misestimate the judge and to be unwilling to setde.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    The self-serving bias, and the impasses it causes, occurs even when disputants possess identical information.

    “The evidence we review shows that the self-serving bias, and the impasses it causes, occurs even when disputants possess identical information, which suggests that private and incomplete information may not be as critical for nonsettlement as is commonly believed.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Prior research on self-serving biases and biased processing suggests that the bias results from selective information processing.

    “Prior research on self-serving biases (Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg, 1989), and on biased processing of information in general (Darley and Gross, 1983), suggests that the bias results from selective information processing.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg, 1989 source
    • cites Darley and Gross, 1983 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    When subjects learned about the bias, they apparently assumed that the other person would succumb to it, but did not think it applied to themselves.

    “When they learned about the bias, subjects apparently assumed that the other person would succumb to it, but did not think it applied to themselves.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    People tend to attribute their successes to ability and skill, but their failures to bad luck.

    “People also tend to attribute their successes to ability and skill, but their failures to bad luck (Zuckerman, 1979).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Zuckerman, 1979 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In the Princeton-Dartmouth football study, Princeton students saw Dartmouth commit twice as many flagrant penalties and three times as many mild penalties as their own team, while Dartmouth students recorded approximately equal penalties by both teams.

    “Princeton students saw the Dartmouth team commit twice as many flagrant penalties and three times as many mild penalties as their own team.Dartmouth students, on the other hand, recorded an approximately equal number of penalties by both teams.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hastorf and Cantril (1954) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    A likely interpretation of Roth and Murnighan (1982) is that both sides viewed as fair the focal settlement that benefitted themselves, so the $20-prize player was likely to hold out for half of the chips, while the $5-prize player demanded equal expected values.

    “A likely interpretation is that both sides viewed as fair the focal settlement that benefitted themselves, so the $20prize player was likely to hold out for half of the chips, while the $5-prize player demanded equal expected values.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Roth and Murnighan, 1982 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The self-serving bias does not come from asymmetric information; parties even with complete information interpret the situation in different ways.

    “This should not be taken to mean that the bias comes from asymmetric information.Instead, what we have in mind is that the parties-even with complete information-interpret the situation in different ways.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The Weg et al. (1990) result is consistent with the self-serving bias: subjects whose pies shrank relatively slowly viewed this as justification for requesting a large fraction of the pie, while subjects whose pies shrunk quickly rejected the rate of pie-shrinkage as a criterion for allocating the pie.

    “Again, consistent with the self-serving bias, perhaps subjects whose pies shrank relatively slowly viewed this as justification for requesting a large fraction of the pie, but subjects whose pies shrunk quickly rejected the rate of pie-shrinkage as a criterion for allocating the pie.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Proposers in the contest condition felt self-servingly entitled to a higher payoff, but responders did not view the contest as relevant to the fair division of the pie.

    “It seems that proposers in the contest condition felt self-servingly entitled to a higher payoff, but responders did not view the contest as relevant to the fair division of the pie.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994), offers in the contest condition were lower than in the chance condition, and the rejection rate was substantially higher.

    “Offers in the contest condition were lower than in the chance condition, and the rejection rate was substantially higher.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Thompson and Loewenstein (1992), management estimates of a fair settlement were significantly lower than those provided by the union, and there was a significant positive correlation between the difference in assessments of fairness and the length of strikes.

    “In an experimental study of labormanagement negotiations, Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) found that management estimates of a fair settlement were significantly lower than those provided by the union and observed a significant positive correlation between the difference in assessments of fairness and the length of strikes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Camerer and Loewenstein (1993), subjects bargained over the sale of a piece of land, knowing only their reservation value, and all pairs agreed on a sale price.

    “In a study by Camerer and Loewenstein (1993), subjects bargained over the sale of a piece of land, knowing only their reservation value.All pairs agreed on a sale price.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Camerer and Loewenstein (1993) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    In ultimatum games, the modal offer is typically half the pie, and smaller offers are often rejected.

    “But in practice, the modal offer is typically half the pie, and smaller offers are often rejected.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    As Cox and Isaac (1986) write, experiments in economics do not normally involve role playing by subjects, that is, experiments in which the instructions, context, and/or motivation of the experimental design draw upon subjects' knowledge of economic agents or institutions outside the laboratory.

    “As Cox and Isaac (1986) write, experiments in economics do not normally involve”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cox and Isaac (1986)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Roth and Murnighan (1982), when neither player knew who would receive which payoff, subjects generally agreed to divide the chips about equally and only 12 percent of pairs failed to reach an agreement; when both subjects knew who was assigned to which payoff, 22 percent failed to reach agreement.

    “When neither player knew who would receive which payoff, subjects generally agreed to divide the chips about equally and only 12 percent of pairs failed to reach an agreement and ended up with no payoff.However, when both subjects knew who was assigned to which payoff, 22 percent failed to reach agreement.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Roth and Murnighan, 1982 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990), when the pie shrunk at the same rate for both individuals, the rejection rate was only 12 percent in the first round, but when the pie shrunk at different rates for each subject, the rejection rate was 57 percent in the first round.

    “In one investigation of this game, Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990) found that when the pie shrunk at the same rate for both individuals, the rejection rate was only 12 percent in the first round, but when the pie shrunk at different rates for each subject, the rejection rate was 57 percent in the first round.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    As asymmetries are introduced between parties, both parties' notions of fairness tend to gravitate toward settlements that favor themselves, and they believe their personal conception of fairness is impartial.

    “However, even in a very simple setting like this, as soon as asymmetries are introduced between the parties-for example, different nonagreement values or costs of nonsettlement, or subtle differences in roles-both parties' notions of fairness will tend to gravitate toward settlements that favor themselves.They will not only view these settlements as fair, but believe that their personal conception”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Rejections in ultimatum experiments can be explained by self-serving biases: proposers view themselves in a powerful role and believe they deserve more than half, whereas responders do not believe that role should affect the division of the pie.

    “Although ultimatum experiments have been used by economists to illustrate the importance of fairness considerations, rejections in these experiments can be explained by self-serving biases.Proposers, who view themselves in a powerful role, believe that they deserve more than half of the pie, whereas responders do not believe that role should affect the division of the pie.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Failure to collect data on psychological constructs robs us of information that can contribute to more nuanced tests of theory.

    “Moreover, failure to collect data on psychological constructs robs us of information that can contribute to more nuanced tests of theory.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Researchers who subscribe to the illusion that their particular experiment is context free are likely to come away with an exaggerated sense of the generalizability of their findings.

    “Researchers who subscribe to the illusion that their particular experiment is”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Tracy (1986,1987) finds a positive relationship between investor uncertainty, a proxy for the union's uncertainty about the firm, and strike activity and cites this as evidence consistent with an asymmetric information model of impasse.

    “For example, Tracy (1986,1987) finds a positive relationship between investor uncertainty (a proxy for the union's uncertainty about the firm) and strike activity and cites this as evidence consistent with an asymmetric information model of impasse.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tracy (1986,1987)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Akerlof and Yellen (1985) have shown that people do not even seem able to remember with any great accuracy whether they were employed or unemployed during the past year.

    “Indeed, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) have shown that people do not even seem able to remember with any great accuracy whether they were employed or unemployed during the past year.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Akerlof and Yellen (1985)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Because of the reluctance to collect and analyze data on intervening variables, economists have sometimes been forced into very coarse tests of their models' predictions.

    “Because of the reluctance to collect and analyze data on intervening variables, economists have sometimes been forced into very coarse tests of their models' predictions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    In the Grover High School version of the Wason four-card problem, 89 percent of subjects state correctly which cards need to be turned over.

    “89 percent of subjects state correctly which cards need to be turned over (Cosmides, 1989).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cosmides, 1989 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductcitation

    The response rate for returning the survey was 57 percent for the union presidents and 35 percent for the school board presidents.

    “The response rate for returning the survey was 57 percent for the union presidents and 35 percent for the school board presidents.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein (1996) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    All economics involves psychology.

    “All economics involves psychology.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In the abstract Wason four-card problem, very few people give the correct answer, which is X and 1.

    “When the problem is given to people in the abstract form just described, very few people give the correct answer, which is”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cosmides, 1989 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Models that incorporate individuals' preferences for fair outcomes still use traditional methods, yet lead to predictions with more empirical support than conventional models.

    “Models that incorporate individuals' preferences for”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Bolton, 1991
    • cites Rabin, 1993

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Bayes' rule, the rational expectations assumption and the theory of revealed preference are all psychological assumptions about how people form expectations and what motivates them.

    “Bayes' rule, the rational expectations assumption and the theory of revealed preference are all psychological assumptions about how people form expectations and what motivates them.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    When the Wason four-card task is put into a familiar context, almost everyone answers correctly.

    “However, when the task is put into a familiar context, almost everyone answers correctly.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cosmides, 1989 source
46 of 46

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Individuals are unlikely to be conscious of their biased processing of information, so increases in incentives will not cause them to be more conscientious.

    “Second, individuals are unlikely to be conscious of their biased processing of information so that increases in incentives will not cause them to be more conscientious.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining.

    “Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining, and each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.

    “Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining, and each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are undoubtedly many theories that could predict the positive correlation between investor uncertainty and strike activity.

    “However, there are undoubtedly many theories that could predict this positive correlation.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Much of the data on behavior used in economic analyses comes from surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Survey and Current Population Survey, in which respondents provide information on such things as jobs, wages, spells of unemployment, and so on.

    “Much of the data on”
5 of 5

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G.
Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University (US)
ORCID
Loewenstein, George
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
1997-02-01
Volume
11
Issue
1
Pages
109-126
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/jep.11.1.109
OpenAlex
W2038552289
Cited by
1,071
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 51 · 2017: 36 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 42 · 2014: 50 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 49
FWCI
36.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Conflict Management and Negotiation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
bargaining impasse, self-serving bias, fairness judgments, negotiation, bias mitigation, strikes, teachers' unions, school boards

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-23.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-23.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review