The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
In the citing paper
“For example, in multiplayer games, cheap talk14,15 and onymity16 sustain reciprocation”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
Citations
Cites
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,691
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912320 · Cited by 1,431
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Banks, J. S., & Sobel, J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913604 · Cited by 958
Pinkham, R. S., & Wilks, S. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2311277 · Cited by 671
Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M., & Thomas, S. H. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00140829 · Cited by 620
Multistage Games with Communication
Myerson, R. B. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913154 · Cited by 611
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
Isaac, R. M., McCue, K., & Plott, C. R. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6 · Cited by 594
An Approach to Communication Equilibria
Forges, F. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914304 · Cited by 394
Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R. S., & Ross, T. W. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555734 · Cited by 369
Cited by
Sorted by citations
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion?
James Andreoni, A. (2002) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/1843760258.00027 · Cited by 912
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk
Crawford, V. P. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2359 · Cited by 551
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
Cai, H., & Wang, J. T.-Y. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001 · Cited by 370
Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
Crawford, V. P. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951699 · Cited by 306
Metadata
- Authors
- Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1991-05
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 183-220
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965142293
- Cited by
- 127
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 13.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- cheap talk, public goods game, private information, costly communication, equilibrium model, simultaneous moves, voluntary contributions, experimental economics
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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