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Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
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“In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
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“For example, in multiplayer games, cheap talk14,15 and onymity16 sustain reciprocation”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1991-05
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 183-220
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965142293
- Cited by
- 127
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 13.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- cheap talk, public goods game, private information, costly communication, equilibrium model, simultaneous moves, voluntary contributions, experimental economics
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