Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type
Abstract
Two experiments used within-subject designs to examine how conjunction errors depend on the use of (1) choice versus estimation tasks, (2) probability versus frequency language, and (3) conjunctions of two likely events versus conjunctions of likely and unlikely events. All problems included a three-option format verified to minimize misinterpretation of the base event. In both experiments, conjunction errors were reduced when likely events were conjoined. Conjunction errors were also reduced for estimations compared with choices, with this reduction greater for likely conjuncts, an interaction effect. Shifting conceptual focus from probabilities to frequencies did not affect conjunction error rates. Analyses of numerical estimates for a subset of the problems provided support for the use of three general models by participants for generating estimates. Strikingly, the order in which the two tasks were carried out did not affect the pattern of results, supporting the idea that the mode of responding strongly determines the mode of thinking about conjunctions and hence the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy. These findings were evaluated in terms of implications for rationality of human judgment and reasoning.
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One source of the conjunction fallacy is the inability to bring to mind relevant information.
“The conjunction fallacy is a complex effect [47,48], but one source of the fallacy is the inability to bring to mind relevant information.”
From Bayesian Brains without Probabilities (2016) · cites this paper as [48]
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References 28 · Cited by 79
- Authors
- Wedell, D. H., & Moro, R.
- Affiliations
- University of South Carolina (US)
- Corresponding author
- Wedell, Douglas H.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-04
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 105-136
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2021120012
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 4.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Keywords
- conjunction fallacy, probability judgment, frequency judgment, response mode, base rate neglect
- MeSH terms
- Choice Behavior, Concept Formation, Female, Humans, Male, Reaction Time
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