Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
Open accessAbstract
Bayesian explanations have swept through cognitive science over the past two decades, from intuitive physics and causal learning, to perception, motor control and language. Yet people flounder with even the simplest probability questions. What explains this apparent paradox? How can a supposedly Bayesian brain reason so poorly with probabilities? In this paper, we propose a direct and perhaps unexpected answer: that Bayesian brains need not represent or calculate probabilities at all and are, indeed, poorly adapted to do so. Instead, the brain is a Bayesian sampler. Only with infinite samples does a Bayesian sampler conform to the laws of probability; with finite samples it systematically generates classic probabilistic reasoning errors, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Bayesian cognitive models do not require the brain to represent or calculate probabilities; instead, the brain can be a Bayesian sampler. With finite samples, such a sampler systematically produces classic probabilistic reasoning errors, while only infinite samples would conform to the laws of probability.
Key findings
- Bayesian brains need not represent or calculate probabilities at all; sampling can approximate Bayesian inference using only local relative posterior probabilities, and only with infinite samples does a Bayesian sampler conform to probability laws.
- Finite sampling generates classic reasoning fallacies, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy. For example, explicit Bayesian calculation over vocabulary would require posterior probabilities over tens of thousands of words, ideally the 600,000 words in the Oxford English Dictionary.
- Rich, contextually constrained real-world tasks can be easier for a Bayesian sampler than abstract lab tasks, because context focuses sampling on relevant regions of the probability landscape.
- Sampling predicts behavioral traces such as stochasticity and autocorrelation; the paper reinterprets anchoring and adjustment as insufficient sampling from a starting point.
Methods
- Theoretical opinion article; no empirical sample or dataset is reported.
- The argument is developed conceptually and illustrated with simulations of sampling algorithms, including Metropolis-Hastings and JAGS, in Figures 1 and 2; R code for the plots is included as supplemental material.
- Main analysis is a conceptual reconciliation of Bayesian cognitive models with probabilistic reasoning errors, using examples such as word-pattern judgments, puzzle-piece conjunctions, and cross-domain probability comparisons.
Limitations
- Paper-stated: the Outstanding Questions section lists open issues, including whether sampling is sequential or parallel, how sampling is neurally implemented, how autocorrelated samples are integrated, whether samples come from the correct complex distribution or a simplified one, and how sampling handles counterfactuals and causality.
- Evident from the text: this is an opinion/theoretical paper with no new empirical data or formal model-fitting; the sampling simulations are illustrative rather than quantitative tests of human behavior.
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 65 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingcitation§ Box 1. Sampling and Autocorrelation
Participants given clumpier reward distributions in a 2D computer foraging task later behaved as if tuned to clumpier distributions in semantic space in a word-generations task.
“Participants given 'clumpier' reward distributions in a 2D computer foraging task later behaved as if 'tuned' to clumpier distributions in semantic space in a word-generations task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [78][79][80]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
Using a number of samples much smaller than the number of hypotheses makes the computations feasible.
“Using a number of samples much smaller than the number of hypotheses makes the computations feasible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Unavoidable Limitations of Sampling
The problem of missing peaks applies to any sampling algorithm without prior knowledge of the location of the peaks.
“it applies to any sampling algorithm without prior knowledge of the location of the peaks [28,30]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning§ Unavoidable Limitations of Sampling
A Bayesian sampler that misses peaks of probability will produce reasoning fallacies.
“A Bayesian sampler that misses peaks of probability will produce reasoning fallacies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Unavoidable Limitations of Sampling
A Bayesian sampler's progress around a probability landscape is biased by its starting point.
“The android's progress around the probability landscape is, first and most obviously, biased by its starting point.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
Bayesian cognitive models that operate well in complex domains actually predict probabilistic reasoning errors in simple domains.
“Bayesian cognitive models that operate well in complex domains actually predict probabilistic reasoning errors in simple domains”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Unavoidable Limitations of Sampling
A Bayesian sampler starting far from an isolated peak in an undulating landscape has little chance of finding the peak.
“Starting far from the peak in an undulating landscape, the android has little chance of finding the peak.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Premisecitation§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
Explicitly representing and calculating probabilities in complex domains such as vision and language is impossible for any physical system, including brains.
“such calculations are too complex for any physical system, including brains, to perform in even moderately complex domains [4,[28][29][30].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisenone given§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
The number of real numbers required to encode the joint probability distribution over n binary variables grows exponentially with 2^n.
“the number of real numbers required to encode the joint probability distribution over n binary variables grows exponentially with 2 n”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
One source of the conjunction fallacy is the inability to bring to mind relevant information.
“The conjunction fallacy is a complex effect [47,48], but one source of the fallacy is the inability to bring to mind relevant information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Premisereasoning§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
A Bayesian sampler conforms to the laws of probability only in the limit of an infinite number of samples.
“only converge on 'well-behaved' probabilities at an (unattainable) limit of an infinite number of samples.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
Sampling naturally generates a variety of systematic probabilistic reasoning errors on elementary probability problems, which are observed in experiments with people.
“Sampling naturally generates a variety of systematic probabilistic reasoning errors on elementary probability problems, which are observed in experiments with people.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Premisenone given§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
Drawing samples from a probability distribution is relatively easy compared to explicitly representing and working with the distribution.
“although explicitly representing and working with a probability distribution is hard, drawing samples from that distribution is relatively easy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
The brain implements Bayesian inference.
“we argue for the opposite view: that the brain implements Bayesian inference and that systematic probability reasoning errors actually follow from a Bayesian approach.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationcitation§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
When guided to where the peaks are, for example by being asked about a more detailed pattern, large peaks are found and probability estimates are higher.
“when guided to where the peaks are (i.e., starting the android from a different location), for example, by being asked about the pattern _ _ _ _ ing in the more detailed description, then large peaks are found and probability estimates are higher [31,45].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
With finite samples, a Bayesian sampler systematically generates classic probabilistic reasoning errors, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy.
“with finite samples it systematically generates classic probabilistic reasoning errors, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
From a sampling point of view, bringing to mind numerous but low-salience types of lawyer ensures these peaks are not missed, yielding a higher probability rating.
“From a sampling point of view, bringing to mind types of lawyer that are numerous but of low salience ensures these 'peaks' are not missed by the sampling process, yielding a higher probability rating.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationcitation§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
If the unpacked hypotheses are low probability, the sampler is guided away from the peaks of probability, so the unpacked event is judged less probable than the packed event.
“if the unpacked hypotheses are low probability instead of high, for example trying to assess whether a person with a background in social activism becomes either 'a lawyer' or 'a tax, corporate, patent, or other type of lawyer' then the probability of the unpacked event is judged less than that of the packed event [46] the sampler is guided away from the peaks of probability”
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- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Premisecitation§ Sampling and Task Richness
Language interpretation is a high-level cognitive task which shows a good correspondence to Bayesian models.
“Language interpretation is a high-level cognitive task which shows a good correspondence to Bayesian models [5,6].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
Rich real-world tasks may be more tractable to Bayesian sampling than abstract lab tasks, because sampling is more constrained.
“We have argued that rich real-world tasks may be more tractable to Bayesian sampling than abstract lab tasks, because sampling is more constrained.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
Such good-enough hypotheses are no less valuable if an isolated peak corresponding to an even better hypothesis remains undiscovered.
“Such hypotheses are no less valuable if an isolated peak, corresponding to an even better hypothesis, remained undiscovered.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
Rich, realistic tasks, in which there is a lot of contextual information available to guide sampling, are just those where the Bayesian sampler is most effective.
“Rich, realistic tasks, in which there is a lot of contextual information available to guide sampling, are just those where the Bayesian sampler is most effective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
There are counterexamples to the architectural distinction between well-optimized Bayesian perceptual processes and heuristic central processes.
“Second, there are counterexamples to the architectural distinction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
In the puzzle example, the whole puzzle will be judged more probable than a single piece, exhibiting the conjunction fallacy.
“So the whole puzzle will be judged more probable than a single piece, exhibiting the conjunction fallacy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
By limiting the region in which the sampler must search, rich problems can often be far easier for the sampler than apparently simpler, but more abstract, problems.
“By limiting the region in which the sampler must search, rich problems can often be far easier for the sampler than apparently simpler, but more abstract, problems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
Bayesian sampling provides a mechanism for satisficing in real-world environments.
“Rather, Bayesian sampling provides a mechanism for satisficing in real-world environments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
A second bias in sampling is that sometimes regions of high probability are so far apart that a sampler starting in one region is extremely unlikely to transition to the other.
“Sometimes regions of high probability are so far apart that a sampler starting in one region is extremely unlikely to transition to the other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
These studies can be interpreted as providing a link that allows a Bayesian sampler to traverse between the two regions to combine probabilities meaningfully.
“we can interpret these studies as providing a link that allows a Bayesian sampler to traverse between the two regions to combine probabilities meaningfully.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
Being unable to effectively compare the probabilities of two hypotheses is a second way in which a Bayesian sampler generates reasoning fallacies observed in people.
“Being unable to effectively compare the probabilities of two hypotheses is a second way in which a Bayesian sampler generates reasoning fallacies observed in people.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Premisereasoning§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11
The normalization constant of a probability distribution often cannot be determined, even approximately.
“technically, the normalization constant often cannot be determined, even approximately”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
For many real-world problems, multiple but distant peaks corresponding to very different hypotheses about the world may be rare, particularly when context and background knowledge are taken into account.
“We suggest too that, for many real-world problems, multiple but distant peaks, corresponding to very different hypotheses about the world, may be rare, particularly when context and background knowledge are taken into account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
Purely perceptual versions of reasoning fallacies can be constructed.
“purely perceptual versions of reasoning fallacies can be constructed, as Figure 2A illustrates.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Sampling and Task Richness
Bayesian samplers can match behavioral stochasticity in tasks such as perception, categorization, causal reasoning, and decision making.
“Bayesian samplers can match behavioral stochasticity in tasks such as perception, categorization, causal reasoning, and decision making [20,21,23,24].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 4 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
A second consequence of sampling is that behavior will be autocorrelated because the sampler makes only small steps in the probability landscape.
“A second consequence of sampling is that behavior will be autocorrelated, meaning that each new sample depends on the last, because the sampler makes only small steps in the probability landscape (see Box 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Sampling and Task Richness
Bayesian samplers produce human-like autocorrelations in perceptual and reasoning tasks.
“and Bayesian samplers produce human-like autocorrelations in perceptual and reasoning tasks [18,25].”
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- cites [25]
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- Interpretationreasoning§ Box 1. Sampling and Autocorrelation
A particular consequence of autocorrelation is that priming a particular starting point in the sampling process will bias the sampler.
“particular consequence of autocorrelation will be that 'priming' a particular starting point in the sampling process will bias the sampler.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ Sampling and Task Richness
The ubiquitous variability of human behavior, especially in highly abstract judgments or choice tasks, is puzzling for pure optimality explanations.
“The ubiquitous variability of human behavior, especially in highly abstract judgments or choice tasks [71][72][73][74] is puzzling for pure 'optimality' explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [71][72][73][74]
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- Interpretationreasoning§ Box 1. Sampling and Autocorrelation
This provides a Bayesian reinterpretation of anchoring and adjustment, a process widely observed in human judgment.
“This provides a Bayesian reinterpretation of 'anchoring and adjustment' [25], a process widely observed in human judgment [15,77].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
If the brain is a Bayesian sampler, then sampling should leave traces in behavior.
“If the brain is indeed a Bayesian sampler, then sampling should leave traces in behavior.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Sampling and Task Richness
Any perceptual task where a hint can disambiguate the stimulus will generate examples of the conjunction fallacy.
“any perceptual task where a hint can disambiguate the stimulus (e.g., sine-wave speech [67]) will generate examples of the conjunction fallacy.”
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- Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
Bayesian sampling implies that behavior should be stochastic because of the variability of the samples drawn.
“One immediate consequence is that behavior should be stochastic, because of the variability of the samples drawn.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Sampling and Task Richness
Autocorrelation appears ubiquitous within and between trials throughout memory, decision making, perception, language, and motor control.
“Autocorrelation appears ubiquitous within and between trials throughout memory, decision making, perception, language, and motor control (e.g., [75,76]),”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task Richness
Behavior will look noisy even where on average the response will be correct.
“Hence behavior will look noisy, even where on average the response will be correct (e.g., generating the wisdom of crowds even from a single individual [68][69][70]).”
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- Interpretationcitation§ Box 1. Sampling and Autocorrelation
This suggests that there is a general sampling process that people adapt to the properties of the probability distributions that they face.
“This suggests that there is a general sampling process that people adapt to the properties of the probability distributions that they face [78][79][80].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [78][79][80]
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- May combine two claims. 22
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Findingown data§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationSamples produced by both MCMC methods have low autocorrelations for independent unimodal distributions, but for highly correlated variables and bimodal distributions autocorrelations are more prevalent, even when the aggregated samples match the overall distribution.
“Samples produced by both MCMC methods have low autocorrelations for independent unimodal distributions (top row of Figure 1B), but for highly correlated variables and bimodal distributions autocorrelations are more prevalent, even when the aggregated samples match the overall distribution (middle rows of Figure 1B).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone given§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationWhen two modes are far apart, these samplers are very unlikely to sample both modes.
“And of course, when two modes are far apart, these samplers are very unlikely to sample both modes (bottom row of Figure 1B).”
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Findingnone given§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationThe extent of autocorrelation depends on both the algorithm and the probability distribution.
“The extent of autocorrelation depends on both the algorithm and the probability distribution (see Figure 1B).”
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Findingcitation§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationMore recently developed sampling methods such as those employed by Stan can also show sample autocorrelations, but more complex distributions are needed to induce them.
“More recently developed sampling methods such as those employed by the program Stan can also show sample autocorrelations, but more complex distributions are needed to induce them [94].”
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Findingnone given§ Outstanding QuestionsSampling algorithms have difficulties with isolated modes and produce autocorrelations.
“Sampling Algorithms Have Difficulties with Isolated Modes and Produce Autocorrelations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ Outstanding QuestionsNot all of the modes are always sampled, even when thousands of samples are drawn.
“These show that not all of the modes are always sampled, even when thousands of samples are drawn (i.e., in the bottom row).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11In the unpacking effect, participants judge a packed description (e.g., 'being a lawyer') to be less probable than an unpacked description (e.g., 'being a tax, corporate, patent, or other type of lawyer').
“In the unpacking effect, participants judge, say, 'being a lawyer', to be less probable than the 'unpacked' description 'being a tax, corporate, patent, or other type of lawyer' [44][45][46].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Unavoidable Limitations of SamplingAny distribution that can be sampled can be approximated arbitrarily closely in the limit of infinite samples.
“Any distribution that can be sampled can, in the limit, be approximated”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Bayesian Brains without ProbabilitiesBayesian brains need not represent or calculate probabilities at all and are poorly adapted to do so.
“we propose a direct and perhaps unexpected answer: that Bayesian brains need not represent or calculate probabilities at all and are, indeed, poorly adapted to do so.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Unavoidable Limitations of SamplingFinite samples from a distribution are imperfect and hence potentially misleading.
“finite samples will be imperfect and hence potentially misleading.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11Accuracy is improved in base-rate neglect studies when a causal link is provided between the individual events, and experiencing outcomes together weakens conjunction fallacies.
“accuracy is improved in base-rate neglect studies when a causal link is provided between the individual events [55,56], and experiencing outcomes together weakens conjunction fallacies [57]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11The conjunction of the correct locations of all puzzle pieces cannot be more probable than the correct location of a single piece.
“The conjunction of the correct locations of all the puzzle pieces cannot, of course, be more probable that the correct location of a single piece.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11Sampling cannot accurately assess base rates or estimate the probabilities of conjunctions or disjunctions.
“the inability to bridge between the two phenomena means that sampling cannot accurately assess base rates or estimate the probabilities of conjunctions or disjunctions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task RichnessIn complex real-world problems, climbing a rugged probability landscape to find a 'good-enough' hypothesis is crucial; linking to numerical probabilities, even approximately, is not.
“In complex real-world problems, then, climbing a rugged probability landscape to find 'good-enough' hypothesis is crucial; linking to numerical probabilities, even approximately, is not.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
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Premisecitation§ Sampling and Task RichnessBayesian models of cognition have primarily flourished as explanations of the complex dependency of behavior on the environment in domains including intuitive physics, causal learning, perception, motor control, and language.
“Bayesian models of cognition have primarily flourished as explanations of the complex dependency of behavior on the environment in domains including intuitive physics, causal learning, perception, motor control, and language [1-10]”
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Interpretationreasoning§ Sampling and Task RichnessLearning the structure of the world, or interpreting an image or a sentence, involves finding 'good-enough' hypotheses to usefully guide our actions, which can be achieved by local sampling in the probability landscape.
“the problem of learning the structure of the world, or interpreting an image or a sentence, involves finding 'good-enough' hypotheses to usefully guide our actions, which can be achieved by local sampling in the probability landscape.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
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Interpretationcitation§ TICS 1618 No. of Pages 11In these cases, participants are left to combine non-normalized sampled probability estimates for each hypothesis manually, and perhaps choose just one or combine them inappropriately.
“participants are left to combine the non-normalized sampled probability estimates for each hypothesis 'manually', and perhaps choose just one of the probabilities or perhaps combine them inappropriately [52][53][54].”
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Interpretationnone given§ Sampling and Task RichnessThese computational models generally do not involve explicit probability calculations, but apply Bayesian sampling, using methods such as MCMC.
“these computational models generally do not involve explicit probability calculations, but apply Bayesian sampling, using methods such as MCMC.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationAsking the gestation time of an elephant will bias a person's estimate because they begin with the common reference point of 9 months; the starting point is an anchor and sampling adjusts from that anchor but insufficiently when small samples are drawn.
“Thus, asking, for example, the gestation time of an elephant will bias a person's estimate because they begin with the common reference point of 9 months: the starting point is an 'anchor' and sampling 'adjusts' from that anchorbut insufficiently when small samples are drawn.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationModels of free recall such as Search of Associative Memory and SIMPLE use the previously recalled word to cue the next word, and have been productively used to account for the dependencies seen when people attempt to recall a list of words.
“Models of free recall such as Search of Associative Memory [95] and SIMPLE [96] use the previously recalled word to cue the next word, and has been productively used to account for the dependencies seen when people attempt to recall a list of words.”
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Premisereasoning§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationBecause MCMC algorithms look locally when producing the next sample, autocorrelation can result.
“Because these algorithms look locally when producing the next sample, autocorrelation can result.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationIn decision making, the ballistic accumulator model could be considered an extreme version of autocorrelation in which each internal time step produces the same strength of sampled evidence within a trial.
“In decision making, the ballistic accumulator model could be considered an extreme version of autocorrelation in which each internal time step produces the same strength of sampled evidence within a trial [97].”
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Premisenone given§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationThe best settings of these tuning parameters are not known in advance, but they can be learned by drawing warm-up samples to get a sense of what the distribution is like.
“Of course the best settings of these tuning parameters are not known in advance, but they can be learned by drawing 'warm-up' samples to get a sense of what the distribution is like.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationWhen sampling from complex distributions, it is often impossible to draw samples directly, and sampling algorithms such as MCMC are used instead.
“When sampling from complex distributions, it is often impossible to draw samples directly, and sampling algorithms such as MCMC are used instead.”
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Premisecitation§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationAlthough outnumbered by models of behavior that assume independent sampling, several models of memory and decision making do assume there are autocorrelations in sampling.
“Although they are outnumbered by models of behavior that assume independent sampling, several models of memory and decision making do assume there are autocorrelations in sampling.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationExplicit models of autocorrelated sampling have been used to account for perceptual switching times of multistable stimuli and anchoring effects in reasoning tasks.
“Explicit models of autocorrelated sampling have been used to account for perceptual switching times of multistable stimuli [18] and anchoring effects in reasoning tasks [25].”
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Premisenone given§ Box 1. Sampling and AutocorrelationSampling algorithms often have tuning parameters which are chosen to minimize autocorrelation and to better explore multiple peaks.
“Sampling algorithms often have tuning parameters which are chosen to minimize autocorrelation and to better explore multiple peaks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Outstanding QuestionsWhen comparing 'Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold' to the eclipse, the quote may seem more likely as it is common among quotes, yet this neglects the base rates: most websites do not have literary quotations, and there are many chances for an eclipse each year.
“In particular, when comparing 'Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold' to the eclipse, the quote may seem more likely as it is a common among quotes, yet this neglects the base rates: most websites do not have literary quotations, and there are many chances for an eclipse each year.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesIt is possible that the brain represents probability distributions over small collections of variables or variational approximations to probability distributions, but this would not affect the key argument, which stems from the unavoidable difficulty of finding isolated peaks in, and calculating the volume of, complex probability distributions.
“Of course, it is possible that the brain represents probability distributions over small collections of variables [90,91], or variational approximations to probability distributions [92], but this would not affect our key argument, which stems from the unavoidable difficulty of finding isolated peaks in, and calculating the volume of, complex probability distributions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesThe sampling viewpoint fits with current thinking in computational neuroscience, where an influential proposal is that transitions between brain states correspond to sampling from a probability distribution or multiple samples are represented simultaneously.
“The sampling viewpoint also fits with current thinking in computational neuroscience, where an influential proposal is that transitions between brain states correspond to sampling from a probability distribution [26,27,81,82] or multiple samples are represented simultaneously (e.g., using particle filters [83][84][85][86]).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 5 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesNeural networks dating back to the Boltzmann machine take a sampling approach to probabilistic inference.
“Moreover, neural networks dating back to the Boltzmann machine [87] take a sampling approach to probabilistic inference.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [87] source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesAs with human performance, deep belief networks readily sample highly complex probability distributions, but can only calculate explicit probabilities with difficulty.
“As with human performance, these networks readily sample highly complex probability distributions, but can only calculate explicit probabilities with difficulty.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesDeep belief networks have been highly successful in vision, acoustic analysis, language, and other areas of machine learning.
“For example, consider deep belief networks, which have been highly successful in vision, acoustic analysis, language, and other areas of machine learning [88].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [88] source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesSampling provides a natural and scalable implementation of Bayesian models.
“Sampling provides a natural and scalable implementation of Bayesian models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesThe questions easier to answer with sampling are contextually rich, highly complex, real-world questions on which people show surprising competence.
“and those easier to answer with sampling are contextually rich, and highly complex, real-world questions on which people show surprising competence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Outstanding QuestionsComparing the probability of seeing the two astronomical events in a year, or the probability of the two quotations appearing on a random website, are both relatively easy.
“Comparing the probability of seeing the two astronomical events in a year, or the probability of the two quotations appearing on a random website, are both relatively easy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ Outstanding QuestionsEvaluating the probability of a conjunction will be easier.
“The bottom row illustrates that evaluating the probability of a conjunction will be easier.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesSampling generates reasoning fallacies, and leaves traces, such as stochasticity and autocorrelations, which are observed in human behavior.
“Sampling generates reasoning fallacies, and leaves traces, such as stochasticity and autocorrelations, which are observed in human behavior.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesThe questions that are difficult to answer with sampling correspond to those with which people struggle.
“Moreover, the questions that are difficult to answer with sampling correspond to those with which people struggle,”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Outstanding QuestionsComparing the probability of seeing one of the astronomical events in a year to the probability of seeing one of the quotations on a random website is more difficult.
“Comparing the probability of seeing one of the astronomical events in a year to the probability of seeing one of the quotations on a random website is more difficult.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Concluding Remarks and Future PerspectivesApplications of deep belief networks include generating facial expressions and recognizing objects.
“Applications of deep belief networks include generating facial expressions and recognizing objects [34,89].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [34]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [89]
Not checked in the free run.
The authors state this as an assumption.
The brain is a Bayesian sampler.
“Instead, the key assumption is that the brain is a Bayesian sampler (see Glossary).”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
When behavioral data fail to conform to Bayesian optimality predictions, researchers frequently appeal to auxiliary assumptions such as suboptimal priors, cognitive capacity limitations, or approximation algorithms to account for deviations.
“when behavioral data fail to conform to the predictions of Bayesian optimality, researchers frequently appeal to auxiliary assumptions—such as “suboptimal” priors, cognitive capacity limitations, or the use of approximation algorithms—to account for these deviations (Rahnev and Denison 2018; Sanborn and Chater 2016).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Sanborn and Chater 2016
In “Bayesian Brains without Probabilities” and “Unavoidable Limitations of Sampling” (page unavailable), the paper explains departures from ideal probability judgments through finite sampling and computational limits. It does not say that researchers frequently invoke auxiliary assumptions in general, or identify suboptimal priors as one of those explanations. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredCognitive experiments have revealed signatures of sampling and amortized inference in human behavior.
“In particular, cognitive experiments have revealed signatures of sampling111 and amortized inference112 in human behavior.”
From Cognitive computational neuroscience (2018) · cites this paper as [111]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Two different references are numbered 24
MinorReference 24 is assigned to two different papers, making citations to [24] ambiguous.
“24. Denison, S. et al. (2013) Rational variability in children's causal inferences: the sampling hypothesis. Cognition 126, 285-300”
“24. Lieder, F. et al. (2012) Burn-in, bias, and the rationality of anchor- ing. Adv. Neural Inf. Process Syst. 25, 2690-2798”
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Hertwig (1999) · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199912)12:4
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Lieder, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1900061x · Cited by 892 · see citing works
Cognitive computational neuroscience
Kriegeskorte, N., & Douglas, P. K. (2018) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-018-0210-5 · Cited by 535 · see citing works
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367 · see citing works
The Generative Adversarial Brain
Gershman, S. J. (2019) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2019.00018 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?
Block, N. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0341 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
A theory of learning to infer.
Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2020) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000178 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
Climbing Brain Levels of Organisation from Genes to Consciousness
Changeux, J.-P. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.004 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Radulescu, A., Shin, Y. S., & Niv, Y. (2021) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-092920-120559 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
Classification in the Wild: The Science and Art of Transparent Decision Making
Katsikopoulos, K. V., Şimşek, Ö., Buckmann, M., & Gigerenzer, G. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11790.001.0001 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Is prediction nothing more than multi-scale pattern completion of the future?
Falandays, J. B., Nguyen, B., & Spivey, M. J. (2021) · Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2021.147578 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Four-dimensional graded consciousness
Jonkisz, J., Wierzchoń, M., & Binder, M. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00420 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
A model of conceptual bootstrapping in human cognition
Zhao, B., Lucas, C. G., & Bramley, N. R. (2023) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-023-01719-1 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Human inference in changing environments with temporal structure.
Prat-Carrabin, A., Wilson, R. C., Cohen, J. D., & Azeredo da Silveira, R. (2021) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000276 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
“Moreover, they account for a range of cognitive biases in the laboratory, such as base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and the unpacking effect, as well as for human performance in complex, real-world tasks, and specific observations such as response variability and autocorrelation in perception and reasoning tasks…”
BackgroundThe myth of the Bayesian brain
Mangalam, M. (2025) · European Journal of Applied Physiology · doi:10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“…inference, Monte Carlo sampling, etc.)—and have been proposed as biologically plausible strategies, these still require sophisticated computations that strain biological plausibility, especially for real-time decision-making under pressure (Griffiths et al. 2015; Sanborn and Chater 2016).”
Amortized Hypothesis Generation
Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., Goodman, N. D., & Gershman, S. J. (2017) · doi:10.1101/137190 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
- Authors
- Sanborn, A. N., & Chater, N.
- Affiliations
- University of Warwick (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Sanborn, Adam N.
- ORCID
- Sanborn, Adam N.
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 883-893
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2541895270
- Semantic Scholar
- 35b39fd2c568d37d1a17f678d6f13646e12e1d6a
- Cited by
- 307
- References
- 100
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 60 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 20 · 2015: 1
- FWCI
- 4.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP/K039830/1)
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K002201/1, ES/K004948/1)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- Bayesian inference, probability judgment, Bayesian sampling, base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, finite sample size, cognitive adaptation, causal learning, perception
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Brain, Humans, Probability, Thinking, Cognitive Science
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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