Cited by 22Safety Systems Engineering in AutonomyIndustrial Automation and Control SystemsFormal Methods in Verification

A methodology for automatic generation, formal verification and implementation of safe PLC programs for power supply equipment of the electric lines of railway control systems

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Niang, M., Riera, B., Philippot, A., Zaytoon, J., Gellot, F., Coupat, R.·2020·Computers in Industry

Abstract

To improve the design, Verification and Validation phases of Power Supply Equipment of the Electric Lines control systems at French Railway Company (SNCF for Société nationale des chemins de fer français), this paper proposes an integrated methodology, for automatic generation, formal verification and implementation of safe Programmable Logic Control (PLC) programs. The main objective is to save time and to improve the “overloaded” workflow of systems engineers. This methodology is compliant with the traditional engineering workflow. The first phase of the methodology focuses on the automatic generation of PLC programs, wiring diagrams , and test-based recipe books, based on reusing and adapting similar models of existing projects to the new specifications (corresponding to functional and safety requirements). The second phase is related to the application of formal verification and control synthesis techniques to guarantee the safety of the control installation. The first phase of the methodology has been successfully deployed at SNCF. The second phase is currently being evaluated.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.compind.2020.103328

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  • AI-based process-aware anomaly detection is suitable for detecting command injections that retain protocol legitimacy, whereas traditional OT security solutions are limited in identifying internal manipulations.

    “Comparative evaluations show that traditional OT security solutions are limited in identifying internal manipulations because they rely on network-layer signatures, while AI-based process-aware anomaly detection integrates physical process dynamics, making it suitable for detecting command injections that retain protocol legitimacy.”

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Authors
Niang, M., Riera, B., Philippot, A., Zaytoon, J., Gellot, F., & Coupat, R.
Affiliations
  • Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (France) (FR)
  • Centre de Recherche en Sciences et Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication (FR)
Corresponding author
Philippot, A.
Venue
Computers in Industry
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-12
Volume
123
Pages
103328
ISSN
0166-3615 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3094328277
Cited by
22
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1
FWCI
2.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Computers in Industry (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computational Theory and Mathematics › Formal Methods in Verification
Keywords
programmable logic controller, formal verification, railway control systems, safety-critical control, wiring diagrams, model reuse, controller synthesis, SNCF

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