The “minimal self” in psychopathology: Re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum
Abstract
The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self.
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Some practitioners reported fundamental changes in sense of self akin to a loss of the sense of basic self or the minimal self, such that they felt they no longer existed or would disappear or be invisible to others.
“Some practitioners reported even more fundamental changes in their sense of self akin to a loss of the sense of basic self [131] or the minimal self [132] such that they felt like they no longer existed at all or that they would disappear or be invisible to others.”
From The varieties of contemplative experience: A mixed-methods study of meditation-related challenges in Western Buddhists (2017) · cites this paper as [132]
Cites
Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007017 · Cited by 1,324 · see citing works
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Lindahl, J. R., Fisher, N. E., Cooper, D. J., Rosen, R. K., & Britton, W. B. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0176239 · Cited by 476 · see citing works
Schizophrenia, Subjectivity, and Mindreading
Nour, M. M., & Barrera, A. (2015) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbv035 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
- Authors
- Cermolacce, M., Naudin, J., & Parnas, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Copenhagen (DK)
- Hôpital Sainte-Marguerite (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Parnas, Josef
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-09
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 703-714
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2094838083
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 18.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
- Keywords
- minimal self, core self, schizophrenia, schizophrenia spectrum, first-person perspective, mineness, transparency, embodiment, agency, ownership, hallucinations, chronic schizophrenia, self-disorder, phenomenology of schizophrenia
- MeSH terms
- Body Image, Consciousness, Delusions, Hallucinations, Humans, Internal-External Control, Psychological Theory, Schizophrenia, Schizophrenic Psychology, Self Concept
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