Bringing free will down to Earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment
Abstract
Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection to blame. We address this confusion by testing two prominent models of the folk concept of free will-a metaphysical model, in which free will involves a soul as an uncaused "first mover," and a psychological model, in which free will involves choice, alignment with desires, and lack of constraints. We test the predictions of these two models by creating agents that vary in their capacity for choice and the presence of a soul. In two studies, people's judgments of free will and blame for these agents show little to no basis in ascriptions of a soul but are powerfully predicted by ascriptions of choice capacity. These results support a psychological model of the folk concept of free will.
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Belief in free will is the generalized belief that human behavior is free from internal and external constraints across situations.
“Belief in free will is the generalized belief that human behavior is free from internal and external constraints across situations (Feldman, 2017;Monroe & Malle, 2014).”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Monroe & Malle, 2014
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References 38 · Cited by 125
- Authors
- Monroe, A. E., Dillon, K. D., & Malle, B. F.
- Affiliations
- Florida State University (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Brown University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Monroe, Andrew E.
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-07
- Volume
- 27
- Pages
- 100-108
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117218751
- Cited by
- 125
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6
- FWCI
- 7.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- FSU Research Foundation
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- free will, moral judgment, blame, soul, agency
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Choice Behavior, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Middle Aged, Morals, Personal Autonomy, Intention
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