Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs
Open accessAbstract
Bias Blind Spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people tend to perceive themselves as less susceptible to biases than others. In three pre-registered experiments (overall N = 969), we replicated two experiments of the first demonstration of the phenomenon by Pronin et al. (2002). We found support of the BBS hypotheses, with effects in line with findings in the original study: Participants rated themselves as less susceptible to biases than others (d= –1.00 [–1.33, –0.67]). Deviating from the original, we found an unexpected effect that participants rated themselves as having fewer shortcomings (d= –0.34 [–0.46, –0.23]), though there was support for the target’s main premise that BBS was stronger for biases than for shortcomings (d= –0.43 [–0.56, –0.29]). Extending the replications, we found that beliefs in own free will were positively associated with BBS (r ∼ 0.17–0.22) and that beliefs in both own and general free will were positively associated with self-other asymmetry related to personal shortcomings (r∼ 0.16–0.24). Materials, datasets, and code are available on https://osf.io/3df5s/.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
In three preregistered replications of Pronin et al. (2002), participants rated themselves as less susceptible to biases than others, and also—contrary to the original null—as having fewer personal shortcomings, with the bias gap larger than the shortcomings gap. Free will beliefs were associated with stronger self-other asymmetries, especially for personal shortcomings, though these extension findings are correlational.
Key findings
- Bias blind spot replicated: mini meta-analytic self-other asymmetry in susceptibility to biases was d = −1.00 [−1.33, −0.67]; self-other asymmetry in personal shortcomings was d = −0.34 [−0.46, −0.23]; the difference between bias and shortcomings asymmetries was d = −0.43 [−0.56, −0.29].
- Better-than-average effects replicated: positive personality dimensions d = 1.05 [0.57, 1.54], negative personality dimensions d = −0.98 [−1.49, −0.47], and denial of the better-than-average effect d = 1.69 [1.49, 1.88]; after being made aware of the bias, 79% in Study 1b and 82% in Study 3 still denied it.
- Free will beliefs were negatively correlated with perceived personal shortcomings in the self (r ∼ −0.22 to −0.09) and with self-other differences in personal shortcomings (r ∼ −0.24 to −0.16); self-referential free will beliefs were associated with BBS in susceptibility to bias (r ∼ 0.17–0.22), with weaker associations for generalized free will beliefs.
- Effects were supported across Hong Kong and U.S. samples.
Methods
- Three preregistered studies; the abstract reports overall N = 969, with analyzed samples reported as Study 1a N = 45, Study 1b N = 43, Study 2 N = 303, and Study 3 N = 621. Study 1a/1b used University of Hong Kong undergraduates; Studies 2/3 used U.S. Amazon Mechanical Turk participants.
- Within-subject self-versus-others ratings of eight biases and three personal shortcomings, plus better-than-average personality ratings; Studies 2 and 3 added free will belief scales (FWI, FWD, and in Study 3 FAD+).
- Analyses used one-tailed paired-samples t-tests, chi-squared tests, correlations, and random-effects mini meta-analysis; replication results were evaluated with LeBel et al. criteria.
Limitations
- The paper states that evidence for the relation between belief in free will and BBS effects is correlational only, so causal inferences are not possible.
- The paper advises caution in over-interpreting the cross-cultural findings given the small sample and the singular bias under examination.
- Evident from the text: Studies 1a and 1b had small undergraduate samples (N = 45 and 43), Study 1a was described as slightly underpowered, and the free will extension was tested only in Studies 2 and 3.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
4 of 21 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationreasoning
Free will beliefs in reference to the self are related to the nature of introspection accessed.
“This indicates that free will beliefs in reference to the self are related to the nature of introspection accessed, complementing previous work that argued that free will beliefs impact fundamental socio-cognitive processes (Genschow et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Genschow et al., 2017 source
- Premisecitation
Free will beliefs were found to be associated with an overestimation of internal factors compared to external factors when evaluating others' behavior.
“Fourth, free will beliefs were found to be associated with an overestimation of the influence of internal (dispositional and fixed) factors as compared to external (varying and adaptable) factors when evaluating others' behavior (Genschow et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Genschow et al., 2017 source
The Results report that stronger free-will belief correlated with attributing others’ behavior more to internal than external factors. The paper describes these as person and situation attributions, but the cited passages do not establish that internal factors are fixed or external factors are adaptable. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingown data
Beliefs in own free will were positively associated with BBS (r ∼ 0.17-0.22).
“Extending the replications, we found that beliefs in own free will were positively associated with BBS (r ∼ 0.17-0.22)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Participants rated themselves as less susceptible to biases than others across the three samples.
“Participants rated themselves as less susceptible to biases than others (d = -1.00[-1.33, -0.67]).”
- Also stated in: § 3.1 Susceptibility to biases and personal shortcomings · plain
“We conducted a series of one-tailed paired samples t-tests, and found that participants showed a general tendency to view themselves as less susceptible to biases across the three samples”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 3.1 Susceptibility to biases and personal shortcomings · plain
- Findingown data
The mini meta-analysis found support for self-other differences in perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.34 [-0.46, -0.23]).
“We found support for self-other differences in perceived susceptibility to bias (d = -1.00[-1.33, -0.67]), self-other differences in perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.34[-0.46, -0.23]), and the effects were stronger for perceived susceptibility to bias compared to perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.43[-0.56, -0.29]).”
- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
“Using a larger sample of participants, we found support for self-other differences for personal shortcomings, whereas the original article hypothesized and argued findings were in support of a null effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
- Findingown data
Beliefs in both own and general free will were positively associated with self-other asymmetry related to personal shortcomings (r ∼ 0.16-0.24).
“and that beliefs in both own and general free will were positively associated with self-other asymmetry related to personal shortcomings (r ∼ 0.16-0.24).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The mini meta-analysis found support for better than average effects for negative personality dimensions (d = -0.98 [-1.49, -0.47]).
“We found support for better than average effects, with higher rating for positive personality dimensions (d = 1.05 [0.57, 1.54]), negative personality dimensions (d = -0.98 [-1.49, -0.47]), and denial of better than average effect (d = 1.69 [1.49, 1.88]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For four out of five free will beliefs measures, there was no support for a link between free will beliefs and perceived personal shortcomings in others (r from 0.00 [-0.11, 0.12] to 0.05 [-0.03, 0.13]; FWD in Study 3, r ∼ 0.11 [0.03, 0.18]).
“However, for four out of five free will beliefs measures, we found no support for a link between free will beliefs and perceived personal shortcomings in others (r ∼ 0.00 [-0.11, 0.12] to 0.05 [-0.03, 0.13]; FWD in Study 3, r ∼ 0.11 [0.03, 0.18]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Study 3, only 109 of 621 participants (18%) admitted bias, leaving 82% denying the bias.
“We found similar results in Study 3, with only 109 of the 621 participants (18%) admitting bias, leaving 82% denying the bias”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Self-other differences for biases were larger than self-other differences for personal shortcomings across all three samples.
“there was support for the target's main premise that BBS was stronger for biases than for shortcomings (d = -0.43[-0.56, -0.29]).”
- Also stated in: § 3.1 Susceptibility to biases and personal shortcomings · plain
“Finally, we found support for differences between the mean self-other bias asymmetry (across all biases) and the mean self-other personal shortcomings asymmetry (across all shortcomings) across all three samples”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 3.1 Susceptibility to biases and personal shortcomings · plain
- Findingown data
Belief in free will was negatively correlated with the self-other asymmetry in perceived personal shortcomings (r from -0.24 [-0.34, -0.13] to -0.16 [-0.24, -0.09]).
“beliefs negatively correlated with personal shortcomings self-other asymmetry (r ∼ -0.24 [-0.34, -0.13] to -0.16 [-0.24, -0.09]).”
- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · hedged
“Overall, our findings supported our predictions that belief in free will would be associated with stronger selfother differences in perceived personal shortcomings (r ∼ 0.16-0.24).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · hedged
- Findingown data
The mini meta-analysis found support for better than average effects, with higher ratings for positive personality dimensions (d = 1.05 [0.57, 1.54]).
“We found support for better than average effects, with higher rating for positive personality dimensions (d = 1.05 [0.57, 1.54]), negative personality dimensions (d = -0.98 [-1.49, -0.47]), and denial of better than average effect (d = 1.69 [1.49, 1.88]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The mini meta-analysis found support for self-other differences in perceived susceptibility to bias (d = -1.00 [-1.33, -0.67]).
“We found support for self-other differences in perceived susceptibility to bias (d = -1.00[-1.33, -0.67]), self-other differences in perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.34[-0.46, -0.23]), and the effects were stronger for perceived susceptibility to bias compared to perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.43[-0.56, -0.29]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The self-other difference effects were stronger for perceived susceptibility to bias than for perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.43 [-0.56, -0.29]).
“We found support for self-other differences in perceived susceptibility to bias (d = -1.00[-1.33, -0.67]), self-other differences in perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.34[-0.46, -0.23]), and the effects were stronger for perceived susceptibility to bias compared to perceived personal shortcomings (d = -0.43[-0.56, -0.29]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The replication findings are consistent across the samples from the USA and Hong Kong.
“The findings of our replication samples are consistent in the samples from USA and Hong Kong.”
- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
“We find support for BBS effects across samples from the USA and Hong Kong.”
- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · boosted
“Despite knowledge of other biases, and despite possible cultural differences, the findings were highly consistent with the findings in the classic article and the two MTurk samples.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
- Findingown data
Participants rated themselves as having more positive personality characteristics than others.
“We conducted one-sample one-tailed t-tests and found that participants rated themselves as having personality characteristics that are more positive (Study 1b: M = 5.74, t(42) = 5.09, p < .001,d z = 0.78, 95% CI [0.43, 1.11]; Study 3: M = 6.42; t(620) = 31.74,p < .001;d z = 1.27, 95% CI [1.17,1.38])”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
All free will beliefs scales were negatively correlated with perceived personal shortcomings in the self (r from -0.22 [-0.32, -0.11] to -0.09 [-0.17, -0.01]).
“All free will beliefs scales were negatively correlated with perceived personal shortcomings in self (r ∼ -0.22 [-0.32, -0.11] to -0.09 [-0.17, -0.01]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Participants rated themselves as having less negative personality characteristics than others.
“and less negative (Study 1b: M = 4.16, t(42) = -4.55,p < .001,d z = -0.69,95% CI [-1.02, -0.36]; Study 3: M = 3.21; t (620) = -30.38,p <.001; d z = -1.22,95% CI [-1.32, -1.11]) than others'.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The mini meta-analysis found support for denial of the better than average effect (d = 1.69 [1.49, 1.88]).
“We found support for better than average effects, with higher rating for positive personality dimensions (d = 1.05 [0.57, 1.54]), negative personality dimensions (d = -0.98 [-1.49, -0.47]), and denial of better than average effect (d = 1.69 [1.49, 1.88]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The findings support denial of the better than average effect bias.
“We conclude that our findings are in support of denial of the better than average effect bias.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Pronin et al. (2002) found empirical evidence that the sources of BBS are not restricted to self-serving motives.
“Specifically, Pronin et al. (2002) found empirical evidence for the view that the sources of BBS are not restricted to self-serving motives.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
- Interpretationown data
It is very likely that the null findings reported in the target article were mostly due to insufficient power.
“It is very likely that the null findings reported in the target article were mostly due to insufficient power.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The findings offer some support for the bias blind spot being robust enough to withstand concerns such as non-naivete and cross-cultural differences.
“yet it offers some support for BBS being robust enough to withstand concerns such as non-naivete and cross-cultural differences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Concerns around cultural relativity of findings in psychology seem to be less of a concern with bias blind spot effects.
“Concerns around cultural relativity of the findings in psychology seems to be less of a concern with BBS effects (Gergen, 1973;Henrich et al., 2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationown data
There exists a bias also for personal shortcomings.
“Our replication findings suggest that there exists a bias also for personal shortcomings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Different free will beliefs scales gauge different aspects of agency.
“3) different free will beliefs scales gauge different aspects of agency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The effect size of the replications for denial of the better than average effect was around twice the effect size of the original study.
“The effect size of the replications (Study 1b: d z = 1.43;Study 3: d z = 1.27) was around twice the effect size of the original study (d z = 0.70).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
- Interpretationown data
The findings support the better than average effect.
“We conclude support of the better than average effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The replication results lend support for the main introspection hypothesis that self-other differences are larger for susceptibility to bias than for personal shortcomings.
“the replication results lend support for the main introspection hypothesis that self-other differences are larger for susceptibility to bias than for personal shortcoming.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Free will beliefs correlate more strongly with perceived shortcomings in the self than in others.
“These findings seem to indicate that free will beliefs correlate more strongly with perceived shortcomings in self than in others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
The original study (Pronin et al., 2002) had underpowered samples.
“We addressed one of the potential methodological shortcomings, the underpowered samples in the original study.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 18
- May combine two claims. 18
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationBelief in free will is the generalized belief that human behavior is free from internal and external constraints across situations.
“Belief in free will is the generalized belief that human behavior is free from internal and external constraints across situations (Feldman, 2017;Monroe & Malle, 2014).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationFree will beliefs were measured using the Free Will Inventory (FWI) and the Free Will and Determinism (FWD) personal agency subscale.
“For the extension, free will beliefs were measured before the replication using two free will belief subscales: Free Will Inventory (FWI) (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) (5 items; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; = 0.91) and Free Will and Determinism (FWD) personal agency subscale (Rakos et al., 2008) (4 items; 1 = Not true at all, 5 = Almost always true; = 0.92).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn Study 1b, only 9 of 43 participants (21%) acknowledged any potential bias, leaving 79% claiming to be better than their average peers.
“In Study 1b, we found that despite being made aware of their potential bias, only 9 of the 43 participants (21%) acknowledged any potential bias, leaving 79% of participants still claiming to be better than their average peers”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataStronger perceptions of personal free will were associated with a stronger bias blind spot in susceptibility to bias (r ∼ 0.17-0.22), but associations were much weaker for generalized free will beliefs.
“These suggested that stronger perceptions of personal free will were associated with stronger bias blind spot, but associations were much weaker for generalized free will beliefs.”
- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
“We also found support for an association between free will beliefs and the BBS in susceptibility to bias (r ∼ 0.17-0.22),but only with for the free will beliefs scale that concerned the self, rather than in general.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataIn Study 2 and Study 3, participants rated themselves as less prone to personal shortcomings than others.
“we found an unexpected effect that participants rated themselves as having fewer shortcomings (d = -0.34[-0.46, -0.23])”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationBias blind spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people perceive themselves to be less susceptible to biases than others.
“Bias blind spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people perceive themselves to be less susceptible to biases than others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe replications provide strong support for the main hypotheses of the target article, with effects comparable to and at times larger than the original's.
“We conclude strong support for the main hypotheses of the target article, with effects comparable and at times larger than the original's (see Figure 1).”
- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
“Our findings were in support of the main predictions of the BBS effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 4.1 Replications of the bias blind spot · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenStudy 2 was a separate replication of the bias blind spot effect, designed by a different replication team, with a larger, well-powered sample of different demographics.
“Study 2 was a separate replication of the BBS effect, designed by a different replication team, and with a larger, well-powered sample of different demographics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAcross the four studies in Pronin et al. (2002), sample size ranged from 24 to 91, with an average of 55 per study.
“Across the four studies reported in the original paper, the sample size ranged from 24 to 91, with an average sample size of 55 per study.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationStudy 1 Survey 2 of Pronin et al. (2002) found support that people rate themselves as less susceptible to biases than others, but no support for self-other asymmetry in personal shortcomings.
“Study 1 Survey 2 of Pronin et al. (2002) found empirical support for the view that people rate themselves, compared with others, to be less susceptible to biases, whereas there was no support for self-other asymmetry in ratings of personal shortcomings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenIn each replication study, the experiment was pre-registered on OSF, and data collection was launched within one week of registration.
“In each of the replication studies, we first pre-registered the experiment on the Open Science Framework (OSF), and data collection was launched within one week of registration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenAll measures, manipulations, and exclusions for this investigation are reported, and data collection was completed before analyses.
“All measures, manipulations, and exclusions for this investigation are reported, and data collection was completed before analyses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenEight participants were excluded based on pre-registered criteria: two self-reported not being serious about filling in the survey and six were not from the USA.
“We excluded 8 participants based on pre-registered criteria: self-reported not being serious about filling in the survey (2), and not from the USA (6).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenDisplay of conditions was counterbalanced in a 2 (reference: self vs. others) by 2 (attributes: biases and personal shortcomings) within-subject design.
“Display of conditions was counterbalanced in a 2 (reference: self vs. others) by 2 (attributes: biases and personal shortcomings) within-subject design (see the Supplementary Materials for more details and full measures).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFree will beliefs have been found to be associated with academic and job performance, job satisfaction, cooperation, and well-being and meaning in life.
“Free will beliefs have been found to be associated with a range of behavioral and psychological factors, such as academic and job performance (Feldman et al., 2016;Stillman et al., 2010), job satisfaction (Feldman et al., 2018), cooperation (Protzko et al., 2016), and well-being and meaning in life (Crescioni et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Feldman et al., 2016
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Stillman et al., 2010 source
- cites Feldman et al., 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataIn Study 3, eight participants were excluded based on pre-registered criteria, leaving 621 participants in the analysis.
“Of those, eight participants were excluded based on pre-registered exclusion criteria , leaving 621 participants included in the analysis”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataFree will belief associations are more about viewing oneself as free of biases and shortcomings, and less about viewing others as more susceptible to biases and shortcomings.
“The results suggest that free will belief associations are more about viewing oneself to be free of biases and shortcomings, and less about viewing others as more susceptible to biases and shortcomings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe evidence for the relation between belief in free will and bias blind spot effects is correlational only, so the current findings do not allow for causal inferences.
“It is important to note that our evidence for the relation between belief in free will and BBS effects is correlational only.Therefore, current findings do not allow for causal inferences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe same power issues may explain why the original study detected the hypothesized effect in only four of the eight self-serving bias items tested.
“Similarly, the same issues with power may have been the reason why they were able to detect the hypothesized effect in only four of the eight self-serving bias items tested.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataIn Study 2, seven participants were excluded based on pre-registered criteria, leaving 303 participants in the analysis.
“Of those, seven participants were excluded based on pre-registered exclusion criteria , leaving 303 participants included in the analysis”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPronin et al. (2002) provided the first demonstration of BBS by showing that people tend to perceive themselves as less biased, even when made aware of their potential bias.
“Pronin et al. (2002) provided the first demonstration of the effect by examining people's ratings of susceptibility to common biases in themselves and in others, and showed that people tend to perceive themselves as being less biased, even when being made aware of their potential bias.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningPronin et al. (2002) predicted that the self-versus-others asymmetry is larger for biases than for personal shortcomings.
“Based on this argument, the authors predicted that the self-versus-others asymmetry is larger for biases than for personal shortcomings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin et al. (2002) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation80% of study participants in psychology come from Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) societies.
“Scholars note that the psychology literature is lopsided, with 80% of study participants in psychology coming from Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich et al., 2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Henrich et al., 2010 source
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataStudy 1's sample was slightly underpowered, yet the effects reported in the classic article were still detected.
“The sample was slightly underpowered, and yet we were able to detect the effects reported in the classic article.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe findings support the BBS hypothesis and the original findings.
“We conclude these findings to be in support of the BBS hypothesis and the original findings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenParticipants who took part in Study 2 were prevented from participating in Study 3.
“We prevented participants who took part in Study 2 from participating in Study 3.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataIn Study 3 the predictions were pre-registered, and the effects found were very consistent.
“In Study 2, these findings were discovered in exploratory analyses, and in Study 3 we pre-registered the predictions and found very consistent effects, suggesting that these were not accidental.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationBBS has been theorized to result from three possible sources: introspection illusion, naïve realism, and self-enhancement motives.
“Bias blind spot has been theorized to be a result of the three possible sources: introspection illusion, naïve realism, and self-enhancement motives (Pronin & Kugler, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pronin & Kugler, 2007 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningStudy 3 used an even larger sample that would allow for detecting smaller effects.
“Study 3 aimed to replicate and extend the findings, especially regarding the free will beliefs extensions proposed and tested in Study 2, using an even larger sample that would allow for detecting smaller effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
There are no published direct replications of Pronin et al. (2002).
“To the best of our knowledge, there are no published direct replications of Pronin et al. (2002).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
People have limited to no control over their own biases, and biases occur regardless of choice and without awareness.
“First, by definition, people have limited to no control over their own biases, and these seem to mostly occur to regardless of one's own choice, affecting individuals without their awareness.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Prior research has documented individuals' bias blind spots in non-U.S. populations.
“prior research has documented individuals’ bias blind spots (Chandrashekar et al., 2021; Niszczota et al., 2023) and reliance on an affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000; Keller et al., 2006) in non-U.S. populations.”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Chandrashekar et al., 2021
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Consistentt(44) = -4.54reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(44) = -4.54,p < .001”
- Consistentt(302) = -16.16reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(302) = -16.16,p < .001”
- Consistentt(620) = -32.04reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(620) = -32.04,p < .001”
- Consistentt(302) = -5.22reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(302) = -5.22,p < .001”
- Consistentt(620) = -10.54reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(620) = -10.54,p < .001”
- Consistentt(44) = -1.13reported p = .265 · recomputed p = .265
“t(44) = -1.13,p = .265”
- Consistentt(44) = -1.97reported p = .055 · recomputed p = .055
“t(44) = -1.97,p = .055”
- Consistentt(302) = -6.39reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t (302) = -6.39,p < .001”
- Consistentt(620) = -13.01reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t (620) = -13.01,p < .001”
- Consistentt(42) = 5.09reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(42) = 5.09, p < .001”
- Consistentt(620) = 31.74reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(620) = 31.74,p < .001”
- Consistentt(42) = -4.55reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t(42) = -4.55,p < .001”
- Consistentt(620) = -30.38reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t (620) = -30.38,p < .001”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Study 3 denial-of-bias effect size is misquoted in the conclusion
MinorThe concluding comparison gives Study 3's denial-of-bias effect size as 1.27, but the preceding result gives it as 1.71. The value 1.27 belongs to Study 3's positive-personality ratings.
“The effect size of the replications (Study 1b: d z = 1.43;Study 3: d z = 1.27) was around twice the effect size of the original study (d z = 0.70).”
“We found similar results in Study 3, with only 109 of the 621 participants (18%) admitting bias, leaving 82% denying the bias ( 2 (1, N = 621) = 261.53,p < .001;d z = 1.71, 95% CI [1.50, 1.91]).”
One-tailed tests report two-tailed p-values
MinorThe reported Study 1a p-values match two-tailed tests, despite the stated use of one-tailed tests. For t(44) = -1.97, the one-tailed p-value is about .028, not .055; for t(44) = -1.13, it is about .13, not .265.
“Study 1a: M d = -0.46,t(44) = -1.97,p = .055,d z = -0.29,95% CI [-0.60, 0.01]”
“We conducted a series of one-tailed paired samples t-tests”
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“…developments in psychological science and the growing recognition of the importance of reproducibility and replicability (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Van‘t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Zwaan et al., 2018), we aimed to revisit the classic work on the BBS with…”
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The New Statistics: Why and How
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Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction?
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“For example, people often rate themselves as being better than average (Dunning et al., 1989), and attribute failure to uncontrollable external factors while claiming credit for success (Miller & Ross, 1975).”
TurkPrime.com: A versatile crowdsourcing data acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences
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“Concerns around cultural relativity of the findings in psychology seems to be less of a concern with BBS effects (Gergen, 1973; Henrich et al., 2010).”
The bias blind spot: perceptions of bias in self versus others
Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167202286008 · Cited by 1,289 · cited 17× · see citing works
“To the best of our knowledge, there are no published direct replications of Pronin et al. (2002).”
InfluentialMini Meta‐Analysis of Your Own Studies: Some Arguments on Why and a Primer on How
Goh, J. X., Hall, J. A., & Rosenthal, R. (2016) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12267 · Cited by 994 · cited 1× · see citing works
“To summarize the replication results across the three samples, we conducted a mini meta-analysis of the effect sizes observed across the three replication studies (Goh et al., 2016; Lakens & Etz, 2017).”
Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: Divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others
Pronin, E., Gilovich, T., & Ross, L. (2004) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.111.3.781 · Cited by 771 · cited 3× · see citing works
“At the time of writing (March 2021), Google Scholar indicated 1129 citations of the article, laying ground to broader theories about human sense-making and objectivity (Pronin, 2007; Pronin et al., 2004).”
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (1989) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1082 · Cited by 758 · cited 1× · see citing works
“For example, people often rate themselves as being better than average (Dunning et al., 1989), and attribute failure to uncontrollable external factors while claiming credit for success (Miller & Ross, 1975).”
The Replication Recipe: What makes for a convincing replication?
Brandt, M. J., IJzerman, H., Dijksterhuis, A., Farach, F. J., Geller, J., Giner‐Sorolla, R., Grange, J. A., Perugini, M., Spies, J. R., & Veer, A. V. '. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.10.005 · Cited by 703 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Following the recent developments in psychological science and the growing recognition of the importance of reproducibility and replicability (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Van‘t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Zwaan et al., 2018), we aimed to revisit the classic work on…”
Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement
Wilson, T. D., & Dunn, E. W. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.141954 · Cited by 629 · cited 1× · see citing works
“As a result, people can fairly easily detect subjectivity in others, yet fail to detect subjectivity in themselves (Pronin, 2007; Pronin et al., 2004; Ross & Ward, 1995; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).”
BackgroundA Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians From Industry
Dana, J. (2003) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.290.2.252 · Cited by 594 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Doctors view themselves as being immune to the impact of gifts from pharmaceutical industry representatives on their own judgments, while perceiving their peers’ judgments to be strongly affected (Dana & Loewenstein, 2003).”
Zwaan, R. A., Etz, A. J., Lucas, R. E., & Donnellan, M. B. (2017) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x17001972 · Cited by 474 · see citing works
Pre-registration in social psychology—A discussion and suggested template
Veer, A. V. '., & Giner‐Sorolla, R. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2016.03.004 · Cited by 436 · see citing works
Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment
Pronin, E. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.001 · Cited by 433 · cited 10× · see citing works
“In three pre-registered experiments (overall N = 969), we replicated two experiments of the first demonstration of the phenomenon by Pronin et al. (2002). We found support of the BBS hypotheses, with effects in line with findings in the original study: Participants rated themselves as less susceptible to biases than o…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPsychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution
Ross, L. D., & Ward, A. C. (1995) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60407-4 · Cited by 381 · cited 2× · see citing works
“As a result, people can fairly easily detect subjectivity in others, yet fail to detect subjectivity in themselves (Pronin, 2007; Pronin et al., 2004; Ross & Ward, 1995; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).”
Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot
Pronin, E., & Kugler, M. B. (2007) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011 · Cited by 366 · cited 5× · see citing works
“Ironically, they also resist revising their views about being biased, and persist in their biased perceptions even after having been made aware of their biases (Ehrlinger et al., 2005; Pronin, 2007).”
InfluentialCognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot.
West, R. F., Meserve, R. J., & Stanovich, K. E. (2012) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0028857 · Cited by 361 · cited 1× · see citing works
“So far, there is little work examining individual differences as predictors of BBS, although one example is by West et al. (2012) who reported failing to find support for associations between cognitive ability and sophistication and the BBS.”
The FAD–Plus: Measuring Lay Beliefs Regarding Free Will and Related Constructs
Paulhus, D. L., & Carey, J. (2010) · Journal of Personality Assessment · doi:10.1080/00223891.2010.528483 · Cited by 338 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In addition to the free will beliefs measures we collected in Study 2, we added an additional measure of generalized free will beliefs, using an older scale by Paulhus and Carey (2011).”
Free Will in Scientific Psychology
Baumeister, R. F. (2008) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00057.x · Cited by 331 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Studies on the folk understanding of free will found that people normally associate free will with having choice, and understand free will as the absence of internal and external constraints (Baumeister, 2008; Feldman et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Vonasch et al., 2018).”
BackgroundContinuously Cumulating Meta-Analysis and Replicability
Braver, S. L., Thoemmes, F. J., & Rosenthal, R. (2014) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691614529796 · Cited by 298 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The mini meta-analysis is not only helpful in succinctly summarizing the findings across studies but also in yielding a more precise estimate of the effect size (Braver et al., 2014; Cumming, 2014).”
Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others
Ehrlinger, J. M., Gilovich, T. D., & Ross, L. D. (2005) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167204271570 · Cited by 255 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Ironically, they also resist revising their views about being biased, and persist in their biased perceptions even after having been made aware of their biases (Ehrlinger et al., 2005; Pronin, 2007).”
Monroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2009) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0010-7 · Cited by 247 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Studies on the folk understanding of free will found that people normally associate free will with having choice, and understand free will as the absence of internal and external constraints (Baumeister, 2008; Feldman et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Vonasch et al., 2018).”
“I think it, therefore it’s true”: Effects of self-perceived objectivity on hiring discrimination
Uhlmann, E. L., & Cohen, G. L. (2007) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.07.001 · Cited by 232 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The illusion of objectivity associated with BBS has also been linked with discrimination in hiring (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007).”
The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility
Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Ross, L. T. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.006 · Cited by 219 · cited 9× · see citing works
“FWD was chosen as it focuses specifically on free will beliefs in the self, which we thought might differ from the more generalized FWI scale.”
InfluentialA Unified Framework to Quantify the Credibility of Scientific Findings
LeBel, E. P., McCarthy, R. J., Earp, B. D., Elson, M., & Vanpaemel, W. (2018) · Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2515245918787489 · Cited by 215 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Replication summary directly based on LeBel et al., (2018) that considered the following three statistical aspects: (1) whether a signal was detected (i.”
meta: General Package for Meta-Analysis
Schwarzer, G. (2006) · CRAN: Contributed Packages · doi:10.32614/cran.package.meta · Cited by 202 · see citing works
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2015) · American Psychological Association eBooks · doi:10.1037/14805-007 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance
Stillman, T. F., Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., Lambert, N. M., Fincham, F. D., & Brewer, L. E. (2010) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550609351600 · Cited by 191 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…have been found to be associated with a range of behavioral and psychological factors, such as academic and job performance (Feldman et al., 2016; Stillman et al., 2010), job satisfaction (Feldman et al., 2018), cooperation (Protzko et al., 2016), and well-being and meaning in life (Crescioni et…”
Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences
Scopelliti, I., Morewedge, C. K., McCormick, E., Min, H. L., Lebrecht, S., & Kassam, K. S. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2096 · Cited by 183 · cited 1× · see citing works
“More recent theoretical assertions from Scopelliti et al. (2015) claim the BBS effect is a meta-bias that can be measured at the individual level.”
Belief in Free Will: Measurement and Conceptualization Innovations
Rakos, R. F., Laurene, K. R., Skala, S., & Slane, S. (2008) · Behavior and Social Issues · doi:10.5210/bsi.v17i1.1929 · Cited by 159 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…two free will belief subscales: Free Will Inventory (FWI) (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) (5 items; 1 = Strongly disagree , 7 = Strongly agree ; = 0.91) and Free Will and Determinism (FWD) personal agency subscale (Rakos et al., 2008) (4 items; 1 = Not true at all , 5 = Almost always true ; 𝛼 = 0.92).”
InfluentialLakens, D., & Etz, A. J. (2017) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550617693058 · Cited by 145 · cited 1× · see citing works
“To summarize the replication results across the three samples, we conducted a mini meta-analysis of the effect sizes observed across the three replication studies (Goh et al., 2016; Lakens & Etz, 2017).”
Monroe, A. E., Dillon, K. D., & Malle, B. F. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.011 · Cited by 125 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Studies on the folk understanding of free will found that people normally associate free will with having choice, and understand free will as the absence of internal and external constraints (Baumeister, 2008; Feldman et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Vonasch et al., 2018).”
BackgroundMaking sense of agency: Belief in free will as a unique and important construct
Feldman, G. (2017) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12293 · Cited by 106 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Belief in free will is the generalized belief that human behavior is free from internal and external constraints across situations (Feldman, 2017; Monroe & Malle, 2014).”
Self-citationPeople believe they have more free will than others
Pronin, E., & Kugler, M. B. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1012046108 · Cited by 100 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Third, in a previous study by Pronin and colleague about free will attributions, they demonstrated that “people believe they have more free-will than others” (Pronin & Kugler, 2010).”
ResultSubjective correlates and consequences of belief in free will
Crescioni, A. W., Baumeister, R., Ainsworth, S. E., Ent, M. R., & Lambert, N. (2016) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.996285 · Cited by 98 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…found to be associated with a range of behavioral and psychological factors, such as academic and job performance (Feldman et al., 2016; Stillman et al., 2010), job satisfaction (Feldman et al., 2018), cooperation (Protzko et al., 2016), and well-being and meaning in life (Crescioni et al., 2016).”
The freedom to excel: Belief in free will predicts better academic performance
Feldman, G., Chandrashekar, S. P., & Wong, K. F. E. (2015) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2015.11.043 · Cited by 94 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Second, free will beliefs have been linked with counterfactual thinking (Alquist et al., 2015; Fillon et al., 2021), reflecting stronger introspection, which could contribute to learning to avoid similar mistakes in the future (Feldman et al., 2016).”
Self-citationThe empirical content of theories in judgment and decision making: Shortcomings and remedies
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2011) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500004149 · Cited by 87 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Replications contribute to theory specification and form the basis of further theory development (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011).”
A Brief Guide to Evaluate Replications
LeBel, E. P., Vanpaemel, W., Cheung, I., & Campbell, L. (2019) · Meta-Psychology · doi:10.15626/mp.2018.843 · Cited by 87 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Our evaluation of the replication findings based on the LeBel et al. (2019) criteria is summarized in the right column in Table 4 (separate analyses for each study are provided Table S4 of the Supplementary Materials).”
People Claim Objectivity After Knowingly Using Biased Strategies
Hansen, K., Gerbasi, M. E., Todorov, A. T., Kruse, E. T., & Pronin, E. (2014) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167214523476 · Cited by 83 · cited 1× · see citing works
“If people are to improve their decision-making and overcome biases, they must first be able to recognize and understand their own biases (Hansen et al., 2014).”
Baumeister, R. F., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-800284-1.00001-1 · Cited by 83 · cited 1× · see citing works
“We were specifically interested in possible associations with free will beliefs as laybeliefs regarding self-regulation and own choice and control (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014).”
Belief in free will affects causal attributions when judging others’ behavior
Genschow, O., Rigoni, D., & Brass, M. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1701916114 · Cited by 82 · cited 2× · see citing works
“This indicates that free will beliefs in reference to the self are related to the nature of introspection accessed, complementing previous work that argued that free will beliefs impact fundamental socio-cognitive processes (Genschow et al., 2017).”
Free will is about choosing: The link between choice and the belief in free will
Feldman, G., Baumeister, R. F., & Wong, K. F. E. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.07.012 · Cited by 81 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Studies on the folk understanding of free will found that people normally associate free will with having choice, and understand free will as the absence of internal and external constraints (Baumeister, 2008; Feldman et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Vonasch et al., 2018).”
BackgroundSelf-citationOrdinary people think free will is a lack of constraint, not the presence of a soul
Vonasch, A. J., Baumeister, R. F., & Mele, A. R. (2018) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2018.03.002 · Cited by 68 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Studies on the folk understanding of free will found that people normally associate free will with having choice, and understand free will as the absence of internal and external constraints (Baumeister, 2008; Feldman et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Vonasch et al., 2018).”
BackgroundMonroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333950.003.0003 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
The Making of Might-Have-Beens
Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., Baumeister, R. F., et al. (2014) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167214563673 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Agency Beliefs Over Time and Across Cultures: Free Will Beliefs Predict Higher Job Satisfaction
Feldman, G., Farh, J., & Wong, K. F. E. (2017) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167217739261 · Cited by 45 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…found to be associated with a range of behavioral and psychological factors, such as academic and job performance (Feldman et al., 2016; Stillman et al., 2010), job satisfaction (Feldman et al., 2018), cooperation (Protzko et al., 2016), and well-being and meaning in life (Crescioni et al., 2016).”
Self-citationBelieving there is no free will corrupts intuitive cooperation
Protzko, J., Ouimette, B., & Schooler, J. W. (2016) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.02.014 · Cited by 42 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…found to be associated with a range of behavioral and psychological factors, such as academic and job performance (Feldman et al., 2016; Stillman et al., 2010), job satisfaction (Feldman et al., 2018), cooperation (Protzko et al., 2016), and well-being and meaning in life (Crescioni et al., 2016).”
Lakens, D., & Etz, A. J. (2017) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/nnkg9 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
A Unified Framework to Quantify the Credibility of Scientific FindingsPreprint
LeBel, E. P., McCarthy, R. J., Earp, B. D., Elson, M., & Vanpaemel, W. (2017) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/uwmr8 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Exceptionality Effect in Agency: Exceptional Choices Attributed Higher Free Will Than RoutinePreprint
Fillon, A. A., Lantian, A., Feldman, G., et al. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/sep8f · Cited by 5 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Second, free will beliefs have been linked with counterfactual thinking (Alquist et al., 2015; Fillon et al., 2021), reflecting stronger introspection, which could contribute to learning to avoid similar mistakes in the future (Feldman et al., 2016).”
Self-citationA Brief Guide to Evaluate Replications
LeBel, E. P., vanpaemel, W., Cheung, I., et al. (2018) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/paxyn
Flagged first, then by citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Humans’ Bias Blind Spot and Its Societal Significance
Pronin, E., & Hazel, L. (2023) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/09637214231178745 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
“Further support for this conclusion comes from recent studies showing a BBS in Chinese, Japanese, Middle Eastern, Western European, and Eastern European samples (e.g., Chandrashekar et al., 2021; Kambara, 2017; Niszczota et al., 2022).”
The Dialectical Principle of Charity: A Procedure for a Critical Discussion
Pruś, J., & Sikora, P. (2023) · Argumentation · doi:10.1007/s10503-023-09615-8 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
“The study was repeated with similar results, and developed (Pronin and Kugler 2007; Chandrashekar et al. 2021).”
ResultMandel, D. R., Collins, R. N., Walker, A. C., Fugelsang, J. A., & Risko, E. F. (2022) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500009475 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Managers’ Cognitive Biases in Decision Making: Revisiting an Effective Method
Mirbagheri, S. M., & Atani, A. A. R. (2025) · SAGE Open · doi:10.1177/21582440251355330 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“Research shows that almost everyone thinks they are less biased than others, regardless of whether they make good decisions themselves (Chandrashekar et al., 2021; Haga´ et al., 2018; Zaleskiewicz & Gasiorowska, 2021).”
Motivated bias blind spot: people confess to more or less bias depending on its desirability
Cruz, F., & Mata, A. (2025) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1007/s11299-025-00325-0 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“…Ehrlinger et al. 2005; Scopelliti et al. 2015) and cognitive (e.g., Jones et al. 2018; Mata et al. 2013b; Mattavelli et al. 2024; Reis et al. 2023; West et al. 2012) biases alike, across different cultures (Chandrashekar et al., 2021) and from childhood (Elashi and Mills 2015; Hagá et al. 2018).”
Logan, A. C., Mishra, P., Berryessa, C. M., Caruso, G. D., Hagenbeek, F. A., Denson, T. F., Robinson, J. M., & Prescott, S. L. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1791262 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Strong free will beliefs are also associated with inflated perceptions of one’s own objectivity and resistance to bias (Chandrashekar et al., 2021).”
Duan, S., Zhou, C., Liu, Q., Gong, Y., Dou, Z., Li, J., & Chuan-Peng, H. (2024) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.220876 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Josephine Priya, L., P., A. K., & Vilvanathan, L. (2025) · Higher Education, Skills and Work-based Learning · doi:10.1108/heswbl-08-2024-0235 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot
Walker, A. C., Collins, R. N., Walker, H. E. K., Fugelsang, J. A., & Mandel, D. R. (2026) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672261439247 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Seda, L., Martins, I. T. C., Lisbôa, T. L. R. D. C., Batistuzzo, M. C., & Fatori, D. (2024) · Collabra Psychology · doi:10.1525/collabra.122158 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Fugelsang, J. A., Mandel, D. R., Lab, C., Walker, A. C., & Collins, R. N. (2021) · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.17605/osf.io/dzkxy
Helm, R. K., Greenhalgh, T., Williamson, J., & Trofimov, A. (2026) · Journal of Criminal Justice · doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2026.102634 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Chandrashekar, S. P., Yeung, S. K., Yau, K. C., Cheung, C. Y., Agarwal, T. K., Wong, C. Y. J., Pillai, T., Thirlwell, T. N., Leung, W. N., Tse, C., Li, Y. T., Cheng, B. L., Chan, H. Y. C., & Feldman, G.
- Affiliations
- Hong Kong Metropolitan University (HK)
- University of Hong Kong (HK)
- Corresponding author
- Feldman, Gilad
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2021-11
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1392-1412
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4286870253
- Semantic Scholar
- d417fda35681fec80169044e772bbf9ee7fd7af6
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 47
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 2.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Judgment and Decision Making (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- bias blind spot, self-other asymmetry, perceived bias, belief in free will, self-perception, cognitive biases, replication
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