Tearing apart the “evil” twins: A general conspiracy mentality is not the same as specific conspiracy beliefs
Abstract
Although sometimes used interchangeably, the present review highlights the important differences between generalized worldviews suspecting conspiracy at play (conspiracy mentality) and specific beliefs about the existence of a certain conspiracy (conspiracy theory). In contrast to measures of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, those of conspiracy mentality are more stable, less malleable, less skewed in their distribution and less contaminated by other ideological content. These differences have important implications for empirical research and the theorizing of conspiracy beliefs. Building on an analogy of personality traits, we argue that conspiracy mentality is a relatively stable readiness to interpret world events as being caused by plots hatched in secret, whereas specific conspiracy beliefs are then manifest indicators (partially contaminated by other dispositions).
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Belief in specific conspiracies is skewed and subject to change.
“While conspiracy mentality tends to be relatively stable and normally distributed in society, the belief in specific conspiracies is skewed and subject to change (Imhoff et al., 2022; Uscinski, Enders, et al., 2022).”
From The Seed of Doubt: Examining the Role of Alternative Social and News Media for the Birth of a Conspiracy Theory (2024) · cites this paper as Imhoff et al., 2022
Conspiracy mentality tends to be relatively stable and normally distributed in society.
“While conspiracy mentality tends to be relatively stable and normally distributed in society, the belief in specific conspiracies is skewed and subject to change (Imhoff et al., 2022; Uscinski, Enders, et al., 2022).”
From The Seed of Doubt: Examining the Role of Alternative Social and News Media for the Birth of a Conspiracy Theory (2024) · cites this paper as Imhoff et al., 2022
More general conspiracy myths and established conspiracy theories provide the lens through which pivotal events can be immediately interpreted in a conspiracy-theoretical manner.
“but also implies that, just as conspiracy mentality represents the foil on which distinct conspiracy beliefs flourish (Imhoff et al., 2022), these more general conspiracy myths and established conspiracy theories provide the lens through which pivotal events can be immediately interpreted in a conspiracy-theoretical manner.”
From The Seed of Doubt: Examining the Role of Alternative Social and News Media for the Birth of a Conspiracy Theory (2024) · cites this paper as Imhoff et al., 2022
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References 41 · Cited by 194
- Authors
- Imhoff, R., Bertlich, T., & Frenken, M.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Imhoff, Roland
- Venue
- Current Opinion in Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2022-08
- Volume
- 46
- Pages
- 101349
- ISSN
- 2352-250X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4224001918
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 23
- FWCI
- 6.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Current Opinion in Psychology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- conspiracy mentality, conspiracy theories, conspiracy beliefs, belief stability, personality traits, belief measurement
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Personality
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