Cited by 52Energy, Environment, and Transportation PoliciesClimate Change Policy and EconomicsEnergy, Environment, Economic Growth

Buffer effect and price effect of a personal carbon trading scheme

Fan, Jin, Wang, Shanyong, Wu, Yanrui, Li, Jun, Zhao, Dingtao·2015·Energy

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  • Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) is often viewed as a relatively radical policy approach and faces considerable challenges in garnering public support and participation.

    “However, despite its conceptual appeal, PCT is often viewed as a relatively radical policy approach and faces considerable challenges in garnering public support and participation [7].”

    From The power of loss: message framing, climate anxiety, and engagement in personal carbon trading (2025) · cites this paper as [7]

    The Introduction (p. 3) calls PCT a radical policy. The Introduction (p. 4) identifies public acceptability and implementation barriers as research topics and says participation costs may be higher, but it does not establish considerable difficulty garnering public support or participation; it also reports that consumers may prefer PCT to a carbon tax. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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Authors
Fan, J., Wang, S., Wu, Y., Li, J., & Zhao, D.
Affiliations
  • University of Science and Technology of China (CN)
  • The University of Western Australia (AU)
Corresponding author
Wang, Shanyong
Venue
Energy
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2015-03
Volume
82
Pages
601-610
ISSN
0360-5442 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2088059649
Cited by
52
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2
FWCI
1.11
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Energy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • UWA Profiles and Research Repository (UWA) (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Natural Science Foundation of China (71301157, 71171183)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Energy › Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment › Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
Keywords
personal carbon trading, emissions trading, household carbon emissions, buffering effect, substitution effect, income effects, Cobb-Douglas utility

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