Bicameralism and corruption
Integrity signals
Registry
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Claims the paper makes
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The mechanisms by which ideological polarization may reduce corruption received broad empirical support from country-level panel analyses, a state-level panel analysis from the United States, and an interview-based cross-sectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries.
“These mechanisms received broad empirical support from countrylevel panel analyses (Brown et al., 2011;Testa, 2010), a statelevel panel analysis from the United States (Melki & Pickering, 2020), and an interviewbased crosssectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries (Davis et al., 2004).”
From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Testa, 2010
Ideological polarization may reduce corruption by enhancing accountability.
“Ideological polarization may decrease corruption via various channels.Firstly, it may reduce corruption by enhancing accountability (Testa, 2010).”
From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Testa, 2010
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review
Hajnal, Á. (2024) · Intersections · doi:10.17356/ieejsp.v10i2.1310 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Firstly, it may re - duce corruption by enhancing accountability (Testa, 2010).”
Background
- Authors
- Testa, C.
- Affiliations
- Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Testa, Cecilia
- ORCID
- Testa, Cecilia
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-02
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-198
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1980556547
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 16 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 12.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- EUR Research Repository (Erasmus University Rotterdam) (publishedVersion)
- EUR Research Repository (Erasmus University Rotterdam) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Keywords
- bicameralism, corruption, elected officials, parliamentary organization, legislative accountability, partisan polarization, interest groups, two-period game
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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