Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review
Open accessAbstract
Notwithstanding the considerable scholarly and public attention that political polarization and corruption have attracted in recent years and the important mechanisms through which the former may influence the latter, research in this area remains limited and inconclusive. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical synthesis of the current state of research in this domain. It finds that a large fraction of the apparent contradictions can be attributed to the conceptual inconsistencies and ambiguity surrounding political polarization. The types of polarization that have an inherently hostile and uncivil element (usually referred to as affective or pernicious polarization) undermine democratic accountability, which leads to more corruption. The role of ideological polarization among parties and the general population is more complex: it may boost accountability and decrease corruption but can also contribute to the aforementioned harmful forms of polarization and enhance the role of partisan bias in public opinion formation, thereby increasing corruption. The overall effect of ideological polarization on corruption may depend on the nature and the degree of the former, as well as on mitigating contextual factors. The two may create a vicious circle as corruption also increases political polarization via various channels.
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TL;DR
This review synthesizes theoretical and empirical research on how political polarization affects corruption, arguing that many apparent contradictions stem from conflating different types of polarization. It concludes that affective/pernicious polarization increases corruption by undermining democratic accountability, while ideological polarization has ambiguous effects that may be U-shaped depending on context and degree.
Key findings
- Affective and pernicious polarization undermine democratic accountability and thereby increase corruption. Orhan’s (2022) analysis of 53 countries between 1996 and 2020 found that affective polarization deteriorated democracy and accountability; however, Broockman et al. (2023) found no relationship between affective polarization and democratic attitudes in a survey experiment.
- Ideological polarization has contradictory effects: it may reduce corruption by enhancing accountability and raising the ideological costs of corruption, but it may also increase corruption by raising partisan stakes, strengthening partisan cues, and making compromise harder. Eggers (2014), using UK constituency-level data from the 2010 election after the Expenses Scandal, found corrupt MPs were punished less in more polarized constituencies and were more likely to be involved in the scandal. The review hypothesizes a U-shaped relationship between ideological polarization and corruption.
- Partisan bias shapes corruption perceptions: citizens are more forgiving of co-partisan politicians’ corruption and more condemning of other-party corruption (Anduiza et al., 2013; Cornejo, 2023). Polarization increases partisanship and the weight of partisan cues relative to substantive arguments (Druckman et al., 2013), reducing the electoral costs of corruption.
- Corruption may also increase polarization: new parties may emerge to challenge corrupt elites, and corruption fuels anti-establishment and populist sentiments, creating a vicious circle between polarization and corruption.
Methods
- Design: an “extensive, but not systematic” theoretical and empirical review that synthesizes mechanisms and evidence across three streams: ideological polarization and corruption, affective/pernicious polarization and democracy/accountability, and partisan bias and corruption perceptions.
- Data/sample: no original data; the review draws on existing country-level panel analyses, a US state-level panel analysis, an interview-based cross-sectional analysis of Latin American countries, UK constituency-level data from the 2010 election, survey experiments, qualitative accounts, and game-theoretic models. Table 1 summarizes empirical articles focused specifically on the polarization–corruption relationship.
- Analysis: narrative conceptual synthesis and discussion of proposed causal mechanisms, empirical support and contradictions, and research gaps; it proposes a U-shaped hypothesis for ideological polarization but does not test it empirically.
Limitations
- The paper explicitly states that it is an extensive but not systematic review, so it lacks a formal systematic search and selection protocol.
- The paper states that reviewed studies often use simple, one-dimensional corruption indices, that most polarization–corruption contributions rely on large-N quantitative methods, and that evidence remains contradictory and inconclusive; it also notes Broockman et al.’s (2023) null finding on affective polarization and democratic attitudes.
- Evident from the text: as a narrative review, it conducts no meta-analysis or formal quality appraisal, and the proposed U-shaped relationship between ideological polarization and corruption is not empirically tested in the article.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
12 of 44 cited sources checked · 10 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruption
Higher levels of ideological polarization increase the ideological costs of corruption and thus decrease the prevalence of corruption.
“Secondly, supposing that politicians care about both rents from corruption and ideology and that engaging in corruption reduces their chances for reelection, higher levels of ideological polarization increase the (ideological) costs of corruption and thus decrease the prevalence of corruption (Melki & Pickering, 2020;Testa, 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptions
Partisan-motivated reasoning decreases the relative weight of substantive arguments vis-à-vis partisan cues in citizens' political opinion formation.
“Partisanmotivated reasoning undermines decisionmaking as it decreases the relative weight of substantive arguments visávis partisan cues in citizens' political opinion formation (Bolsen et al., 2014;Druckman et al., 2013)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruption
Ideological polarization increases the role of partisan cues vis-à-vis substantive arguments in individuals' opinion formation.
“Furthermore, a survey experiment found that ideological polarization increases the role of partisan cues visávis substantive arguments in the opinion formation of individuals (Druckman et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Druckman et al., 2013 source
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Ideological polarization can enhance the role of partisan bias in public opinion formation.
“enhance the role of partisan bias in public opinion formation”
- Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · plain
“ideological polarization also increases the weight of partisan cues in public opinion formation (Druckman et al., 2013)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Druckman et al., 2013 source
- Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · plain
- Premisecitation§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptions
Ideological polarization enhances the effect of partisan cues relative to substantive arguments on political opinion formation.
“and to enhance the effect of partisan cues (relative to substantive arguments) on political opinion formation (Druckman et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Druckman et al., 2013 source
- Premisecitation§ 5 Summary and conclusions
Populism fuels affective or pernicious polarization.
“As populism (as an ideology) 'considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups' (Mudde, 2004, p. 543), it fuels affective/pernicious polarization (Roberts, 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Mudde, 2004 source
- cites Roberts, 2022 source
In ‘Populism, pluralism and constitutive polarization,’ Roberts describes an affective divide intensified by populist narratives and antipopulist responses. The Conclusion says populism is intrinsically polarizing, but polarization takes pernicious forms only under particular conditions; the claim leaves out that qualification. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationreasoning§ 3.2 The effect of affective and pernicious polarization on democracy and accountability
The mechanism linking affective or pernicious polarization to democratic norm violations may also undermine public integrity and thereby lead to increased levels of corruption.
“Arguably, the above mechanism may also undermine public integrity and thereby lead to increased levels of corruption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Lower democratic accountability leads to more corruption.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
Corruption may increase political polarization via various channels.
“The two may create a vicious circle as corruption also increases political polarization via various channels.”
- Also stated in: § 5 Summary and conclusions · hedged
“Corruption may also increase polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 5 Summary and conclusions · hedged
- Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruption
The ideological distance between parties makes opposition voters more likely to perceive the government as corrupt.
“Thirdly, the ideological distance between parties also makes opposition voters more likely to perceive the government as corruptfoot_0 (Davis et al., 2004).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Davis et al., 2004 source
- Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruption
Ideological polarization may reduce corruption by enhancing accountability.
“Ideological polarization may decrease corruption via various channels.Firstly, it may reduce corruption by enhancing accountability (Testa, 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Testa, 2010 source
- Premisecitation§ 3.2 The effect of affective and pernicious polarization on democracy and accountability
Orhan's (2022) analysis, based on data from 53 countries between 1996 and 2020, found that affective polarization deteriorated democracy and accountability.
“The analysis, which was based on data from 53 countries between 1996 and 2020, found that affective polarization deteriorated democracy and accountability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Orhan (2022) source
- Premisereasoning§ 3.2 The effect of affective and pernicious polarization on democracy and accountability
Under severe affective or pernicious polarization, voters tolerate politicians of their party violating democratic norms.
“Consequently, they tolerate that politicians of their party violate democratic norms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
The overall effect of ideological polarization on corruption may depend on the nature and degree of ideological polarization and on mitigating contextual factors.
“The overall effect of ideological polarization on corruption may depend on the nature and the degree of the former, as well as on mitigating contextual factors.”
- Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · hedged
“The answer likely depends on contextual factors (such as formal and informal norms mitigating the effect), and the nature and degree of ideological polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · hedged
- Premisecitation§ 3.2 The effect of affective and pernicious polarization on democracy and accountability
Under severe affective or pernicious polarization, voters increasingly consider the opposing group illegitimate and an existential threat to their way of life.
“voters increasingly consider the opposing group illegitimate and an existential threat to their way of life (Arbatli & Rosenberg 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Arbatli & Rosenberg 2021 source
- Interpretationnone given§ Abstract
A large fraction of the apparent contradictions in research on polarization and corruption can be attributed to conceptual inconsistencies and ambiguity surrounding political polarization.
“It finds that a large fraction of the apparent contradictions can be attributed to the conceptual inconsistencies and ambiguity surrounding political polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Ideological polarization can contribute to affective or pernicious polarization.
“it may boost accountability and decrease corruption but can also contribute to the aforementioned harmful forms of polarization”
- Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · hedged
“it seems that the former increases the latter (Bougher, 2017;Iyengar et al., 2012;Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · hedged
- Premisecitation§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptions
Ideological polarization of political parties increases partisanship.
“Firstly, ideological polarization of political parties was shown to increase partisanship (Iyengar et al., 2012;Lupu, 2015)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning§ 4 Discussion
Ideological polarization may induce processes that lead to more corruption.
“It may foster democratic accountability and reduce corruption but may also induce processes that lead to more corruption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 5 Summary and conclusions
Most contributions focusing on the link between political polarization and corruption specifically used large-n quantitative methods.
“Secondly, most of the contributions focusing on the link between political polarization and corruption specifically used largen quantitative methods.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptions
Partisan-motivated reasoning can deteriorate democratic accountability by making voters less sensitive to new information and thus decrease politicians' incentives to perform well.
“and can deteriorate democratic accountability by making voters less sensitive to new information and thus decrease politicians' incentives to perform well (Little et al., 2022;Sartori, 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Little et al., 2022 source
- cites Sartori, 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 4 Discussion
If ideological polarization is significant but remains limited to an extent that civil disagreement is still possible, its effect on corruption may be negative (it reduces corruption).
“Arguably, if ideological polarization is significant, but remains limited to an extent that a civil disagreement is still possible, its effect on corruption may be negative, that is, it reduces corruption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4 Discussion
The contradiction in evidence on ideological polarization and corruption may stem from the fact that ideological polarization may set off distinct mechanisms with opposing outcomes.
“This contradiction may stem from the fact that ideological polarization may set off distinct mechanisms with opposing outcomes (Figure 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5 Summary and conclusions
The relationship between political polarization and corruption largely depends on the exact type of polarization.
“The relationship of interest largely depends on the exact type of polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 5 Summary and conclusions
The reviewed studies use simple, readily available 'one-dimensional' indices to measure perceptions of corruption.
“Firstly, the reviewed studies use simple, readily available 'onedimensional' indices to measure (perceptions of) corruption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptions
The mechanism of partisan-motivated reasoning may be thought of as a segment of the mechanism linking affective or pernicious polarization and corruption.
“In effect, the mechanism of partisanmotivated reasoning may be thought of as a segment of the mechanism linking affective/pernicious polarization and corruption (described in the previous subsection).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptions
The effect of partisan cues or biases on public opinion formation received extensive empirical support, primarily from survey experiments.
“The effect of partisan cues (or biases) on public opinion formation received extensive empirical support, primarily from survey experiments (for a recent review see Little, Schnakenberg & Turner, 2022).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Little, Schnakenberg & Turner, 2022 source
- May combine two claims. 19
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 5
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruptionIf the ideological distance between parties is large, it is less likely that they will be in a coalition in the future, so politicians are more incentivized to expose the corrupt practices of opposing parties.
“If the ideological distance between parties is large, it is less likely that they will be in a coalition in the future.Therefore, politicians are more incentivized to expose the corrupt practices of the opposing parties (Brown et al., 2011;Melki & Pickering, 2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Brown et al., 2011 source
- cites Melki & Pickering, 2020 source
Section 2 (“Hypothesis”; page unavailable) says that ideologically distinct opposition politicians more readily hold incumbents to account and that ideological proximity can facilitate collusion in corruption. It does not give the claimed explanation that distant parties are less likely to form a future coalition, or specifically say that politicians are more likely to expose opponents’ corrupt practices. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 2 Conceptual frameworkConceptual proliferation and inconsistency in polarization research have resulted in significant confusion in public discourse and academia.
“Given that distinct manifestations of polarization exhibit different patterns and induce distinct, often opposite causal mechanisms, this conceptual proliferation and inconsistency have resulted in significant confusion both in public discourse and academia (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008;Lelkes, 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruptionThe mechanisms by which ideological polarization may reduce corruption received broad empirical support from country-level panel analyses, a state-level panel analysis from the United States, and an interview-based cross-sectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries.
“These mechanisms received broad empirical support from countrylevel panel analyses (Brown et al., 2011;Testa, 2010), a statelevel panel analysis from the United States (Melki & Pickering, 2020), and an interviewbased crosssectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries (Davis et al., 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ 5 Summary and conclusionsA growing number of scholars highlight the importance of discerning different types of corruption.
“By contrast, a growing number of scholars highlight the importance of discerning different types of corruption (e.g.Ang, 2020;Graycar, 2015;Hajnal, 2024).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Ang, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Graycar, 2015 source
- cites Hajnal, 2024
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 5 Summary and conclusionsAs new political parties may emerge seeking to challenge the corrupt elite, the political arena becomes more fragmented and polarized.
“As new political parties may emerge, seeking to challenge the corrupt elite, the political arena becomes more fragmented and polarized (Apergis & Pinar, 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Apergis & Pinar, 2023 source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruptionEggers (2014) found that corrupt MPs were punished to a lesser extent in more polarized constituencies, and these MPs were more likely to be involved in the scandal.
“Using constituencylevel data from the 2010 election in the United Kingdom following the Expenses Scandal, in which corrupt practices of many members of Parliament (MPs) were exposed, Eggers found that not only were corrupt MPs punished to a lesser extent in more polarized constituencies, but these MPs -anticipating the former effect -were also more likely to be involved in the scandal.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Eggers (2014) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruptionHigher ideological polarization is associated with more corruption.
“Other authors argue in favour of the opposite effect, that is, higher ideological polarization is associated with more corruption.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 1 IntroductionSevere divisions within societies can undermine democratic processes and subvert democratic accountability and thus increase corruption.
“However, severe divisions within societies can also undermine democratic processes and subvert democratic accountability (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018;McCoy et al., 2018) and thus increase corruption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites McCoy et al., 2018 source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruptionIdeological polarization may yield adverse effects on the legislative process, as large ideological distances between MPs or members of congress make compromises harder and may result in gridlocks.
“Finally, ideological polarization may yield adverse effects on the legislative process, as large ideological distances between MPs or members of congress make compromises harder and may hence result in gridlocks (Barber & McCarty, 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Barber & McCarty, 2015 source
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractIdeological polarization among parties and the general population may boost accountability and decrease corruption.
“The role of ideological polarization among parties and the general population is more complex: it may boost accountability and decrease corruption but can also contribute to the aforementioned harmful forms of polarization and enhance the role of partisan bias in public opinion formation, thereby increasing corruption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 3.2 The effect of affective and pernicious polarization on democracy and accountabilitySevere affective or pernicious polarization inflates animosity between opposing groups and the perceived stakes of political rivalry.
“animosity between opposing groups and the perceived stakes of the political rivalry inflate”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McCoy et al., 2018 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.1 The effect of ideological polarization on corruptionIdeological polarization makes people less responsive to corruption, which reduces the electoral costs of corruption.
“the outlined mechanism arguably applies to corruption as well: ideological polarization makes people less responsive to corruption, which in turn reduces the electoral costs of corruption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 1 IntroductionIdeological differences boost political competition and may thereby contribute to accountability and lower corruption.
“Ideological differences boost political competition and may thereby also contribute to accountability and lower corruption (Brown et al., 2011;Testa, 2012).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractAffective or pernicious polarization (types with an inherently hostile and uncivil element) undermines democratic accountability, which leads to more corruption.
“The types of polarization that have an inherently hostile and uncivil element (usually referred to as affective or pernicious polarization) undermine democratic accountability, which leads to more corruption.”
- Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · plain
“affective/pernicious polarization undermines democratic accountability and paves the way for more corruption”
- Also stated in: § 5 Summary and conclusions · plain
“The types of polarization that involve a hostile and uncivil element (i.e.affective and pernicious polarization) increase corruption by loosening democratic accountability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Lower democratic accountability leads to more corruption.
- Also stated in: § 4 Discussion · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 3.2 The effect of affective and pernicious polarization on democracy and accountabilityA recent survey experiment found no relationship between affective polarization and democratic attitudes.
“Notably, the evidence is not completely unequivocal: a recent survey experiment found no relationship between affective polarization and democratic attitudes (Broockman et al., 2023).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Broockman et al., 2023 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ AbstractResearch on the relationship between political polarization and corruption remains limited and inconclusive.
“research in this area remains li mited and inconclusive”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ 4 DiscussionIf the extent and nature of ideological divisions are such that the norm of mutual toleration erodes and societal divisions turn antagonistic, democratic accountability deteriorates and corruption increases.
“By contrast, if the extent and the nature of ideological divisions are such that the norm of mutual toleration (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018) erodes and societal divisions turn antagonistic, democratic accountability deteriorates and corruption increases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 4 DiscussionEvidence on the effect of ideological polarization on corruption is contradictory: some studies present mechanisms and evidence of a negative link, while others argue in favour of the opposite effect.
“As for the effect of ideological polarization on corruption, evidence is contradictory: some studies present mechanisms and evidence of a negative link (i.e.ideological polarization reduces corruption), while others argue in favour of the opposite effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 4 DiscussionA compelling body of evidence underpins that partisan bias decreases the importance of substantive information in voters' opinion formation, which in turn decreases the electoral cost of corruption.
“Likewise, a compelling body of evidence underpins that partisan bias decreases the importance of substantive information in voters' opinion formation, which in turn decreases the electoral cost of corruption.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 5 Summary and conclusionsCorruption fuels anti-establishment sentiments, which are both employed and exacerbated by populist actors.
“Furthermore, corruption fuels antiestablishment sentiments, which are both employed and exacerbated by populist actors (Engler, 2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Engler, 2020 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptionsIf due to the increasing role of partisan bias in opinion formation, voters tend to be forgiving towards their politicians' corruption scandals, corruption is likely to increase.
“If due to the increasing role of partisan bias in opinion formation, voters tend to be forgiving towards their politicians' corruption scandals, corruption is likely to increase.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: In democratic contexts, citizens' opinions on corrupt acts translate into de facto corrupt actions or electoral consequences.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5 Summary and conclusionsPolarization and corruption exhibit a circular causal relationship, creating a vicious circle.
“Therefore, polarization and corruption exhibit a circular causal relationship, thereby creating a vicious circle.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 3.3 The effect of partisan bias on corruption perceptionsCitizens evaluate corrupt actions differently depending on the partisan affiliation of the involved politician: they tend to be more forgiving with co-partisan politicians and more condemning towards members of other parties.
“Citizens evaluate corrupt actions differently depending on the partisan affiliation of the involved politician: they tend to be more forgiving with copartisan politicians and more condemning towards members of other parties (Anduiza et al., 2013;Cornejo, 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
The paper relies on this without support.
Lower democratic accountability leads to more corruption.
“Clearly, lower accountability paves the way for more corruption.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In democratic contexts, citizens' opinions on corrupt acts translate into de facto corrupt actions or electoral consequences.
“Although citizens' opinions on corrupt acts do not directly translate into defacto corrupt actions, in democratic contexts a relatively straightforward relationship exists.”
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“As pop - ulism (as an ideology) ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543), it fuels affective/pernicious polarization (Roberts, 2022).”
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Anduiza, E., Gallego, A., & Muñoz, J. (2013) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414013489081 · Cited by 331 · see citing works
Party Polarization and Mass Partisanship: A Comparative Perspective
Lupu, N. (2015) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-014-9279-z · Cited by 312 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Firstly, ideological polarization of po - litical parties was shown to increase partisanship (Iyengar et al., 2012; Lupu, 2015) and to enhance the effect of partisan cues (relative to substantive arguments) on political opinion formation (Druckman et al., 2013).”
BackgroundCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION: WHAT HAS PAST DECADE'S EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TAUGHT US? A SURVEY
Dimant, E., & Tosato, G. (2018) · doi:10.1111/joes.12198 · Cited by 300 · cited 1×
“A large body of literature has focused on the determinants of corruption (for a review see Dimant & Tosato, 2018), identifying numerous economic, social, and political factors.”
BackgroundDoes affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Maybe not
Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L., & Westwood, S. J. (2023) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12719 · Cited by 297 · see citing works
Does Affective Polarization Undermine Democratic Norms or Accountability? Maybe Not
Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L., & Westwood, S. (2020) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.31219/osf.io/9btsq · Cited by 214 · cited 1×
“Notably, the evidence is not completely unequivocal: a recent survey experiment found no relationship between affective polarization and democratic attitudes (Broockman et al., 2023).”
BackgroundThe relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence
Orhan, Y. E. (2022) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.2008912 · Cited by 198 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The mechanism has received broad support both intersections. east european journal of society and politics, 10(2): 21–33. from qualitative (Carothers & O’Donohue, 2019; McCoy & Somer, 2019) and quantitative accounts (Orhan, 2022) and has also been underpinned by gametheoretic models (Kiss, 2012).”
BackgroundClausen, J., Daniel, L., Hoch, N. J., et al. (2008) · Handbook on Space, Place and Law · doi:10.4135/9781446219249.n6 · Cited by 188 · cited 4×
“Secondly, ideological polarization also increases the weight of partisan cues in public opinion formation (Druckman et al., 2013) and hence decreases the electoral consequences of corruption.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Correlates of Discord: Identity, Issue Alignment, and Political Hostility in Polarized America
Bougher, L. D. (2017) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-016-9377-1 · Cited by 179 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Firstly, although the relationship between ideological and affective/pernicious polariza - tion is complex and debated, it seems that the former increases the latter (Bougher, 2017; Iyengar et al., 2012; Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016).”
BackgroundCorruption: Classification and analysis
Graycar, A. (2015) · Policy and Society · doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.001 · Cited by 174 · cited 1× · see citing works
“By contrast, a growing number of scholars highlight the importance of discerning different types of corruption (e.g. Ang, 2020; Graycar, 2015; Hajnal, 2024).”
BackgroundUnited we stand, divided we rule: how political polarization erodes democracy
Arbatli, E., & Rosenberg, D. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1818068 · Cited by 146 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…and unite various societal groups (McCoy et al., 2018) – animosi - ty between opposing groups and the perceived stakes of the political rivalry inflate and voters increasingly consider the opposing group illegitimate and an existential threat to their way of life (Arbatli & Rosenberg 2021).”
BackgroundPolitical Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison
Brown, D. S., Touchton, M., & Whitford, A. (2011) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.006 · Cited by 129 · cited 4× · see citing works
“…also re - ferred to as ideological polarization (Melki & Pickering, 2020), elite polarization (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008), and political polarization (Brown et al., 2011), and is usually measured either simply by the distance on a leftright scale (Melki & Pickering, 2020) or by the sum of parties’…”
InfluentialDavis, C. L., Camp, R. A., & Coleman, K. M. (2004) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414004265879 · Cited by 126 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Thirdly, the ideological distance between parties also makes opposition voters more likely to perceive the government as corrupt 1 (Davis et al., 2004). intersections. east european journal of society and politics, 10 (2): 21–33.”
BackgroundTransformations through Polarizations and Global Threats to Democracy
Somer, M., & McCoy, J. (2018) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716218818058 · Cited by 125 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…as ‘a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension, crosscutting differences become re inforcing, and people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of “us” versus “them”’ (Somer & McCoy, 2019, p. 13).”
BackgroundEngler, S. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1713106 · Cited by 120 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Furthermore, corruption fuels antiestablishment senti - ments, which are both employed and exacerbated by populist actors (Engler, 2020).”
BackgroundRoberts, K. M. (2022) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2021.14 · Cited by 116 · cited 1× · see citing works
“As pop - ulism (as an ideology) ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543), it fuels affective/pernicious polarization (Roberts, 2022).”
BackgroundPartisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal
Eggers, A. C. (2014) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00013140 · Cited by 91 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Eggers (2014) presents a model in which voters consider both the ideology and the integrity of candidates at elections.”
BackgroundTesta, C. (2010) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.04.010 · Cited by 50 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Firstly, it may re - duce corruption by enhancing accountability (Testa, 2010).”
BackgroundMotivated reasoning and democratic accountability
LITTLE, A. T., SCHNAKENBERG, K. E., & TURNER, I. R. (2022) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421001209 · Cited by 41 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…partisan cues in citi - zens’ political opinion formation (Bolsen et al., 2014; Druckman et al., 2013) and can deteri - orate democratic accountability by making voters less sensitive to new information and thus decrease politicians’ incentives to perform well (Little et al., 2022; Sartori, 2005).”
BackgroundUnbundling Corruption: Revisiting Six Questions on Corruption
Ang, Y. Y. (2019) · Global Perspectives · doi:10.1525/gp.2020.12036 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Unbundling Corruption: Revisiting Six Questions on Corruption
Yuen, Y.-A. (2020) · Global Perspectives · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3481412 · Cited by 34 · cited 1×
“By contrast, a growing number of scholars highlight the importance of discerning different types of corruption (e.g. Ang, 2020; Graycar, 2015; Hajnal, 2024).”
BackgroundPatkós, V. (2022) · Quality & Quantity · doi:10.1007/s11135-022-01350-8 · Cited by 29 · cited 1× · see citing works
“These conclusions are consistent with recent re - search on the economic effects of partisan polarization (Patkós, 2023).”
ResultTesta, C. (2012) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.04.005 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Polarization and corruption in America
Melki, M., & Pickering, A. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103397 · Cited by 19 · cited 6× · see citing works
“These mechanisms received broad empirical support from countrylevel panel analyses (Brown et al., 2011; Testa, 2010), a statelevel panel analysis from the United States (Melki & Pickering, 2020), and an interviewbased crosssectional analysis focusing on Latin American countries (Davis et al., 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialSame scandal, different interpretations: politics of corruption, anger, and partisan bias in Mexico
Cornejo, R. C. (2023) · Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2022.2120487 · Cited by 17 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Citi - zens evaluate corrupt actions differently depending on the partisan affiliation of the in - volved politician: they tend to be more forgiving with copartisan politicians and more condemning towards members of other parties (Anduiza et al., 2013; Cornejo, 2023).”
BackgroundHow to define and measure corruption
Mungiu‐Pippidi, A., & Fazekas, M. (2020) · doi:10.4337/9781789905007.00008 · Cited by 13
Corruption and partisan polarization: evidence from the European Union
Apergis, N., & Pinar, M. (2023) · Empirical Economics · doi:10.1007/s00181-022-02247-z · Cited by 7 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…(Fiorina & Abrams, 2008), and political polarization (Brown et al., 2011), and is usually measured either simply by the distance on a leftright scale (Melki & Pickering, 2020) or by the sum of parties’ ideological distance from the mean, weighted by their vote share (Apergis & Pinar, 2023).”
BackgroundDivisive politics and accountability
Kiss, A. (2012) · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.11.004 · Cited by 7 · cited 1×
“The mechanism has received broad support both intersections. east european journal of society and politics, 10(2): 21–33. from qualitative (Carothers & O’Donohue, 2019; McCoy & Somer, 2019) and quantitative accounts (Orhan, 2022) and has also been underpinned by gametheoretic models (Kiss, 2012).”
BackgroundHajnal, Á. (2025) · European Political Science · doi:10.1057/s41304-025-00514-y · Cited by 6 · cited 1× · see citing works
“By contrast, a growing number of scholars highlight the importance of discerning different types of corruption (e.g. Ang, 2020; Graycar, 2015; Hajnal, 2024).”
BackgroundSelf-citationIgnatieff, M. (2022) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2022.0033 · Cited by 3 · cited 1×
“Democratic institutions can be viewed as instruments to peacefully resolve disagree - ments that arise from this multiplicity (Ignatieff, 2022; Lipset, 1960).”
BackgroundRethinking corruption and democracy
Mungiu‐Pippidi, A. (2023) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781800379831.00011
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Carothers, T. & O'Donohue, A. (2019). Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization. Brookings Institution Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctvbd8j2p · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Hajnal, Á. (2025) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217251324306 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“These opposing propositions point toward a curvilinear relationship between ideological polarization and corruption (Hajnal, 2024).”
InfluentialSelf-citationHajnal, Á. (2025) · European Political Science · doi:10.1057/s41304-025-00514-y · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“For instance, such regimes often fuel political polarisation and partisan sentiment to reduce electoral retribution for corruption (Hajnal 2024).”
Self-citationShackle or hammer? How polarisation influences political corruption
Hajnal, Á., İnalcı, A., & Patkós, V. (2026) · East European Politics · doi:10.1080/21599165.2026.2686979
Self-citation
- Authors
- Hajnal, Á.
- Affiliations
- Corvinus University of Budapest (HU)
- Corresponding author
- Hajnal, Áron
- ORCID
- Hajnal, Áron
- Venue
- Intersections
- Publisher
- Intersections
- Published
- 2024-10-16
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 21-33
- ISSN
- 2416-089X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4403640323
- Semantic Scholar
- c123b6656117f34e40f575b8f700a2e3f475dd40
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2
- FWCI
- 2.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Intersections (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Repository of the Academy's Library (Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) (acceptedVersion)
- Corvinus Research Archive (Corvinus University of Budapest) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- political polarization, corruption, affective polarization, ideological polarization, democratic accountability, partisan bias, public opinion formation, vicious circle
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