The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A controlled field experiment on corruption
Overview
Integrity signals
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“In a subsequent study on the external validity of laboratory experiments on corruption, the same authors (Armantier & Boly, 2011), concluded that “Although a definitive answer to the external validity question has yet to be provided, these preliminary results provide some support to the external validity of lab experiments on corruption.””
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Armantier & Boly, 2011
In the citing paper
“Results show no difference between laboratory and field experiments (a result already known in the literature, see for example Armantier & Boly, 2011; Camerer 2012; Whang 2009), as the coefficient associated with the dummy variable is never statistically different from zero.”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Armantier & Boly, 2011
Citations
Cites
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002561 · Cited by 4,504
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
Akerlof, G. A. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885099 · Cited by 3,210
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues
Bardhan, P. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315126647-30 · Cited by 2,652
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
Leff, N. H. (1964) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276426400800303 · Cited by 2,616
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Olken, B. A. (2005) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/517935 · Cited by 1,949
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
Jain, A. K. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00133 · Cited by 1,393
Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries
Rauch, J. E., & Evans, P. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00044-4 · Cited by 1,232
Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey
Aidt, T. S. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00171.x · Cited by 1,200
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Camerer, C. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1977749 · Cited by 211
Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works
Gans‐Morse, J., da Silva, M. B. M., Makarin, A., Mannah-Blankson, T., Nickow, A. J., & Zhang, D. (2017) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.12.015 · Cited by 195
Women’s Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies
Esarey, J., & Schwindt‐Bayer, L. A. (2017) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123416000478 · Cited by 185
Leader corruption depends on power and testosterone
Bendahan, S., Zehnder, C., Pralong, F. P., & Antonakis, J. (2014) · The Leadership Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2014.07.010 · Cited by 177
Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging
Armantier, O., & Treich, N. (2010) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.008 · Cited by 157
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Armantier, O., & Boly, A.
- Affiliations
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York (US)
- United Nations Industrial Development Organization (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Armantier, Olivier
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-12
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1072-1082
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2007950074
- Cited by
- 146
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 22.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Keywords
- corruption, bribery, wage effects, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation, deterrence, religiosity, causes of corruption, field experiments
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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