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Cited by 109Economic Sanctions and International RelationsInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyGlobal trade and economics

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Understanding economic sanctions: Interdisciplinary perspectives on theory and evidence

Felbermayr, Gabriel, Morgan, T. Clifton, Syropoulos, Constantinos, Yotov, Yoto V.·2021·European Economic Review
DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103720
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Crossref · 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103720

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  • The effects of sanctions on economic development, trade flows, foreign direct investment, and growth are long-lasting and often persist even after sanctions are lifted.

    “Third, the effects of sanctions on economic development, trade flows, foreign direct investment, and growth are long-lasting and often persist even after sanctions are lifted.”

    From Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges (2023) · cites this paper as Felbermayr et al. (2021)

  • The effects of sanctions can be very heterogeneous depending on their type, whether they are imposed unilaterally or multilaterally, and the specifics of individual cases.

    “Fourth, the effects of sanctions can be very heterogeneous depending on their type (for example, trade versus financial sanctions or complete versus partial sanctions), on whether they are imposed unilaterally or multilaterally (for example, UN versus US sanctions), and on the specifics of individual cases.”

    From Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges (2023) · cites this paper as Felbermayr et al. (2021)

  • The impact of sanctions on various economic agents (firms and individuals), sectors, and specific activities in target states has been negative and significant.

    “First, the impact of sanctions on various economic agents (firms and individuals), sectors, and specific activities in target states has been negative and significant.”

    From Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges (2023) · cites this paper as Felbermayr et al. (2021)

Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 32

  1. Bapat, 2013, Determinants of sanctions effectiveness: sensitivity analysis using new data,, Int. Interact., 39, 79, 10.1080/03050629.2013.751298 · DOI
  2. Cortright, 2002, Smart sanctions: targeting economic statecraft, Ethics Int. Affairs, 16
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  10. Gutmann, 2019, Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights, Public Choice, 1
  11. Hufbauer, Gary, Oegg, Barbara, 2007. Economic Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes: A Survey of the Twentieth Century, in: William A. Kerr and James D. Gaisford (ed.), Handbook on International Trade Policy, chapter 47, Edward Elgar Publishing. · DOI
  12. Kaempfer, 2007, The political economy of economic sanctions, Handbook Def. Econ., 2, 867, 10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02027-8 · DOI
  13. Krustev, 2011, Ending economic coercion: Domestic politics and international bargaining, Conflict Manag. Peace Sci., 28, 351, 10.1177/0738894211413057 · DOI
  14. Lacy, 2004, A theory of economic sanctions and issue linkage: the roles of preferences, information, and threats, J. Politics, 66, 25, 10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x · DOI
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  18. Morgan, 2014, Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset, Conflict Manag. Peace Sci., 31, 541, 10.1177/0738894213520379 · DOI
  19. Morgan, 2009, The threat and imposition of sanctions 1971-2000, Conflict Manag. Peace Sci., 26, 92, 10.1177/0738894208097668 · DOI · Paper page
  20. Morgan, 1997, Fools suffer gladly: The use of economic sanctions in international crises, Int. Stud. Q., 41, 27, 10.1111/0020-8833.00032 · DOI · Paper page
  21. Whang, 2014, Designing foreign policy: voters, special interest groups and economic sanctions, J. Peace Res., 51, 589, 10.1177/0022343314533811 · DOI · Paper page
  22. Neuenkirch, Matthias, and Florian Neumeier, (2015), “The Impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth,” FIW Working Paper series, FIW, 138. · DOI
  23. Neuenkirch, 2016, The impact of US sanctions on poverty, J. Devel. Econ., 121, 110, 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.03.005 · DOI
  24. Powell, 1993, Guns, butter, and anarchy, Am. Politic. Sci. Rev., 87, 115, 10.2307/2938960 · DOI
  25. Powell, 1996, Bargaining in the shadow of power, Games Econ. Behav., 15, 255, 10.1006/game.1996.0068 · DOI
  26. Powell, 2006, War as a commitment problem, Int. Org., 60, 169, 10.1017/S0020818306060061 · DOI
  27. Schelling, Thomas C., “Arms and influence,” Yale University Press, 1966. · DOI
  28. Skaperdas, 2001, Guns, butter and openness: on the relationship between security and trade, Am. Econ. Rev., 91, 353, 10.1257/aer.91.2.353 · DOI
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Metadata

Authors
Felbermayr, G., Morgan, T. C., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, Y. V.
Affiliations
  • Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel (DE)
  • Rice University (US)
  • Drexel University (US)
Corresponding author
Felbermayr, Gabriel
ORCID
Venue
European Economic Review
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2021-06
Volume
135
Pages
103720
ISSN
0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103720
OpenAlex
W3142487165
Cited by
109
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 2
FWCI
11.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
Keywords
economic sanctions, sanctions effectiveness, sanctions impact, interdisciplinary collaboration

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