Rationalist explanations for war
Abstract
Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.
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Whether the use of violence is a viable option depends critically on state capacity to uphold the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.
“Although environmental or other grievances may motivate societal groups to challenge the status quo, whether the use of violence is a viable option depends critically on state capacity to uphold the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.”
From Vicious Circles: Violence, Vulnerability, and Climate Change (2021) · cites this paper as [120]
Strategic uncertainty and the inability to credibly commit to peaceful agreements are widely recognised as two of the major causes of costly conflict.
“Strategic uncertainty and the inability to credibly commit to peaceful agreements are widely recognised as two of the major causes of costly conflict (Blattman, 2023; Fearon, 1995).”
From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (2025) · cites this paper as Fearon, 1995
In high-stakes situations, extreme pressures for agents to defect may make trust harder to establish and potentially lead to conflict.
“Even if it is possible to provide assurances around the day-to-day performance of most AI agents, in high-stakes situations there may be extreme pressures for agents to defect against others, making trust harder to establish, and potentially leading to conflict (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006, see also Section 2.2).”
From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (2025) · cites this paper as Fearon, 1995
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- Authors
- Fearon, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Fearon, James D.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1995
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 379-414
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2047156377
- Cited by
- 3,995
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 142 · 2025: 239 · 2024: 261 · 2023: 241 · 2022: 153 · 2021: 217 · 2020: 288 · 2019: 283 · 2018: 178 · 2017: 159 · 2016: 216 · 2015: 168 · 2014: 165 · 2013: 165 · 2012: 151
- FWCI
- 93.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Keywords
- interstate war, negotiated settlement, bargaining, private information, information asymmetry, credible commitment
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