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Cited by 45Corporate Finance and GovernanceBanking stability, regulation, efficiencyRisk Management in Financial Firms

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Better safe than sorry. Bank corporate governance, risk-taking, and performance

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Brogi, Marina, Lagasio, Valentina·2022·Finance Research Letters
DOI 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102039
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Metadata

Authors
Brogi, M., & Lagasio, V.
Affiliations
Sapienza University of Rome (IT)
Corresponding author
Brogi, Marina
ORCID
Venue
Finance Research Letters
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2022-01
Volume
44
Pages
102039
ISSN
1544-6123 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.frl.2021.102039
OpenAlex
W3145146662
Cited by
45
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 6
FWCI
8.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Finance research letters (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • BOA (University of Milano-Bicocca) (submittedVersion)
  • IRIS Research product catalog (Sapienza University of Rome) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Risk Management in Financial Firms
Keywords
bank governance, board independence, board size, board diversity, board tenure, risk-taking, bank performance, bank solvency, agency theory

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