Exploiting traffic periodicity in industrial control networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Industrial control systems play a major role in the operation of critical infrastructure assets. Due to the polling mechanisms typically used to retrieve data from field devices, industrial control network traffic exhibits strong periodic patterns. This paper presents a novel approach that uses message repetition and timing information to automatically learn traffic models that capture the periodic patterns. The feasibility of the approach is demonstrated using three traffic traces collected from real-world industrial networks. Two practical applications for the learned models are presented. The first is their use in intrusion detection systems; the learned models represent whitelists of valid commands and the frequencies at which they are sent; thus, the models may be used to detect data injection and denial-of-service attacks. The second application is to generate synthetic traffic traces, which can be used to test intrusion detection systems and evaluate the performance of industrial control devices.
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Citations
Cites
A taxonomy of network and computer attacks
Hansman, S., & Hunt, R. (2005) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2004.06.011 · Cited by 402 · cited 1×
“Hence, the following discussion is based on some of the general attack classes proposed in [17].”
BackgroundReview of security issues in industrial networks
Cheminod, M., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2012.2198666 · Cited by 349 · cited 1×
“Due to the presence of large numbers of zero-day attacks, anomaly-based intrusion detection in industrial control networks is of particular interest [8].”
BackgroundAccurate modeling of modbus/TCP for intrusion detection in SCADA systems
Goldenberg, N., & Wool, A. (2013) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.05.001 · Cited by 323 · cited 9×
“Based on the observa- tion that traffic exchanged between a human–machine inter- face (HMI) and a programmable logic controller consists of requests for the same values being sent periodically, Gold- enberg and Wool attempted to model Modbus traffic using a deterministic finite automaton (DFA).”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Cited by
SICARD, F., ZAMAI, É., & FLAUS, J.-M. (2019) · Reliability Engineering & System Safety · doi:10.1016/j.ress.2019.03.020 · Cited by 25
Lin, X., Yao, Y., Hu, B., Yang, W., Zhou, X., Li, G., & Zhang, W. (2025) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3526599 · Cited by 9
“During the model training phase, we start with data preprocessing, where industrial control protocol (ICP) packets are extracted [17] from the raw traffic.”
Exploiting the temporal behavior of state transitions for intrusion detection in ICS/SCADA
Kabasele Ndonda, G., & Sadre, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3213080 · Cited by 8
“If the training set is too small, it can result in over-fitted models that do not tolerate small deviations that can be often found in real systems (the problem of naturally occurring deviations has been addressed in the design of an IDS described in [18]).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Barbosa, R. R. R., Sadre, R., & Pras, A.
- Venue
- International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 13
- Pages
- 52-62
- ISSN
- 1874-5482 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2289626424
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Barbosa, R. R. R., Sadre, R., & Pras, A. (2016). Exploiting traffic periodicity in industrial control networks. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2016.02.004
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